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Abstract
This thesis describes an operational research study apply-
ing decision theory and quantitative methods to the problems
of competitive bidding. The study was provided with data and
information by four English building construction companies.
First a preliminary feasibility study was conducted which
indicated that the potential for substantial benefits exists. Then
the decision problem was formulated in a quantitative manner
,
which allows treatment of the variation due to estimating
uncertainty, and of the constraining effect of resources. The
Friedman model and some of the published variants were
presented and discussed. This led to the development of i
General Distribution decision model which incorporates
managerial assessment of the competition into a probabilistic
framework. This Model, four Friedman variants, and a feed-
back model were tested with data supplied by the participating
companies. The sample was too small for the results to be
conclusive but they did indicate that the basic Friedman Model
and the General Distribution Model can equal or outperform
actual company behaviour. Partial implementation of the
General Distribution Model indicated that it may be practicable.
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List of Major Symbols
Except where specified otherwise, the following
notation is used.
A.	 - the arithmetic mean of bids submitted on contract i.
- the present value of dispersements associated with
contract i.
a21 	 - the present value of the income stream associated
with contract i.
- the regression coefficients used in Section 3.4.1.
Cih	 - the amount of resource h available in time period j.
d..	 - the amount of money dispersed on contract i in the
j th period.
e.	 - the variation in value of contract i due to estimate
uncertainty.
E( ) - the expected value function.
F( ) - the cumulative distribution function of f( ).
G( ) - the complementary cumulative distribution function
of f( ).
- a subscript identifying the contract.
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k	 - the estimated cost.
10	 - the corrected estimated cost = Z(R, n)k
k.	 - the estimated cost of contract i.1
K	 - the vector of estimated costs, ki
1	 - the cost of preparing and submitting a bid
- a negative quantity.
11.	 - the cost of preparing and submitting a bid
on contract i - a negative quantity.
L -	 the vector of costs, li
n	 - the number of competitors on a contract.
N - the number of bidders on a contract.
(Also used in Chapter 4 as the number of contracts
in the set. )
P - the probability of winning a contract.
Pi(xi) -	 the probability of winning contract i with a bid
of x.1
q	 - (Chapter 5) the number of bids in the histogram.
q--	 - (Chapter 2) the amount of money received fromij
contract i at the end of the j th period.
r	 - discounting rate.
R	 - (no subscript) - the range of estimating accuracy.
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Rh.. 	- (Chapter 4) the amount of resource hij
required by contract i in time period j.
S	 -	 the set of opportunities to bid.
t	 -	 the length of time period j.
u1.	 -	 (Chapter 2) the variation in value due to
contract uncertainty.
- (Chapter 4) Kuhn-Tucker multiplier.
ujh
V	 -	 value.
Vi(xi) -	 the value of contract i if it is won with a bid of x.1
w1.	 -	 (Chapter 4) Kuhn-Tucker multiplier.
x	 -	 bid value.
x.	 -	 the bid value on contract i.1
X	 - the vector of bid values, xi
Y	 -	 lowest competitor's bid.
- the lowest competitor's bid on contract i.yi
(Also used in Section 3.4.2 and Appendix 3 as
order statistics.)
I'	 -	 vector of lowest competitor's bid, yi
MR, n) - the multiplier that corrects the expected error in
the estimated cost.
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?r	 - (Chapter 4) the expected remaining resources.
+	 - a multiplier to convert an estimated cost into
a bid.
01.	 - the managerial assessment of the arithmetic mean
of the competitors' bids on contract i.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The 1956 paper of L. Friedman, "A Competitive
Bidding Strategy" (11)*, presented the first published
probabilistic approach to competitive bidding. Since that
time, a considerable volume of operational research
literature has dealt with the problems of competitive bidding.
This literature has produced a feast of decision models, but
a famine of experimental verifications and reported
applications.
Competitive bidding is used extensively in the con-
struction industry.
This thesis is an operational research study of
competitive bidding in the construction industry.
* The numbers in brackets refer to similarly numbered
entries in the Bibliography.
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1. 1 PROBLEMS
The general "Management Problem" to which this
research is addressed is:
Within the prescribed boundaries, what are the optimal 
decisions relative to the management objectives?
In other words, which of the alternative choices available
should the decision maker select? This problem is called the
"Competitive Bidding Problem".
For this study, the Management Problem poses two
questions. One is determining the relevant decisions in the
situation; the other is determining how to make these decisions.
The first question is concerned with the formulation of a
general model; the second with the suitability of specific
decision models.
1.2 OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this thesis are:
-3-
I. To formulate the construction industry Competitive
Bidding (Management) Problem in a precise manner.
ii. To devise a method of incorporating managerial judgment
into a quantitative decision model.
iii. To develop a quantitative model of the Competitive
Bidding Problem so that a mathematical optimum can
be calculated.
iv. To evaluate empirically six operational research decision
models - four taken from the literature, two developed in
the thesis.
1.3. STRUCTURE
Research of this type does not follow in an orderly
hypothesis-experiment-conclusion sequence but rather is
characterised by cycles with the experiments and conclusions
causing redefinition of the hypothesis The several different
objectives also contribute to the disorder. To provide a
structure for the logical exposition of the research this thesis
is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 is this Introduction;
Chapter 6 is the Summary and Conclusions; Chapters 2, 3,
4, and 5 comprise the body.
-4-
The central chapters each commence with an
introductory section and conclude with a summary. These
sections provide the transition between the chapters and out-
line the relevance of each to the general problems and
objectives.
Chapter 1, this Introduction, states the general problem,
delineates the objectives, and outlines the structure of the thesis.
Chapter 2 is the Problem Description where a precise
account of the Competitive Bidding Problem is presented.
Chapter 3 deals with methods of accommodating the
lowest bid made by competitors. This value is the
uncontrollable variable in the decision situation. Several
existing decision models are analysed and a new model is
developed.
Chapter 4 is a mathematical formulation of the
Competitive Bidding Problem. A model for the N contract,
resource constrained, sequential bidding case is developed
and a solution method proposed.
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Chapter 5 investigates the suitability of specific models.
Six decision models are tested with historical data and the
results evaluated. Partial implementation is also used to
evaluate the models.
Chapter 6 summarises the findings of the research
and presents the conclusions.
!CHAPTER 2: PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
1
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a reason and
conceptual basis for the research. The title of the research
is general - "A Study of Competitive Bidding with particular
reference to the Construction Industry" - whereas the
research is specific - a study of operational research bidding
models based upon information from three construction firms.
This chapter provides the transition from the general to the
specific.
The Management Problem was stated generally as:
Within the prescribed boundaries, what are the optimal
decisions  relative to the management objectives. This chapter
makes this general statement specific by delineating the
boundaries, isolating the decisions, and quantifying the
objectives.
-7-
In addition to the two questions mentioned in Chapter 1,
there is a third question - Should the research be done?
Since there has been considerable research done on competitive
bidding, the possibility that all reasonable approaches have been
investigated must be considered. This question is dealt with in
section 2. 4, Feasibility Study.
The methods employed are varied to suit the subject
matter. A descriptive exposition of the industry is used to
qualitatively define the boundaries. A schematic model is
developed from a description of the decision process. Empirical
testing and interviews were used to determine feasibility, and a
quantitative objective function is developed from an analysis of
the decision variables.
This Chapter provides the foundation - boundaries;
decisions; objectives; and feasibility - upon which the research
is based.
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2. 2 STUDY AREA
2. 2.1 Construction Industry
The description of the Study Area is a progression from
the general to the specific. The starting point therefore is
a general definition of the construction industry. This is
provided by Standard Industrial Classification Order XVII
which covers:
Erecting and repairing bridges of all types. Constructing and
repairing roads and bridges; erecting steel and reinforced
concrete structures, concrete, other civil engineering works
such as laying sewers and gas mains, erecting overhead line
supports and aerial masts, open cast coal mining , etc. The
building and civil engineering establishments of Defence and
other Government Departments are included. Establishments
specialising in demolition work or in sections of construction
work such as asphalting, electric wiring, flooring, glazing,
painting, plastering, plumbing, roofing. The hiring of
contractors plant and scaffolding are included.
There are many excellent references (see Bibliography)
describing the myriad features of the construction industry and
there is little point in duplicating these works or reproducing
the many statistics which are available. The following are
included only to provide an appreciation of the size and importance
of the industry.
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- The value of the industry output in the United Kingdom
is approximately one-eighth of the Gross National Product. The
1964 figure for total value was £ 3, 614,000, 000. (6)
- The construction industry of the United Kingdom
contains over 80, 000 firms. (6)
- The construction industry employs approximately
six percent of the working population. (38)
From these it can be seen that the construction industry
is of national importance and is comprised of many firms.
Firms in the construction industry are characterised
by diversity and versatility and these factors complicate any
attempt at classification. The use of any one base for class-
ification produces anomalies. For example, ranking firms on
the basis of assets, or job size, or number of employees, will
probably result in three different ranking orders since it is not
uncommon for the low assets, one man firm using sub-contractors
to be competing for the same job as the larger firm which has
several hundred employees. Divisions such as: Civil
Engineering; Building; Speciality; and Maintenance, also get
confused because the largest firms accommodate several or
all of these types of work and several jobs combine them. An
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example is a power station - Building and Electrical - with
extensive site works - Civil Engineering. The movement
between classifications also occurs, for example the
speciality contractor who becomes a general contractor for
one project. Obviously, then any classification or description
of a segment of the industry must be a general one based upon
an understanding of the norms and not attempting precise
identification.
The research is based upon one segment of the
construction industry. To delineate the boundaries of this
segment all small contractors, specialised and speciality
contractors, maintenance contractors, etc., are excluded,
and the remaining firms are classified using two character-
istics - contractual risk and resource constraints.
A distinction is made in this thesis between contractual)(
risk and uncertainty. Contractual risk relates to the occurrence
of low probability events of major consequence. These events
usually result in substantial cost increases which must be
borne by the contractor. For example: on bridge sub-structure
construction the once-in-one-hundred-year flood which swamps
the machinery and destroys the formwork is contractual risk;
in tunnelling the unexpected quicksand pocket is contractual
risk. Uncertainty, as defined here, relates to the consequence
of more probable situations. For example: on some firm
price contracts it can be assumed that over the duration of
the contract the costs of labour and materials will rise. What
..\.. is not known is when and by how much they will rise - this is
the uncertainty. Thus contractual risk relates to the occurrence
of unexpected events, uncertainty to the consequences of
situations that can be anticipated. Contractual risk and
uncertainty are present in practically all construction work.
Resources, (men, plant, materials, and capital) are
utilized in some manner on all contracts. Some contracts and
some companies have or cause major resource constraints,
others have or do not. The large motorway contract which
requires a fleet of earth moving plant constrains the market to
those firms which possess or can obtain the plant. The firms
that possess the plant are further constrained by its availibility.
The building contract which requires only local labour and a
tower crane, which can be rented, presents few constraints to
the market.
The construction industry, after excluding all the small
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firms, can be divided into two major groupings - General
Building Construction and Civil Engineering Construction.
Firms that practice both offer no problem since they tend to
adopt a division structure which separates the two and thus
can be treated as two firms.
Civil Engineering Construction usually: is designed by
)(
civil engineers; requires the contractor to utilize a quantity
of large, expensive, specialised plant; and is constructed in
accordance with either the Institute of Civil Engineers,
"General Conditions of Contract for Works of Civil Engineering
Construction", or the, "General Conditions of Government
Contract for Buildings and Civil Engineering Works, Form
CCC/Wks/l". Examples of civil engineering work are motor-
ways, dams, harbours, airports, and bridges. There is often
a high element of contractual risk in Civil Engineering
Construction.
General Building Construction usually: is designed by
an architect; requires little specialised plant; and is constructed
in accordance with the Royal Institute of British Architects'
(RD3A) "Standard Form of Contract". Only minor contractual
risk is usually present in Building Construction and when a
situation of high risk is apparent, it is often provided for in the
GENERAL BUILDING CIVIL ENGINEERING
RESOURCES minimal constraint constrained
CONTRACTUAL
RISK low high
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contract conditions and the client, not the contractor, bears
the cost.
Considering therefore the extreme positions, the
characteristics of the division; General Building, Civil
Engineering are summarised in the table below.
These differences give rise to two different competitive
situations.
The resource requirements of Civil Engineering intro-
duce differences into the valuation of contracts. If a firm has
unemployed plant, or specialised plant, or plant located near
the proposed work, its situation is obviously different to that
of a firm which has not. The resource requirements also make
it difficult for firms to enter or leave the market since
considerable capital is required to establish, say, a fleet of
machines and its disbursement can result in large losses. The
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high element of contractual risk also makes entry difficult since
the firms require skilled personnel and capital to handle the
high risk situation and these are often in short supply. The
i
result is a market with a small number of identifiable competitors,
each possessing a substantial amount of information about the
capabilities and intentions of the others.
The Building Construction Market is the opposite. The
minimal resource constraints and low risk enable firms to
enter and leave the market with ease. Very little specialised
plant is employed and the methods and procedures are generally
uniform throughout the industry. The availability of site staff
is not the problem it is in Civil Engineering; one company inter-
viewed suggested that the half-life of senior site staff was
approximately 2 years. Cost estimates are prepared with the
same general procedure by most firms and only some specific
company policy such as, for instance, keeping certain staff
employed, or doing prestige buildings, can result in one company
valuing a contract differently from another. The result is a
market with a large number of competitors and only minor
valuation differences being placed upon the contracts by these
firms.
It is the Building Construction Market that is studied
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here. That is, a market where there is low risk, and few
resource constraints. A market where all competitors tend
to place roughly the same value on a contract and where there
exist so many competitors that is A uneconomic to obtain data
that would be useful for predicting their individual behaviour.
2.2.2 Building Construction Process
Although there is little contractual risk in Building
Construction, there is often a great deal of uncertainty. This
uncertainty affects the functioning of the competitive bidding
process. To determine how and where uncertainty enters the
problem, the Building Construction Process is examined.
The Tavistock Report (34) defined the Building Process
as:
"The whole series of activities required between the initiating
point of a client's need and the production of a building to
fulfill that need".
The process can be described as the following set of
steps:
-16-
CLIENT
I
SPONSOR
I
BRIEF
I
DESIGN
I
BILL OF QUANTITIES
I
SELECTION OF CONTRACTOR
I
CONSTRUCTION
This is not an all inclusive description covering all variations,
but is a rough description of the process.
The Client, having determined that he has need of a
building, contacts some person or organisation within, or
connected to, the construction industry. This person or
organisation, who could be an architect, quantity surveyor,
speculator, engineer, contractor, etc., is called the Sponsor.
The Sponsor, together with the Client, draws up a Brief of the
Client's requirements. The Brief may be a set of unrecorded
ideas in the Sponsor's head, or it may be a voluminous
manuscript that clearly defines the required building down to
the last fitting, or it may be anything in between.
After the Brief is prepared, the specialist designers,
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(soils engineers, services engineers, structural engineers,
architects), are employed and the detailed Design work is
carried out.
From the Design a Bill of Quantities is prepared. The
Bill of Quantities is a description in words of every operation
which the contractor will have to carry out to give effect to
the plans and specifications. The Bill is prepared in accordance
with some predefined method of measurement; for example,
the Standard Method of Measurement of the Joint Committee of
the R. I. C. S and the N. F. B. T. E.
A Contractor is selected to construct the proposed
facility. This selection is usually done by competitive bidding
based upon the Bill of Quantities, or the design drawings and
specifications, or both. Selection by negotiation is also done
by some clients but the industry norm is competitive bidding.
Once the contractor has been selected he proceeds to
construct the facility in accordance with the contract instruct-
ions.
This brief description of the building process can be
compared with the R. I. B. A. Plan of Work reproduced on the
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following page. There the Client-Sponsor-Brief Phase are
seen as Stages A, B, C, and D. The Design Phase, Stages
E and F. The Bill of Quantities, Stage G, and the Selection
of the Contractor, Stage H. The Construction Phase
encompasses Stages J, K, and L.
This is the description of the Building Construction
Process that is usually found in the literature. It is an
organised process, with specified responsibilities, and little
opportunity for uncertainty. This process is called the
"Formal Building Process" by the Tavistock Study (34),
because:
"The system is formal in that theoretically it is the way in
which the control of the building process works. ... It forms
the basis of written information about the building process".
The Study then goes on to state:
"The formal system of controls, or directive functions, is
not very directly manifested in actual behaviour and, if our
information were based only upon the behaviour of the
building team on the job, we might never have become aware
of the formal system in its true form".
The formal system is how the construction process is
supposed to function, not how it does. On actual projects the
sequential finality of the described phases is rarely present.
To provide tho client with an
appraisal and recommendation
in order that he may determine
the form in which the project is
to proceed, ensuring that it is
feasible, functionally, technically
and financially.
Carry out studies of user
requirements. site conditions.
planning, design, and cost, etc..
as necessary to reach decisions.
Clients' representatives
architects, engineers. and
OS according to nature of
project.
A. Feasibility
To determine general appronh
to layout, design and construction
in order to obtain authoritative
approval of the client on the
outline proposals and accom-
panying report.
Develop the brief further. Carry
out studies on user requirements.
technical problems, planning,
design and costs, as necessary
to reach decisions.
All client interests, architects.
engineers, OS and specialists
as required.
B. Outline
Proposals
Sketch
Plans
To complete the brief and decide
on particular proposals, including
planning arrangement.
appearance, constructional
method, outline specification,
and cost, and to obtain all
approvals.
Final development of the brief, full
design of the project by architect
preliminary design by engineers,
preparation of cost plan and full
explanatory report Submission
of proposals for all approvals.
All client interests, architects.
engineers, OS and specialists
and all statutory and other
approving authorities.
C. Scheme
Design
Action In accordance with
pares. 6-10 inclusive of
Project Management'.
Action in accordance with
pares. 5-10 inclusive of
'Project Management'.
J. Project
Planning
•••••
K. Operations Action in accordance with

Action in accordance with

Architects, engineers,
on Site pares. 11-14 inclusive of  pares. 11-14 inclusive of  contractors. sub-contracting.
'Project Management'. 'Project Management's OS, client.
L Completion Action In accordance with
pares. 15-18 inclusive of
'Project Management'.
Action In accordance with
paras. 15-18 inclusive of
'Project Management'.
Architects. engineers,
convector, OS, client.
Site
Operations
Contractor,
sub-contractors,
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Outline Plan of Work
Stage	 Purpose of work and 	 Tasks to be done	 People directly	 Usual
Decisions to be reached
	 involved	 Terminology
A. Inception To prepare general outline of
 Set up client organisation for  All client interests. architect
 Briefing
requirements and plan future briefing. Consider requirements,
action. appoint architect.
Brief should not be modified after this point.
E. Demi'
Design
Working
Drawings
To obtain final decision on every
matter related to design,
specification, construction and cost.
Full design of every part and
component of the building by
collaboration of all concerned.
Complete cost checking of designs.
Architects, OS engineers and
specialists, contractor (if
appointed).
Any further change in location, size, shape. or cost after this time will result in abortive work.
F. Production  To prepare production inlorma-

Information	 bon and make final detailed
decisions to carry out work.
Pi reparation of final production
information, i.e. drawings,
schedules and specifications.
Architects, engineers and
Specialists, contractor (if
appointed).
G. Bills of To prepare and complete all

Preparation of Bills of Quantities  Architects, OS, contractor (if
Quantities information and arrangements and tender documents. appointed).
for obtaining tender.
H. Tender Action as recommended in  Action as recommended in
 Architects. OS,

Action paras. 7-14 inclusive of pares. 7-14 inclusive of engineers, contractor, client.
'Selective Tendering'. 'Selective Tendering'.
M. Feed-Back

To analyse the management,  Analysis of lob records.  Architect. engineers. OS,
construction and performance Inspection of completed building.  contractor, client
of the project Studies of building in use.
•Pubikation of Nation*/ Joint Consultative Council of Archlteets. Quantity Suiveyoes and Builders.
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Bills of Quantities are prepared from sketch plans and the
building can be completed before the Brief is finalised. An
amusing description of a "normal" project can be found in the
appendix of the Tavistock publication, Interdependence and
Uncertainty (34).
It is in the actual functioning of the process that the
*uncertainty arises. The ad hoc techniques, and general crisis
atmosphere of a construction site, coupled with changes in the
specifications by clients, and operative mistakes produce a
very uncertain situation.
The uncertainty present in a construction project is
classified in this thesis under two categories: Estimating
Uncertainty, and Construction Uncertainty. Construction
Uncertainty is caused by the variable nature of the project
due to client changes, construction errors, personality
conflicts, etc. Estimating Uncertainty is caused by information
gaps and the subjective nature of estimating. The influence of
these uncertainities is discussed in Section 2. 5.2. The
sources of Estimating Uncertainty are examined in Section 2. 3.2.
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2. 2. 3 The Sample Companies
This study was provided with data and assistance by
three construction firms. Two of these firms operate a
division structure in which the project selection, estimating,
and decision on final tender price is the responsibility of
divisional management. Since each division is a semi-
autonomous decision unit, it can be treated as a separate
company. Thus the three firms were able to provide data for
four "companies". The firms wish to remain anonymous and
so they are referred to as Companies A, B, C, and D.
For each Company there is a data set, which is a
"chapter" in the bidding history of a company. A data set
consists of a series of contracts which the company has bid on
over a period of time. Each set is headed with a brief
description of the type of work, and the time period concerned.
For each contract in the data set there is the following inform-
ation.
a sequence number;
the sample company's estimated cost;
the sample company's submitted bid;
the number of competitors;
the competitors' bids;
and in some cases, the names of the competitors. Appendix
-22-
1, Sample Companies' Data, contains a more detailed
description of the data. The contents of the data sets are
summarised in the table below.
SAMPLE COMPANY DATA SETS
Number of
Time	 Number of Contracts 	 different
Period	 Provided	 Usable	 Competitors
Company A 12 mo. 37 34 65
Company B 12 mo. 43 41 81
Company C 9 mo. 41 37
Company D 19 mo. 51 41 100
The four sample companies possess the following common
characteristics:
i. They are all building construction firms operating in the
south of England.
ii. They obtain a large portion of their work load by competitive
bidding.
iii. Most of the contracts in the data sets are Bill of Quantities
type and use It I. B. A. terms and conditions.
iv. The contracts in the data set do not call for any specialised
techniques, patented process, or specialised plant which
-23-
would give any firm a competitive advantage.
These common features describe the Study Area.
This research is concerned with competitive bidding in the
Building Construction Industry where:
i. There are a large number of potential competitors for
each project.
ii. There is little product differentiation.
iii. There is little differentiation between companies.
iv. The resource constraints are minimal.
These are the boundaries of the Management Problem.
-24-
2. 3 MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
2. 3.1	 Competitive Bidding
Competitive' bidding is defined as:
A situation in which a number of contestants (bidders), each
submit to a client a price (bid) in return for which they are
willing to perform certain specified services. The winning
price is determined by some pre-arranged judging procedure
(usually the lowest price submitted*) which is known to the
client and to the contestants.
The contestants do not know each others bid before the
judging.** They may know them after.
Non-price features such as delivery times, client bias, etc.
as mentioned by Simmonds (29) are not normally considered
in the judging.
Of the many variants of competitive bidding, the two in
general use in the construction industry are: Open Competitive
Bidding - in which the competition is open to anyone who wishes
to compete; and Selective Tendering - where competition is
restricted to a few chosen competitors. These two methods
* But not always, see reference 16.
** This may not necessarily always be true in actual fact.
However, this thesis is studying competitive bidding, not colusive
bidding; even though it is probably easier to achieve an optimum
in the colusive case. For an example of the latter, see The
Times, 20 March 1970, news item "Contractors" p honey'
bids spur inquiry".
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have been major subjects in the Banwell (32), Emmerson (33),
and Simon (36) reports. Open Bidding being used for reasons
of public accountability and Selective Tendering being
recommended as conducive to improving the efficiency of the
industry. For this thesis, it is irrelevant which of the two
variants is used. However, the use of Selective Tendering
simplifies the OR problem by controlling the number of
competitors and thus allowing their number to be predicted with
reasonable accuracy.
Competitive bidding is the normal method of contractor
x selection. That it is not necessarily a sound process is
recognised by the industry. This point of view is illustrated
by the following quotations.
From the Building Industry Survey (38);
"One result of the open tendering system has been that success-
ful main contractors drive hard bargains with sub-contractors
with the frequent result that the sub-contractor who gets the job
is tempted to use inferior materials and lower the quality of
his workmanship. Several sub-contractors have told us that
they could not make some jobs pay under the present system
unless they used inferior materials."
From the Emmerson Report (33);
"Open tendering is still common although this prejudices the
firm which maintains a high standard of work and the building
owner does not get the best value from the lowest tender."
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From "Construction and Professional Management" (26);*
"It is partly the process of awarding contracts to the lowest
bidder that accounts for construction contracting having among
the lowest gross profit margins of all the industries, about one
percent for 1964."
In view of this condemnation, is competitive bidding
likely to be replaced by some other process? Reported
attitudes and behaviour suggest no. To quote the Banwell
Report (32);
"Many clients consider that a building can only be secured at
the lowest possible cost if each job is advertised and all
contractors are free to quote a price in competition."
Moreover in addition to the attitude of clients, it would appear
that the account of cost and quality erosion to which reference
has been made may not be generally valid. Judging from the
attitudes of the sample companies, competitive bidding does
not result in competition based upon costs, or profit margins,
but actually produces a lottery in which the inherent uncertainty
of the process decides the winner. Evidence to support this
contention is the fact that all four companies used almost
identical methods of determining the costs and then all used
almost the same percentage mark-ups to arrive at their bid
prices.
* American Reference
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2. 3.2 Estimating and Tendering Procedure
Thus inherent uncertainties appear to be the key to the
workings of the competitive bidding process. One source of
these uncertainties is the estimating and tendering procedure.
The management decisions which are the focus of this research
are part of the estimating and tendering procedure. Therefore,
to isolate these decisions, and to examine this source of
uncertainty, the procedure is investigated.
The estimating and tendering procedure, from receipt of
the invitation to tender through to the notification of success or
failure, is thoroughly described in the "Code of Estimating
Practice", published in 1966 by The Institute of Building (6 ).
The flow chart reproduced on the following page illustrates the
major stages and items of the procedure.
The Code also defines the following terms:
Estimating - is the technical process of predicting cost of
construction.
Tendering - is the separate and subsequent commercial
function based upon the estimate.
Adjudication - is the action taken by management to convert
an estimate into a tender.
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It is convenient to consider the Procedure as three
stages.
I - The Decision to Tender: in which a management decision
is made based upon a preliminary examination of the
specific contract and consideration of the company's
position and market environment.
II - Estimating: which includes sections 4 and 5 of the
Code diagram and is the technical process of arriving
at an estimated cost figure.
- Tendering: which can include declining the contract, and
is the management decision on the bid (tender) price to
submit; based upon an intensive examination of the
specific contract, the competition, the company, and the
market.
Considering the Estimating Stage first, the Code states:
"An estimate must be prepared in a way that is explicit and
consistent and which takes account of methods of construction
and all circumstances which may affect the execution of work
on the project. It is believed that such a sound estimate can
only be achieved when each operation is analysed into its
simplest elements and/ the cost estimated methodically on the
basis of factual information."
This presents estimating as a careful, thorough process by
which a valid estimated cost is obtained. Yet this is contradicted
by P. F. Miller*, who has stated:
"Estimating is the last of the folkcrafts in the construction
industry."
Moreover, examination of the workings of the estimation
procedure reveals some basis for Miller's statement.
*Statement made while presenting a paper, "Cost Control for
Contractors", at the Operational Research Society Construction
Industry Study Group Conference at the Loughborough University
of Technology, Sept. 17, 1969.
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Estimates are usually prepared from a Bill of Quantities.
A conventional definition of a Bill of Quantities is found in
reference 6:
"A Bill of Quantities is a description in words of every operation
which the contractor will have to carry out to give effect to the
architect's plans and specifications, prepared in accordance
with the Standard Method of Measurement of the Joint Committee
of the R. I. C.S and the N. F.B. T.E. or the Scottish Mode of
Measurement. Numerical measurements are set against each
item and space is left for the builder to set his price against each."
A different, and perhaps more appropriate description of a
Bill of Quantities was provided by the Tavistock Institute Report
(15) where they described it as a "hypothetical construct".
The extent to which the Bill of Quantities is hypothetical
is indicated by the fact that the design is often not completed
when the Bill is prepared. Some design details are left until
just before construction. The author's limited experience*
suggests that the bill is rarely prepared from completed drawings
and specifications because these do not exist when the bill is
drawn up. Therefore the Bill must contain a number of
provisional items and "guess - timates" if it is to describe the
desired building even inadequately. Therefore the builders are
not estimating some precise, clearly defined and detailed project,
but they are competing for the right to build some hypothetical
project. The potential for a refined estimate of the construction
cost cannot exist in the absence of a completed design.
*Six months in the employ of an engineering consulting firm in
London.
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The Bill of Quantities is so used to provide the bidders
with a uniform basis for making lump sum offers.
Even if the Bill did represent the building, there are
other problems that prevent estimating from being a thorough
and objective technique based upon factual information.
i. Time - The process as outlined is time consuming.
However the time allowed is not always adequate.
ii. Drawings - The drawings are often incomplete, or drawn
at a very small scale, or not available.
iii. Time Delay - The delay by clients in the letting of
contracts (i.e. elapsed time between the submission
of tenders and the awarding of contract) precludes
the assignment of men and equipment at tender
time. To quote Banwell (31):
"Public Authorities are said to be particularly
slow in notifying the results of tenders and to
show undue haste in expecting a physical start
once the contract has been let."
iv. Determination of Construction Method - Since the divisions
in the bill of quantities bears little relationship to
the construction processes involved, and since
estimates are built up from the bill of quantities,
the relationship between the construction method
and the estimated cost appears tenuous. This is
illustrated by an example from reference 38.
"Another example was that of a leading architect
who designed buildings in such a way as to
eliminate the need for scaffolding (although in
this case difficulties were encountered since none
of the contractors who tendered appreciated this
fact.)."
Often there is little communication between the
estimator and the site agent so that even if a method
is determined at the estimating stage, it is not
necessarily the way the project is constructed.
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However, despite these problems, it is apparent from an exam-
ination of submitted prices that estimators from different
companies, working with approximately the same information,
arrive at almost.the same prices. The average bid range (high
bid minus low bid) on the data set contracts being approximately
10 percent (See Figure A-5).
In section 2.2, uncertainty was categorised into Estimating
Uncertainty and Contract Uncertainty. It is now possible to make
these terms more explicit. Contract Uncertainty is concerned
with the difference between the actual structure and the hypo-
thetical one described in the tender documents. Will the firm
gain or lose in the transition from one to the other? The Estimat-
ing Uncertainty arises in the process discussed above. Does the
estimate approximate closely to the cost of the hypothetical
project? If the estimate is too high the contract will be lost;
if the estimate is too low the contract may be won but the firm is
more likely to suffer a loss on the contract. The Uncertainties
are separated because they are handled differently in the decision
process.
The Stages I and III of the Estimating and Tenderin
Procedure are the management decisions examined in this thesis:
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The Decision to Tender and the Decision on the Tender Price.
In this section some of the relevant elements (those which are
listed in the Code) of the decisions are presented. Comment on
these elements is reserved until subsequent sections.
Under the Decision to Tender, the Code of Estimating
Practice considers the following:
- the organisation's work load in relation to its resources.
- is all necessary information provided?
- is sufficient time allowed for estimating?
- what are the Conditions of Contract?
- are drawings included?
- are operating conditions defined clearly?
what is the value and extent of the project and what is the
main contractors contribution likely to be?
- is the design well developed?
are the Bills of Quantities standard?
Is more information available? Where? When? How?
What is known about:
the client and consultants?
the value of the project?
the Conditions of Contract?
reconsider the contract in relation to certain and expected
construction commitments and the estimating work load.
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Under the Tendering Decision are listed:
Matters to be Considered:
- method of construction.
unusual risks not covered by contract.
- unresolved technical or contractiwal problems.
- assessment of design process.
- assumptions in preparation of estimate.
- assessment of profitability of project.
- pertinent information on market of industrial conditions.
- need for qualification of tender.
- terms of quotations from sub-contractors.
- time for which tender is to remain open.
- Conditions of Contract.
- contractural risks (including Fixed Price Tender Risk).
- Capital requirement including: work in progress, materials,
temporary works, plant investment, retention moneys, and
the possibility of under valuation.
- technical and managerial requirements.
- work load.
- the market.
- reputation of client, architect, quantity surveyor, and other
consultants.
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Additional Factors to be Included:
- Financial implications of items above.
- Risk.
- General Overheads.
- Profit.
2. 3. 3 A Schematic Decision Model
The Decision to Tender (Selection Decision) and the
Tender Price (Adjudication) Decision are the focus of this
investigation. To highlight the interactions and information
flows affecting these decisions a schematic model of the
Competitive Bidding Process is developed. This model serves
as a definition of the Competitive Bidding Process and is used
as a conceptual basis for the following Chapters.
The model is developed by considering a series of Black
Box* models, moving from the general to the specific. A
simplified view of the construction industry using the Competitive
Bidding Process is illustrated below. Dotted arrows are used to
indicate information flows; solid arrows indicate material flows.
* The Black Box is regarded as a system which is definable in
terms of its inputs and outputs, but undefinable in the details
of its workings.
EXTERNAL
ENVIRONMENT
financial resources
market opportunities
Government constraints
CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY
2
---3
7 
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Formal transfers, i.e. a request for tender and a submitted bid,
(or refusal) are also indicated with solid arrows.
(1)	 -Request for Tender
(2)-(3)	 -Information Flows (alternate opportunities,
Government Action, financial resources)
(4) -Response to Tender Request
(5) -Award of Contract
(6)-(7)	 -Flow of resources to and from external environment
(8)	 Constructed Building
The term, resources is used to encompass men, materials,
knowledge, money, etc.
In the diagram, arrows (1), (2), (3) and (4) cover the Competitive
Bidding Process. Consider, therefore, only those first four
steps. The box labelled Construction Industry contains
approximately 80,000 construction companies and their industry
Company /
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resource suppliers. Industry resource suppliers are:
building material suppliers, equipment companies, the con-
struction labour market, and the like. Expanding this section
of the model -
1
To follow the information and material flows the model is now
reduced to that of a single company.
current company position
- work load
- resources
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Using the stages of the Estimating and Tendering proced-
ure discussed in Section 2.3.2, the model now appears as:
I	 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT I4	 4
I	 COMPETITORS	 I II
INDUS TRY
RESOURCE
SUPPLIER
a
I I
1	 II	 I
I"
I
•Decision
Estimating Adjudicationto
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Tender
(Selection -J	 1I
Decision) I
I1 4
1	 I	
I
I	 I	 I
ii
	
I
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
....---REJECT
2 -
.4-- BID
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This model represents the Competitive Bidding Process that
is discussed in this thesis. It is an abstraction, and it is
simplified; but it isolates the major decision areas and inform-
ation flows, and is sufficiently general to be applicable to most
bidding situations.
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2. 4 FEASIBILITY STUDY
A necessary prelude to a research project that is of
practical significance is a positive answer to the question;
"Is it worthwhile?". Despite contractors' claims that they are
losing money, the possibility that they are doing as well as
possible within the system must be considered. If this is the
case then little practical benefit can result from the study.
Also, the subject of competitive bidding has been actively
investigated by operational researchers since 1956. Is there
anything left to explain or investigate?
To investigate these questions, an initial study
of the situation was conducted. This exploratory analysis, as
well as demonstrating the need for the study, produced some
interesting observations on managerial objectives. Since these
observations are used in the study of the process, the analysis
is described here in some detail.
2. 4.1	 Maximize Profits
Defining profits as total receipts minus total cost, the
TOTAL
PROFIT
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conventional economic objective attributed to a company is to
maximize profits. 
By considering the contracts offered to an individual
company over a specified time period it is possible to aggregate
these into a Profit-Volume Opportunity Curve for that Company.
The curve is constructed by considering the effects of different
policies, e. g. uniform mark-ups of 1%, 2%, ... ,10%, on total
profit and volume. Figure 2.4 is an idealised Profit-Volume
Opportunity curve for a firm in the industry.
VOLUME
PROFITS	 PROFITSNet Prof It
VOLUME	 VOLUME
Figure 2.5	 Figure 2.6
F13.04
Ca M.
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The curve is intuitively reasonable since it indicates that low
total profits can be obtained by winning a few contracts at a
high mark-up or by winning many contracts at a low mark-up,
and that an optimal combination of mark-up and contracts exists.
A policy designed to maximize profits should result in the
company operating at point A on the curve.
The maximum profits operating position when overheads
are included on the diagram is a function of the type of overheads.
This is illustrated in Figures 2.5 and 2. 6.
If the overhead costs are fixed (i.e. not changing with volume)
the maximum profit position is at the peak of the curve (point A)
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and the corresponding volume is Vol,. For this case, any
policy which maximized gross profits (length A-Vold also
maximizes net profits (length A-B), and vice versa. It is the
fixed case that one would expect to apply for a construction
company. This case because, although the firms discuss over-
head as a percentage figure (implying variable overheads) there
is a general tendency to keep key staff employed on a year round
basis (fixed cost), and items which might normally be variable
overheads, for example the installation of site offices, utility
costs, permanent staff assigned to a project, equipment mainten-
ance, etc. are usually included in the estimate of site costs.
The second case, Figure 2.6, illustrates the effect of
the addition of variable (increasing with volume) overheads to the
diagram. Since C-D is longer than A-B, the maximum net
profits position has shifted to the left of the maximum gross
profits position, from volume Vol 1 to volume Vol2. Thus the
optimum is at that volume at which the first derivatives of the
profit and cost curves are equal.
The selection of a profit maximising criterion seems
valid in theory; it is in the application that flaws appear. It has
been fairly commonplace for researchers to equate the bid price
with the receipts and the estimated cost with the true cost and
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define
Gross profit on contract i =
I
x. - k.	 ifx . < y.i	 1	 1	 1
0	 if xi > yi
(2. 4. 1-1)
where x1. = the bid price on contract i
k. = the estimated site costs for contract i1
yi = the lowest competitor's bid on contract i
ties, x1. = y1 are assumed not to occur.
Then they assume that the variable overheads are included in
the estimated cost, k, and that the management's objective is to
maximize gross profits.
This definition of gross profits is not completely satis-
factory. First it ignores uncertainty, and one of the main points
of the previous sections was that the estimated cost is not the
true cost. Likewise it was noted that the receipts normally vary
from the bid price. The best that the figure (x - k) can be is a 
prediction of the gross profits, and this assumes that the 
uncertainty does not introduce any bias. However, this definition
does provide an index, since it is reasonable to assume that a
contract won with a bid of Ex + delta, where delta is a positive
quantity, should be more profitable than a contract won with a
bid of Ex.
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A second difficulty with the gross profit criteria is that
it ignores the time aspect of contracts. When comparing
different contracts, or sets of contracts, this neglect distorts
the results. For example, consider the following two contracts:
Contract
	
Estimated	 Bid	 Profit Duration Profit/
Cost	 Year
A	 £2,000,000	 £2,120,000 £120,000 	 4 yrs £30,000
B	 500,000	 530,000	 30,000	 1 yr	 £30,000
Assuming that the cash flows in Contract A in the first year are
similar to the flows in Contract B, the two contracts could be
roughly equal, considered in terms of the effect on the company's
operations in that year. Using a gross profit as a criteria,
Contract A is four times more valuable than Contract B. However,
it is usually assumed that Contract A is more desirable than
Contract B. The use of gross profits as a measure exaggerates
this, but does produce the correct ranking order. The opposite,
Contract B more valuable than Contract A, could result if more
advantageous opportunities occur in the second year. That
possibility is not considered in this pilot study. Section 2.5.5
proposes a method of treatment for this aspect.
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2. 4. 2	 Decision Rule Simulation
Two decision rules were used to test the potential value
of the project. The objective of the earlier researchers,
maximize gross profits, was used as the criterion and the
current company performance, as exhibited by the data sets,
was compared with what the results would have been if:
(a) The company had increased (decreased) all its bids by a
uniform percentage amount.
(b) The company had used a policy of uniform percentage
mark-up on estimated cost.
A problem in using the (2.4.1-1) definition of gross
profits for this purpose is created by the Provisional Cost
Allowances in the data set contracts. These sums carry their
own profit allowance and this introduce additional variation
into the gross profit figure. For an extreme example, assume
for a contract that the estimated cost was £100, £50 of which
was a Provisional Cost Allowance. A 6 percent mark-up would
result in a submitted tender of £103 and a profit, as defined, of
£3. If instead, the Allowance was £20, the 6 percent mark-up
would result in a submitted tender of £104. 8 or profit, if won,
of £4. 8. The contracts, however, have identical value to the
company because they will be paid 6% profit on the work covered
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by the Provisional Allowance. Theoretically this can be
corrected for; in practice the data required to make the
corrections was not available, and so it was necessary to
ignore the Provisional Allowances. This is equivalent to
assuming that the percentage amount of Provisional Allowances
is constant for all contracts, and this is not so. However, from
interviews it was ascertained that the amount is usually small
and does not fluctuate too wildly and so the error introduced by
this factor should not be major. In any case, the errors do not
affect the terms usefulness as an index, i. e. a contract won at
a bid of Ex + delta is still more profitable than one won at Ex.
To simulate the decision rules, two computer programs,
OPTM* and OPT2 were written. Simplified flow charts of
these programs are Figures 2. 7 and 2. 8. The programs were
written for use on The City University, I. C. L. 1905 Computer.
The data sets from the four sample companies, introduced in
section 2.2. 3, were used as input.
A series of contracts, such as the data sets, can be
manipulated to produce several different profit-volume relation-
ships. There are three basic figures to start with; the estimated
cost, the bid, and the lowest competitor's bid, and a different
,
* Capitalized names refer to Fortran IV programs.
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profit-volume relationship can be derived from each.
One approach would be to use the lowest competitor's
bid on each contract. Theoretically the maximum profit
available to the company would result from incrementally under-
bidding the lowest competitor on all contracts which yielded a
positive profit (i. e. all contracts for which the lowest
competitor's bid is greater than the company's cost estimate).
A second approach is to start with the estimated cost figures and
evaluate the effect, in terms of profit and volume, of applying
the same percentage mark-up to all the contracts in the set.
This is done by the OPT2 program. The third approach is to
start with the tender figures submitted by the sample company.
By making the same incremental change to every bid in the set
and calculating the result, a profit-volume relationship is
produced.
Only the second and third approaches are used in this
thesis. This is because it was felt desirable to stay with results
that could realistically be obtained by an operating company. The
results that can be achieved by a policy of constant mark-up, or
the results that can be achieved by a shift of current bidding
policy, are felt to be both practicable and obtainable. The
theoretical maximum is not.
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Consequently, OPTM evaluates the effect on total profits
for the data set of varying all the sample company's bids by a
percentage increment. For example, suppose in the data set
the company had bid 60 contracts, won 5, and received a total
profit of £100,000. The program computes what would have
happened, in terms of total profits, if all 60 tenders had been
raised (reduced) by O. 5%, 1.0%, 1. 5%, ... , 5. 0%. The program
outputs the results in graphical form.
OPT2 is similar to OPTM except that it operates on the
estimated cost instead of the tender figure. The program
evaluates the effect of a uniform mark-up of 0.5%, 1.0%, 1.5%,
. . . , 20.0%.
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 are sample output sheets.
To obscure the identities of the sample companies, the
data results are presented in percentages. The base figure,
100%, selected for each data set is the maximum figure obtained
by using a policy of constant percentage mark-up on the
estimated cost for all contracts in the data set. This is the
maximum produced by the OPT2 program.
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2.4. 3 Results and Discussion
As mentioned above, the OPTM and OPT2 programs
were run with the data from the four sample companies.
Figures 2.11 to 2.14 are the plotted results. The position of the
current company performance is indicated with a circle.
From the graphs it does not appear as if the companies
are bidding to maximize profits. The OPT2 graphs indicate
that the maximum profit region occurs at mark-ups of ft% to
4%. The companies bid in the region of 61%. Considering the
OPTM graphs, Company A's bids are 1% below the peak position;
Company B's are 3% above; Company C's are 1% above; and
Company D's are 31% above the peak. These graphs were
discussed with the managements concerned and, as could be
expected, Company A agreed that a 1% increase it is bids would
have been desirable. On the other hand, Companies B, C, and
D flatly rejected any suggestion that they might improve their
positions by lowering their bids. To support their point, they
revealed that they were losing money on some contracts at the
current price level (one contract in three and one in five were
the figures quoted), and were certain that a reduction in prices
would not improve this situation. A suggestion of bidding in the
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2% to 4% range was treated with scorn.
Now the sample companies were not in financial
difficulties, and all were reasonably happy with their past
performance. If it is accepted that their behaviour is rational
then either the maximum profits criteria is not applicable to
this situation or the assumption of fixed overheads and/or the
assumptions in the (x-k) definition of gross profits are
distorting the results.
The assumption of fixed overheads was investigated
first. From the OPTM and OPT2 output, profit-volume
diagrams were prepared. These are Figures 2.15 and 2.16;
the squares indicating actual company performance. Smooth
curves were fitted by eye to the data and the variable overheads
were estimated by calculating the tangent of the curve at the
location of actual performance. This procedure produced the
following results.
Estimated variable overhead for Company A = 19%
Company B = 28%
• Company C = 3.5%
Company D = 3.1%
These results are inconclusive. The figures for Companies C
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and D could be reasonable, but those for A and B are ridiculous.
Considering the approximations and opportunities for error that
went into the determination it is reasoned that no definite con-
clusion can be drawn from this procedure. However, since the
companies claim that all variable overheads were included in the
estimated costs it is felt that they are not the explanation for the
discrepancy between the received theory and practice.
It is apparent from these results that the primitive concept
of gross profit maximization, as defined earlier, is at variance
with actual behaviour. This is taken as an indication that
further research is required in this area. Consequently, this
aspect is investigated in the following sections.
A detailed examination of the output from the OPTM and
OPT2 programs also revealed the following:-
(a) Company A - If all tenders had been increased by 1%, the
company would have achieved a 16% increase in gross
profits, a 16% increase in their profit-volume ratio, and
exactly the same volume of contracts.
- The uniform mark-up policy in the same
region as the current performance would have won exactly
the same contracts but with 2% less gross profit.
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(b) Company B - An increase of 2% in tender prices would
have achieved a 22% decrease in gross profits, a 43%
decrease in volume, and a 38% increase in profit-volume
ratio.
- A uniform mark-up policy in the same region
as the Company's performance would have achieved 4% less
gross profits on 21% greater volume.
(c) Company C - A decrease of 1% in tender prices would have
achieved an 18% increase in profits, a 36% increase in
volume, and a decrease in the profit-volume ratio of 14%.
- A uniform mark-up policy in the same region
as the Company's performance would have achieved a 41%
increase in gross profit, a 36% increase in volume, and a
3% increase in the profit-volume ratio.
(d) Company D - An increase of 1% in the tender prices would
have achieved a 7% decrease in gross profits, a 20%
decrease in volume, and a 16% increase in profit-volume
ratio.
- A uniform mark-up policy in the same region
as the Company's performance would have achieved a 1%
decrease in gross profits, a 1% increase in total volume,
and a 2% decrease in the profit-volume ratio.
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A general observation is that the decision maker can
usually outperform the arbitrary policy. This was the result
in three out of four cases, and in the fourth case the manage-
ment hastened to point out that the sample contained only a few
contracts and a single contract can alter the results. It appears
that the decision maker's judgment is a significant factor in how
well a company performs.
The following specific observations were made for the
individual companies.
Company A - an increase of 1% in the tender prices would have
produced a more desirable result.
Company B - the desirable policy for the Company is dependent
upon the state of the market of the period. If the
Company has bid all or most of the contracts
available, its current policy was the best. If more
jobs were available, (about 50% more), then a 2%
increase in tender prices would have more than
compensated for the additional estimating that
would have been required to achieve the same
volume.
Company C - either the current policy or a fixed mark-up policy
of 6% are suitable. Any increase or decrease from
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the region of the current position causes
spectacular, but not necessarily desirable
results.
Company D - An increase of 1% in all tender prices would
have produced a more desirable result.
These observations were discussed with the managements of the
companies concerned and general agreement was obtained.
- 2. 4. 4	 Conclusions
The general conclusion that is drawn from this feasibility
study is that competitive bidding in the Construction Industry
could be a very fruitful field of investigation. Obvious areas of
both academic and practical significance are:
1. The determination of an economic objective function that
corresponds to the performance and desires of the sample
companies.
2. The development of a system that can realise at least some
of the benefits that are revealed by hindsight.
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3. The creation of a method of incorporating judgment into
an operational research bidding strategy model (since the
results indicated that the decision maker's judgment is a
relevant factor).
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2. 5 MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES
Fundamental to a study of a decision process is a
concise definition of objectives. But what are the objectives
of a company using the Competitive Bidding Process? When
discussing company objectives the lists became long, sometimes
confusing, and often contradictory. Some of the possible
objectives of a construction company could be:
Maximize Profit,
Maximize Utility,
Minimize Regret,
Minimize the profits of competitors,
Minimize the profits of a particular competitor,
Obtain a certain percentage of the market,
Obtain a certain segment (e. g. prestige buildings) of the market,
Maintain a constant work load,
Achieve a specified return on invested capital,
Make a specified amount of profit,
Obtain a certain volume of work.
The question is which of these, or which combination of these,
is appropriate for the Sample Companies? It has already been
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demonstrated, in section 2.4, that the naive "maximize gross
profits" objective is not suitable. An arbitrary selection from
other members of the list are equally likely to be unsuitable.
Clearly, a more sophisticated approach to determining a
quantitative objective function is required.
The managerial objective function proposed for the
sample companies is developed from three assumptions.
1. The firm is trying to maximize some value measure.
2. The value measure has an economic basis.
3. The current behaviour of the companies is in the region of
the maximum.
The first two assumptions are fairly conventional. It
could be argued that the maximizing of an economic value measure
is an oversimplification and that satisficing and non-economic
considerations also enter the problem. However, some simpli-
fication is necessary to reduce the problem to one that can be
modelled. Also most non-economic objectives, for example
continued employment of loyal staff, can be accommodated as
constraints, and satisficing of secondary objectives if often
compatible with the maximization of a primary one. The third
assumption arises from the fact that the Sample Companies are
adaptive, viable, entities that exist in a competitive market and
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are capable of changing their behaviour if circumstances dictate.
The concept, that managerial behaviour is near optimal, was
formalised by Bowman in his 1963 paper, "Consistency and
Optimalty in Managerial Decision Making" (3). His first two
axioms are:
1. Experienced managers are quite aware of and sensitive to
the criteria of a system.
2. Experienced managers are aware of the system variables
which influences these criteria.
The effect of the third assumption is to provide a means
of testing the developed objective function. Data is available for
the Adjudication stage of the decision and the search is directed
to finding an objective function for that stages that imitates the
current performance of the sample companies.
2. 5.1	 Decision Variables .
For the objectives to be relevant to the decision problem
they must be related to the variables present in the problem. In
the Competitive Bidding Problem, at a specified time, there
exist the following variables:
-70-
S - The set of opportunites,
X - The vector of tender prices (defined on S),
K - The vector of estimated costs (defined on S),.
Y - The vector of lowest competitors' bids (defined on 5),
L - The vector of costs of bidding (defined on S).
The resources required by a contract are not considered variables,
but are constraints.
The variables can be divided into two groups - -
controllable and uncontrollable. The set of opportunities, S, is
a controllable variable that can be varied from all the contracts
offered to zero by the Decision to Tender. Other methods of
controlling this variable are discussed in Section 2. 5. 4, Market
Uncertainty. The tender prices, X, are controlled by the
Adjudication Decision. The estimated costs, K, are stochastic
variables. The variability can be controlled by the Selection
Decision and the bias by correction. The costs of bidding, L,
are binary variables; the Decision to Tender determining whether
the value is 0 or L. The lowest competitor's bids, Y, are the
uncontrollable variables  in the decision situation. Chapter 3 is
concerned with the statistical treatment of these uncontrollable
. variables. In this section the value measurements will be
formulated as discontinuous functions dependent upon the value
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of the variables Y. For example:
VB	if .> Yi
- AValue of Contract i = [V	 .if x. <
(2.5.1-1)
2. 5. 2	 Uncertainty
It is assumed that the value measure is basically economic.
This means that the value of a contract, if it is won, should be
some function of the difference between receipts and costs.
Formally
Value	 =	 v( receipts - costs )
	
(2. 5. 2-1)
Excluding low probability events such as the client going bank-
rupt, the following relationships are approximately correct.
Receipts = bid price + change in receipts due to variations
Costs = estimated cost + error due to estimate uncertainty
+ change in costs due to variations.
(2. 5. 2-2)
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For the market being considered contractual risk is not of
major significance and so is not included, except where it is
implicit in the estimated cost.
Combining the expressions, (2. 5.2-2), with equation (2. 5. 2-1)
and combining the costs and receipts from variations into a
single term provides
Value = v( bid price - estimated cost + estimate uncertainty
+ contract uncertainty)
If	 x. = Bid price on contract i1
yi = lowest competitor's bid on contract i
k. = estimated cost of contract i1
e. --- variation due to estimate uncertainty1
u. = variation due to contract uncertainty1
Then
Value of Contract
	 -{i =	 v(x. - k. + e. + u.)1	 1	 1	 if x. / .1 1 ‘ Y1
(2. 5. 2-3)
0	 if x. ) y.1	 1
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The factor, u, is called the contract uncertainty factor.
It contains the results of the contract variations: how the job
will progress and how the company will fare in the transition
from bill of quantities items to constructed structure. Referring
back to Section 2. 3.2, items.
 such as reputation of client, quantity
surveyor, and consultants; design progress; unresolved problems;
contract conditions; managerial requirements; etc. are included
in u.. It can normally be regarded as a function of the contract
and not of the bid price, therefore it is treated as a parameter of
the function v.
The factor e. is the estimating uncertainty. It is the
error resulting from the information gaps in the estimating, the
subjective nature of estimating, and computational errors.
Estimating departments try to make this error zero; that is they
try to make the expected value of the estimated cost equal to what
the true cost would be if u. did not exist. The presence of u.1	 1
complicates matters but partial feedback and comparison with
other bids permits reasonable control. This error is more of
a function of the estimating department than of the contract.
Rewriting equation (2. 5. 2-3) with u i as a parameter and
using the expected value of the error in k. E(e1) to handle
Value of Contract i =
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estimate uncertainty
Eu. ; x. - k. + (e.) ) if x. < y.1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1
if xi ) yi
(2.5.2-4)
This is the general formulation of the value function.
For clarity of exposition, the cost of bidding, L, is left out of
this formulation. It will be introduced later when the Selection
Decision is considered.
2.5.3	 Interaction Effect 
That the estimated cost is a stochastic variable has been
recognised by almost all previous investigators. Friedman (11)
in 1956 first proposed using the expected value of the estimated
cost to handle any possible bias that might exist in the estimate.
What has been generally overlooked is that the Competitive 
Bidding Process introduces a bias  into the estimated costs of
successful tenders. Simmonds (29) noted this interaction but
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did not develop it mathematically.
This interaction can de demonstrated for the case where
the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder as follows. Assume:
1. That a "true cost" exists. That is, that there is no contract
uncertainty, u
'
. only estimating uncertainty.i
2. That the estimated costs of all bidders on a contract are
random samples from a uniform distribution with range
true cost + R
-	 -2-
That is, the estimated cost is not biased and the expected value
of the estimated cost is the true cost. Moreover estimates are
uniformly distributed over the stated range.
3. That the bidder with the lowest estimated cost is the low
bidder.
The basis of these assumptions is discussed at the end
of this Subsection. First, however, it is demonstrated how
these assumptions interact with the Competitive Bidding Process
to introduce bias into the cost estimate of the winning bid.
If c is the lowest of N random samples from a
distribution h(z); then the frequency distribution of c is
f(c)dc
c N-1
=	 N(1)	 h (z)dz )
	 h(c)dc
-00
(2. 5. 3-3)
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This formula is derived in Section 3.2.2, Order Statitistic
Development. If on a project there are N bidders, all with
estimated costs derived according to assumption 2; then if
assumption 3 holds the frequency distribution of the winning
bidder's estimated cost is again f(c) and
c dz )
N-1 1f(e)dc	 = N (1 - ft
true cost -
-2
.N-1
N , 1	 c	 true cost )= —R2 -	 dc
(2.5.3-2)
To derive a formula in percentage terms, Let
h(z) = 0	 -00 < z < 100 - R/2
1
h(z) = ft	 100 - R/2
 z 100 + R/2
h(z) = 0	 100 + - < z <+ 00
(2.5.3-3)
Where h(z) is the distribution of the estimates, the true cost is
100, and R is the estimating range in percent.
de
-7'1-
For a specified error range of R percent, the expected
percentage amount that the cost estimate of the winning bidder
is below the true cost is:
E (100 -
R100 .+ -2-
N-1
(100_ c + —100 ) de- c) ( I2- ft- 	 R
	R 	
N-1	
R
	
- 100 + -2-	 100 + —2 N-1
100 N	 1	 c	 100	 N	 1 c 100
_	 )	 dc - —	 c(-- - — + .----) 	 dc(2.	 il	 R	 2 R R
R -
	
+ 
RR 
	
R100 - 1.00 - .2-
.	 R 2(-Fr—i- 1)
[N- 11
(2.5.
 3-4)
For a specified participant, if n is the number of competitors,
then n = N - 1, and the expected percentage value that his
cost estimate is below the true cost is
R [ 
2 (n 
n
+ 2)1
(2. 5. 3-5)
if the contract is won.
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The results of this interaction can be demonstrated by
example. If a company has an estimate range of 10% and is
bidding against 5 competitors; the expected value of the
estimated cost, if the company wins, is
5 10 (	 ) = 3. 57% below the true cost.2. 7
This calculation partially explains how a contractor can bid
his jobs at a 5% mark-up and finish with a gross profit only
slightly over 1%.
Let Z(R,n) be a multiplier that corrects the expected
error in the estimated cost.
Z (R, n) E(c) 	 =	 100
Z(R, n)	 ( 100 - E( 100 - c) ) 	 = 100
Z(R, n) =	 200( n + 2 )
200(n+2)	 - Rn
(2.5.3-6)
Using the earlier example of R = 10% and n = 5;
Z(10,5) .	 1400 	 = 1.037
1400 - 50
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and the contractor must bid at a 3.7% mark-up to break even.
Inserting the Z multiplier into equation (2.5.2-4), the
value function becomes
Value of Contract i = ç v( ui ;
0
x. -k. - Z(R,n) ) if xi < yi1	 1
if xi
 yi
(2. 5. 3 -7)
Discussion of Assumptions
Three assumptions were used to create a hypothetical
model of the situation from which the interaction error could be
calculated. These assumptions are not strictly correct, i. e.
contrary examples can be found, but they are reasonably
supported by intuition and the empirical evidence available.
To the extent that it was possible to check, the hypothetical model
can be said to be a reasonable mapping of reality.
The assumption of the existence of a true cost at the
estimating stage, assumption 1, is reasonable. However, the
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assumption must rest on intuitive grounds since subsequent
variations make it practically impossible to recreate the
conditions and demonstrate its existence.
Assumption 2 is the principle basis for the development
of the model. It can be decomposed into three parts:
- That the estimated costs are random samples from
a distribution.
- That the distribution is symmetric about the true cost.
- That the distribution is uniform.
The random sample concept is fundamental to the
statistical approach. The inherent uncertainties in the estimate
and the number of individual items and decisions that go into the
determination of the estimated cost combine to produce a result
that can be described as a chance or random process. One of
the Sample Companies related the following experiment they
conducted. They assigned the same job to two different
estimators and instructed them to independently arrive at a net
esti mated cost. The resulting two estimated costs differed by
16%. Thus the idea of an estimated cost being a random sample
seems not unreasonable.
A uniform distribution with arbitrary cut-off points may
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initially appear unrealistic; but no more so than one without
cut-offs. Within every contract there exist several figures
that define the region of the price. They are the clients budget,
the architect-q. s. estimate, and the price of similar structures.
There are indications that an estimate deviating substantially
(say 15%-20%) from the true cost will be detected and rejected
by the management at the adjudication phase. One of these
indications is that for all the bids in the Sample Companies'
Data Sets, the average value of the range (highest bid on a
contract minus the lowest bid on the contract) is approximately
10%. Fine and Hackemer (10) in their simulation generated bids
by taking random samples from a uniform distribution. They
reported that the distribution of the bids generated compared
very favourably with the distribution of bids derived from the
company bidding records.
The obvious way to verify the assumption would be by study-
ing the distribution of estimated costs. This information was not
available to this study, and it is unlikely that it could be obtained
by any study since it requires competitors to disclose their
estimated costs. Therefore an alternative method had to be
found.
The four Sample Companies were found to be using very
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similar percentage mark-ups. The average mark-ups of the
four companies were all within 0. 35% of 6. 8%. If this result
is generalised to all firms competing, and interviews with
personnel from other companies has suggested that it can,
then the distribution of estimates should be similar to the
distribution of bids. This similarity is examined in Subsection
3. 4.2 and the uniform distribution is reasonably coincident with
that derived from actual bid values.
The assumption of a symmetrical distribution can be
partially substantiated by the empirical evidence. It the mean
bid is taken as an estimate of the true cost plus 6. 8% (the
average mark-up used), then the ratios mean bid to estimated
cost should be samples from a distribution with mean 1. 068.
The hypothesis that the mean of the ratios was not significantly
different from 1.068 was tested for each of the four companies
with a t test and in each case accepted at a 10% level. The data
of the four were combined and the resulting 153 ratios were
plotted to form a histogram. The histogram had a symmetrical
shape with 75 ratios below 1.068 and 78 above. This symmetry
assumption is not necessarily valid for the American-Canadian
construction industry where each contractor calculates his own
quantities and as Park (24) suggests, "errors of omrnission are
more likely than errors of commission". The use of the Bill of
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e
Quantities in the_English_system makes it unlikely that anything
can be missed.
The assumption that the lowest estimated cost wins the
contract is supported by two figures. The r ange of the average
mark-up used by the four Sample Companies was 0. 7%; yet the
average amount by which the contracts in the data set were won
was 2.8% (low bid minus second low bid). Obviously there are
cases where the different mark-ups will cause the second, or third
low estimate to win but in general, it appears that the lowest
estimated costs results in the lowest bid. This point is further
substantiated in Section 5. 3. 5 where the different models tend
to win the same contracts.
As was stated at the start of this discussion, it is not
proposed that the assumptions are strictly correct. It is suggested
that the assumptions are reasonable and that the resulting model
is a fairly realistic mapping of the situation.
2. 5.4	 Market Uncertainty
In addition to the estimating uncertainty and the contract
uncertainty, market uncertainty enters the decision process.
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The construction industry is subject to major fluctuations because
it is sensitive to the government's methods of regulating the
economy. The decision variable S, the set of opportunities, is
subject to these fluctuations. However, this does not mean that
S is not subject to management control.
Some of the methods of increasing S are:
- pressure on the government to stablize the market. The
construction industry represents a major pressure group with
organisations such as the R. I. B. A and the N. F. B. T. E., as
well as the unions, to voice its complaints.
- diversification into other areas of the field. It is becoming
common for major contractors to form alliances with property
developers and industrial concerns and thus provide themselves
with tied markets. Also package deals and patented systems
provide a certain insulation from the major market gyrations.
- promotional activity. This type of activity can range from
buying a potential client lunch to bidding a job "at cost" to impress
a particular architect. Generally, almost any form of activity
other than sitting in the office waiting for invitations to tender can
be regarded as promotional activity.
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Methods of decreasing S are to decline jobs and to submit
cover bids.
The present state of the market  and the expectation of the 
future are the two aspects of the market which influence the
bidding decision. These two aspects have differing character-
istics. The present state of the market is reflected in S, and
this variable is known in detail and subject to control. The future
is unknown and the best information available can only assist in
predicting trends. The expectation of the future influences the
relative value of the contracts in the set S. For example, if it is
anticipated that next years market will provide more profitable
opportunities, then a one year contract in S will be relatively
more desirable than a similar three year contract, since the one
year contract will free resources in time to take advantage of the
anticipated opportunities.
The proposed method of treating the market in the decision
formulation uses the differing characteristics. Aris (2) para-
phrases the dynamic programming principle of optimality as:
"... If you don't do the best you can with what you happen to
have got, you'll never do the best you might have done with
what you should have had."
and this is tile basic concept underlying the treatment.
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It is unlikely that the expectation of the future would
directly cause the exclusion of a contract from the set S. A
contractor would not let men and plant sit idle because he
anticipated an improved martet in 12 months. The result of
expectation is to change the rankings of the contracts within
the set, making some more desirable and others less so.
Therefore, attention is concentrated on known opportunities and
a parameter that will change the relative values is included in
the value function. Chapter 4 deals with the treatment of .the
known set S; the relative value parameter is introduced in
Section 2. 5. 5.
2. 5. 5	 A General Objective Function 
A contract value measure should relate:
- The profitability of the contract,
- The uncertainty of estimating,
- The expectation of the future,
- The existing set of opportunities.
The general value function proposed in Section 2. 5. 3 is:
	
Value of Contract i =1- v( ui
 ; x. - k1. • Z(R,n) ) if xi	y
0	 if x.	 Yi
(2. 5. 5-1)
d..
( 1	 r)
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One factor not explicitly mentioned in the formulation,
but implicit in several of the elements, is the time aspect or
duration of a contract. A method of treating time in evaluation
procedures is by using a discounted cash flow (D. C. F.)
procedure. A D. C. F. method is a theoretically sound basis for
valuing contracts and is, in fact, very similar to the techniques
currently employed by some contractors. The series of papers
by Fine (9) at the Building Research Station indicate that a D. C. F.
measure is appropriate for building construction contracts.
Although the usual measures mentioned in connection with
contracts are profits, or profitability, or margin, or turnover,
contractors are acutely aware of the importance of the timing of
cash flows. This is illustrated by the fact that unbalanced bidding
(See Appendix 2) is widely practiced.
Hence a D.C. F. formulation is proposed for contract
valuation. Let:
q --	 the amount of money received at the end of the j th.
period from contract i
d..	 the amount of money dispersed at the end of the j th.
period for contract i
the discount rate
a	 = the present value of the dispersements associated with
contract i
(2.5.5-2)
x.1
III
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which is a constant for a specified contract.
The R. I.B. A. Contract Conditions, which are the normal
ones for building construction, specify progress payments to the
contractor at fixed time intervals. These payments are
intended to cover work completed up to a specified date, and
are based upon measurement and estimate of work in progress.
In actual fact these payments tend to be linear with time. This
tendency is caused by two factors. One is the difficulty in
estimating accurately the amount of work completed, and the
second is the fact that the amount of payment is the result of a
bargaining session. The only two items that the parties to the•
bargaining generally agree upon are the original bid price and
the scheduled contract completion time; thus if one half of the
time has elapsed, the contractor probably has received one half
of his bid price.
The present value of the income stream is
	
-7 	 qij 
	
/\	 ( 1 + r)j
i
Now if the income stream is linear with time
qi-- =(111
i
4
in
.-  Xi 	 + r) - 1 
mr ( 1 + r )
m
(l+r)i
	 ij=1	 j=1
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where x1.	 = bid price on contract i
in	 = the total number of time periods.
The present value of the income stream is
(2. 5.5-3)
=
x.a .1 21
m
where (1 + r)	 - 1 a2i
mr (1 + r)
	
m
which is a constant for a specified contract i.
The general value function (2. 5. 5-1) contains the contract
uncertainty parameter, ui . The present value expressions
contain a discount rate parameter, r. On a normal contract the
positive cash flows , (q.. > d13.. ), do not occur until the laterij 
periods. Therefore if the discount rate is increased, the present
value of the cash flows would decrease; but the present values of
shorter duration contracts would decrease less severely than
those of longer duration. Now a contract value measure which
accommodates contract profitability and market uncertainty must
aii =
-90-
have some facility for shifting the relative values of the contracts
in the set from their bid minus cost valuation.
The proposed value function for a contract on which a
tender is submitted is
Value of contract i =
	
Z(R,n) . all + a2i xi	 if x < y.i	 1
1	 1
where Z(R,n)	 =	 200( n+2 )	 (2.5.5-4)
200(n + 2) - Rn
R = The estimating range in percent
n = The number of competitors
III
d1  = The amount of money dispersed at the end of
the j th period.
m
=	 (1 + ri )	 - 1a2i
m r.(1+r.) m1	 1
r. = The discount rate for contract i1
x1. = The bid price for contract i
3r 1 = The lowest competitor's bid on contract i
m = The total number of time periods, I .
-91-
This is the conventional present value function except that the
discount rate is varied from contract to contract. Specifically,
a base discount rate is determined by expectation of future
markets; an optimistic expectation resulting in a high base rate
(favouring shorter contracts), a pessimistic outlook would
produce a low base rate. The base rate is then varied for the
individual contracts on the basis of managerial expectation of
the effect of contract uncertainty:
- downward for contracts where the uncertainty is felt to result
in advantageous circumstances.
- upwards for contracts where the uncertainty is felt to result
in adverse circumstances.
To make this value function applicable to a specific firm, the base
rates and limits of contract uncertainty variation would be
determined by empirical investigation.
An additional advantage of using a D.C. F. form of
valuation is that future, and therefore more uncertain, events are
damped and thus play a smaller role in the decision process.
The cost of estimating contract i, 1 i , (a negative
constant) does not influence the adjudication stage of the decision.
It does affect the selection stage and therefore the value function
for the two stage decision is
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Value of Contract i
if it is bid	Z(R,n)a_. + a .x. + 1. 	 if x. < y.11	 1	 1	 1
if x1. > y.
if it is not bid =	 0
(2. 5. 5-5)
To formulate the management objective function the term,
the probability of winning contract i with a bid of k.
is introduced. This term and the related concepts are dealt
with in Chapter 3. Using this probability term, the expected
value of the contract if it is to be bid is
Pi(xi) (Z (R,n) aii + a2i x +	 + (1 - Pi(xj.))1i
(2.5.5-6)
= Pi(xi) (Z (R,n) aii + a2i x.1 	 +
and the expected value of the contract if it is not to be bid is
zero.
The management objective for the two stage decision on the
Competitive Bidding Process is taken to be maximize the
expected value of the decision. Formally
Maximize	 Maximum	 Pi(xi) (Z (R, n) all + a2i xi)+ i ; (Q.•
i 6 S
(2.5. 5-7)
1.1
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Unfortunately data to test this function, and to determine
the ranges for r1 , were not available during this study.
Therefore, the objective (2.5.5-7) is only a proposed method of
accommodating the variables of the decision situation. However,
there are data to test the objective formulation for the sub-problem,
the Adjudication Decision.
2. 5.6	 The Adjudication Objective
The contracts in the Sample Company data sets are
contracts on which the decision to bid has been made. They all
meet the selection criteria and the companies, at the time of
bidding, had sufficient resources to undertake them. The manage-
ments concerned stated that all the bids were "serious and
competitive". In other words, these were contracts that the
companies would have liked to win.
Since these contracts have been selected, the elements of
the value function that determine selection are irrelevant. The
appropriate value function for a contract at this stage is
Vi(xi) =	 Z(R,n) aii + a2i x.1 	x. 	 y.
	
1	 1
(2. 5. 6-1)
if x1 ) yi
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The plot of this function is illustrated below. From the plot it
is obvious that, if the objective is to
V104)
vi. = Li i.
select x. that maximizes V.(x1.), as long as the function is1	 1 
increasing with x.
'
 ( a2i is positive ) , the position of the1 
maximum Vi(xi) is independent of the values of all and a21 .
This means that the Adjudication decision is independent of the
value of r.. The data sets contain only the estimated cost, not1	 .
the timing of the cash flows. This is equivalent to a zero value
of r.. Since the decision is independent of r.1	 1 '
be used and the value function becomes
a zero value can
{ x.1 - Z(R, n) ki	if x. ( y.1	 1Vi (xi) =
0	 if xi > yi
(2.5.6-2)
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where x1.	 = bid price on contract i
Z(R,n) =	 interaction correction
k. = the estimated cost of contract i1
Yi	 = the lowest competitor's bid.
This is simply the profit function with the estimated cost corrected
for interaction.
The OPTM and OPT2 programs of Section 2.4. 2 were
used to examine the value measure. In order to conduct the test,
it was necessary to determine a parameter R for each of the
Sample Companies. Three methods of determining R from the
available data were devised. These are presented in Appendix 3.
The three methods provided the following values for the
Companies.
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
Company A 12. 85% 11. 9 % 15. 35%
Company B 13.45% 12. 9 % 15. 5 %
Company C 11.0 % 9. 35% 16.65%
Company D 13.1% 10. 7 % 16.95%
These calculated ranges are all within the anticipated region and
at this stage no one method was demonstratably more suitable
than any other. Therefore the testing was started using all three
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values for each company.
The Z corrections resulting from the Method 3 range
calculations had the effect of reducing the Companies to
negligible profit operations. This was felt to be unrealistic
and so experimentation with those figures was discontinued.
Figures 2.17 to 2.24 are the results of the OPTM and OPT2
programs on the Companies data sets with the estimated costs
. corrected using the Method 1 and Method 2 ranges. The
Company's actual performance position is indicated with a
circle; the desired operating position determined in the
feasibility study, Section 2.4. 3, is marked with a triangle.
For Company A both the Method 1 and Method 2 range
estimates produce similar results. The Company is operating
1% below the peak of the graph and the desired position is coin-
cident with the peak.
For Company B the Method 2 correction, 12.9% range,
appears to be a better indicator of management desires as it
produces two, almost equal peaks: one at the current performance,
the other at the desired location. Recall from the feasibility study,
the alternate location was only desirable if the market would permit
the obtaining of additional work. The Method 1 correction produces
a definite peak at the desired location.
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For Company C the two correction methods produce
similar results. The actual performance, the desired location,
and the peaks of the graph, all coincide.
For Company D the Method 2 correction, 10. 7% range,
is coincident with the earlier findings; the Method 1 correction
is not. In the Method 2 results the desired location determined
in the feasibility study occurs at the peak of the graph. In the
Method 1 correction results, the peak of the graph is 1% higher
than the desired location and 2% higher than the actual performance.
These graphs indicate that the Method 2 evaluation of the
estimating accuracy produces the most satisfactory results.
Therefore these are the figures that are adopted and the accuracy
ranges for the sample
Companies are taken to be:
Company A	 R = 11. 9 %
Company B	 R =- 12. 9 %
Company C	 R = 9.35%
Company D	 R = 10. 7 %
From the OPTM graphs produced using the Method 2
corrections, the following observations are made.
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1. In every case the desired operating position determined
from the previous examination of the contract data occurs
at the peak of the graph.
2. The actual performance of each sample company is in the
region of the peak of its graph.
From the programs' outputs, profit-volume graphs were
constructed for the four Companies. These are presented in
Figures 2.25 and 2.26. The Company's operating position is
indicated with a rectangle, the desired position with a triangle.
These plots reinforce the previous observations. The rectangles
and triangles occur in the region of the peaks of the curves.
Referring back to the original assumptions of Section 2.5.1,
it was assumed that the objective function should maximize some
economic measure and coincide with managerial behaviour and
desires. The objective function, maximize profits, with profits
defined as the bid price minus the corrected estimated costs on
contracts won, appears to satisfy the criteria; at least for the
four Sample Companies studied. Therefore this is the function
that will be used for the remainder of the experimental investig-
ation of this thesis and the term, profit, without qualifying
adjectives, will refer to gross profit based upon Z corrected
estimated costs.
PROFIT
0
0
Company B
12.9% Range
PROFIT
0
0
0
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01 T01
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It is not proposed that these profit figures necessarily
bear any resemblance to the figures that the accounting machinery
of the companies produce. A suggestion that they might was
accepted by one of the Sample Companies and flatly rejected by
another. The one that accepted it stated that they bid projects
in the 6% mark-up region and were finishing with profits of 1% to
2%. The one who rejected it stated that they bid in the 6% region
and generally showed profits in the 6% plus region. Probably the
difference lies in the definitions, the accounting systems, and the
site negotiating ability of the firms.
What is proposed is that the function, as defined, imitates
management desires and a model programmed to maximize the
function should produce results acceptable to management.
Graphs similar to those resulting from the Z corrected data
sets could be produced by increasing all the estimated costs by a
constant of about 4%. However, no a priori reason could be
found for such an action. Any assumption based upon estimating
accuracy must include the number of competitors as a parameter
and will result in a set of corrections such as were employed.
Fixed overhead costs would not cause the peak to shift and variable
overheads are already included in the estimates.
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The reduction of the objective function to simple profit
maximisation leaves unanswered questions about resource
utilisati9n, timing of cash flows, project desirability, etc. This
is reasonable given that all these factors are considered in the
first decision stage - the Selection of the Contracts. The
contracts represented by the data sets already fulfil the require-
ments of general desirability, resource utilisation, etc. and all
that is left is the objective of winning the contract at the maximum
possible bid price. 
-ill-
2.6 SUMMARY
To recapitulate briefly, the Management Problem may
be stated as, "within the prescribed boundaries, what are the
optimal decisions relative to the management objectives?" The
principal purpose of this Chapter was to delineate the boundaries,
isolate the decisions and quantify the objectives.
- The boundaries are the market of the Sample Companies.
- The decisions are the Selection Decision and the Adjudication
Decision.
- The objectives are expressed as
Maximize	 Maximum	 Pi(xi) (Z (R, n). ali-Fa2i. xj)-1-	 ;
S
A summary of the development of the Problem description, and
objective function formulation follows.
The construction industry is comprised of approximately
80,000 firms and they are characterised by their diversity and
versatility. The market which is the focus of this investigation
is that segment of the industry referred to as the General Building
field. This field is characterised by projects of low contractural
risk with minimal resource constraints. It is a market in which
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• there are a large number of potential competitors and there
exists little differentiation either in the products offered or in
the firms' methods of producing the products. Four Sample
Companies that operate in the field are introduced. It is the
market of these companies, as exhibited by their bidding
histories, that is investigated.
•Uncertainty is the key element in the building construction •
field. It arises in the process of construction - contract uncertainty
- and in the method of obtaining contracts - estimating uncertainty.
These uncertainties are a natural result of the procedures and
practices employed in the industry.
Competitive bidding is the normal method of contract
allocation. The manner in which the process functions gives rise
to a two stage decision problem. The decision maker is first
required to make a Selection Decision (the decision to tender) and
then an Adjudication Decision (the decision on a tender price).
The testing of the Sample Companies' data with two
decision rules indicated that: there was potential for improvement
in the companies' operations; the difference between the bid price
and the estimated cost was inadequate as a value measure;
managerial judgement appeared to be a relevant variable.
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The variables in the decision situation were used as the
basis for constructing a quantitative objective function. Using
a discounted cash flow basis, an objective function was formul-
ated which could accommodate uncertainty and future expectation.
A contracted version of this formulation, the Adjudication objective,
was tested and the results indicated that the objective was
compatible with situations sought by the sample companies in
practice.
In this Chapter only the controllable variables have been
considered. However, the measures of value and the objectives
are expressed as functions of the uncontrollable variable. The
treatment of the uncontrollable variable is the subject of Chapter
3.
CHAPTER 3: THE UNCONTROLLABLE VARIABLE
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The uncontrollable variable in the Competitive Bidding
Problem is the value of the lowest competitor's bid (or bids
when considering a set of contracts). The relationship between
this variable and managerial objectives has been the principal
focus of operational research Bidding Theory. Appendix 4
contains a brief review of the Theory.
The probabilistic method has received most attention in
the literature and seems to offer the best prospects for appli-
cation. This approach assumes the existence of a probability
of success value P.(x1.), corresponding to each bid value x.,1	 1
and uses expected value concepts in the decision function. The
value P.(x.) and the expected value concept have already been1 1
introduced without explanation, in Section 2. 5. 5, to formulate
the objective function.
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This Chapter is concerned with explaining, examining,
and extending the probablistic treatment of the Competitive
'Bidding Problem. The Section titled Probabilistic Basis outlines
the assumptions and concepts underlying the approach. Then
the Friedman Model and some of the published variants are
examined and discussed. Criticisms of the probablistic approach
and some of the models is the topic of Section 3. 3. 3. Section
3..4 describes the development of a probability model which
incorporates the decision makers subjective assessment of the
competition into the bid determination algorithm.
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3. 2 PROBABILISTIC BASIS
Two basic concepts underly the probablistic method of
treating the uncontrollable variable. The first is the assumption
of the existence of a continuous function that relates the probabil-
ity of winning to the value of the bid price. The second is the
use of the statistical concept of expected value as a guide to
action.
3.2.1	 Probability of Winning 
It is not the intention of this thesis to enter the subjective
-objective probability debate and try to justify the assigning of
probabilities to the outcomes of unique events. There exist
many precedents in business literature and Bidding Theory for
this approach. Therefore,  the existence of a continuous function
which relates the value of a specified bid to the probability of
that bid being the low bid, or winner, on a particular contract is 
assumed.
Intuitively this assumption seems reasonable. For any
contract it is simple to conceive of a high price which could not
1.0
0. 5
0. 0
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win (Probability = 0) and a low price that could not lose
(Probability = 1). One could normally expect the function
between these two points to be a downward sloping curve as
illustrated below.
Probability
Of
Winning
Bid Price
CURVE INDICATING PROBABILITY OF WINNING AS A
FUNCTION OF THE BID PRICE
The function is simple to hypothesize, but difficult to define
mathematically. The method of distinguishing between the three
main probabilistic approaches, Friedmans, Gates, and Edelmans
is in the way they evaluate the probability function. A fourth
method is developed in Section 3.4.
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Marvin Gates (12) builds his probability curve from the
assumption that all firms competing for a contract do so on
equal terms. Thus the probability of winning equals 1/N for
each of the N firms competing. By regression on historical
bids Gates determined a formula which relates changes in
probability to changes from standard bidding position.
Edelman (8) based his curve on the subjective estimates
of management and reported very satisfactory results. However
Edelman's market contained client bias, and non-price features
such as delivery times and thus is not directly applicable to the
Management Problem where price alone determines the winner
and contracts are not differentiable.
The Friedman approach (11) is based upon the assumption
that the competitors bids are random samples from a distribution.
Since this assumption is common to the method developed in this
thesis it is considered in detail.
3. 2. 2	 Order Statistics Development 
Definition - Let z1, ••• , zn be random samples from a
distribution. Let y l, ... , yn be the zi's
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arranged in order of magnitude so that
Yl < Y2 < " < Yn' Then the yi 's are
sorder statistics of the z.' .1
The problem is stated as follows:
Determine for a given contract i, the probability P i(xi) that a
bid x, 	 0	 x.
	
00), will be the lowest bid. There are
n competitors, therefore in order for xi to be the lowest it must
be lower than the smallest of the n competitors' bids.
Assume that the n competitors' bids are random samples
(z1 , z2 ,	 zn ) from a density f(z).
L	 set yi , y2 ,	 , yn be order statistics for the z.'
with Y i Y2 <	 < Yn'
The joint density of the order statistics is*
h(Yi , 3T 2 , • • • , Yn) = n! f(n) f (3,2)	 f(y)
The density function of 3/ 1 ,	 p(y1), is the density function
of the lowest of the n bids. p(y 1) is found by integrating
y2 to yn out of 11(y1 , y2 ,	 , y).
* Reference 21, page Z40
P (x )	 = P(37 1)41 =
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13(n) =	 •
Y1
=	 re.f(y1)
• •
y4
Yl
c-.
Y 1
v
13'3
NY1, Y 2 , - - • , yn)	 dy2 dy 3
Y1
3TLI	
51y3
(Yn) dy21(Y2)1 (Y3)"
Y1	
y 
1
dyn
dyn
And term by term integration gives
n-1
p(y1) = n( 1 - F(y1))	 f(Y1)
where	 F(y 1
) = •S'Yl	
f(y)dy
-co
The probability that a bid x is the lowest or winning bid is
the probability that yi is greater than x.
r•co
n-1
n( 1 - F(yd )	 f(yddyi
(3. 2. 2-1)
3. 2. 3	 Expected Value 
The expected value of an event is defined as the product
of the probability of the event occurring and the value of the
event if it occurs. For the contract situation if V a is the value
of the contract if it is won-
' Vb is the value of the contract if it
is lost and P is the probability of winning the contract; then the
expected value of the contract is
(P) Va	+ 	 ( 1 - P ) Vb	 (3.2. 3-1)
The objective used in this thesis as a criteria for the
Management Decision Problem is Maximize Expected Value.
The arguments and rationale for this approach have been well
developed and the interested reader is referred to, "Probability
and Statistics for Business Decisions" by R. Schlaifer (27).
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3. 3 PUBLISHED MODELS
This Section is concerned with the methods and assump-
tions of some of the published operational research bidding
models. Only the Friedman, and Friedman based models are
considered here. This is so because the Edelman model is not
applicable to the market studied, and the Gates model is
essentially the same as the previously introduced OPTM and
OPT2 procedures. The models discussed are all based upon the
random sample, order statistic development and all seek to
maximize expected value. Where they differ is in their method
of deriving the underlying distribution f(x) .
3. 3. 1 Friedman Model 
In his 1956 paper (11), Friedman proposed deriving a
distribution for each competitor by examining past contracts
and building a frequency distribution from the ratios of the
competitor's past bids to the company's cost estimates. In this
manner he derived a distribution for each competitor. The
probability of winning a contract was the product of the
probabilities of beating each competitor participating.
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This approach is open to criticism in so far as, if the
competitors are identifiable, it is probable that far more is
known about them than their distribution of bids. For example
in the Civil engineering motorway construction field, where the
competitors are limited and known, one firm revealed to this
study that it keeps very detailed records of its competitors; to
the extent that it knows what contracts they have won, the
approximate stage of completion of their existing contracts, the
location of their equipment, etc. Even without this detailed
information, the methods of Mercer and Russell (19) for determin-
ing known competitors intentions are likely to provide a better
basis for the Management Decision than just the historical
distribution of bids.
For the condition where there are so many competitors
that it is uneconomic to accumulate data on each one, which is
the case in the market being studied, Friedman proposed the
concept of an "average competitor". A bidding distribution of
the average competitor is derived by combining all previous
ratios of an opposition bid to the company's cost estimate into
• a single distribution function.
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If f(w) is the probability density function of the ratio of the
average competitor's bids to the cost estimates; then the
probability of a bid of x being lower than one average
competitor's bid is
•-• 00
f (w) dw
where k is again the estimated cost. The probability of being
lower than n average competitors is
i oo
x f(w) dw)n
k
From an operational viewpoint, this model has much to
recommend it. Depending only upon historical data and with an
expected value function of a shape illustrated below it is easily
adapted to a discrete computer method of solution.
Expected	 +
Value
(
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Two published reports of successful application of this
model to construction companies are Park (24), and Morin and
Clough (20). Park noted that the distribution was fairly stable
and that the principal determinant of the optimum bid was the
number of competitors. Thus, after determining the distribution
for a company, he was able to develop a list of optimum mark-ups,
dependent only upon the number of competitors. Morin and Clough
used exponential smoothing to introduce the bid-cost ratios into
the distribution and reported profit increases in the order of 27%.
3.3.2	 Friedman Variants
Hanssmann and Rivett (14) stayed within the basic Friedman
concept but replaced the average competitor with the "lowest
competitor". A bidding distribution for the lowest competitor is
derived by combining all previous ratios of the lowest opposing
bid to the company's cost estimate into a single distribution. The
method assumes that the firm is only competing against this one
super competitor. Whether this is valid is questionable since
most of the other determinations regard the number of competitors
as a major parameter.
The model proposed in, "Fundamentals of Operations
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Research" ( 1 ) goes one step further. It assumes that the
distribution of the ratios, i. e. lowest competitor bid to company
cost estimate, is normal. The CM-squared test was used to
check this assumption for the Sample Companies data. The
ratio employed was; lowest competitor bid to Z corrected
estimated cost, and the hypothesis that the distribution is normal
was accepted in every case at the 10% level of significance.
3. 3. 3	 Criticism of Models
One criticism of the Friedman type models is that they
are not applicable if the contracts are differentiable, (i.e. have
different values to different firms). This criticism is valid, but
not appropriate, since in the market studied the contracts are not
significantly differentiable. Appropriate criticism rests on the
two assumptions implicit in the use of bid-estimate ratios for
deriving the probability functions. The first assumption is
that competitors will continue to behave as they have done in the 
past. The second is that cost estimating does not change. 
The first assumption is sufficient to cast doubt on the
model. Presumably a competitor's pricing policy is a function
of Ms available capacity and the market condition. As his capacity
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increases he could be expected to lower his mark-up to obtain
additional work. If his capacity is highly utilised, and the
market is good, he could be expected to raise his mark-ups.
These comments can also apply to the aggregate behaviour of
competitors because the major fluctuations in the industry often
result in capacity of all firms being highly utilised or all firms
being slack. The distribution compiled from the ratios could
easily cover more than one market condition and thus indicate a
much wider range than is actually present. Equally possible is
a case where the distribution could be compiled from a market
situation that is the reverse of the one in which the present
contract is being bid; with the result that the competitors'
behaviour will have changed markedly from that expressed by the
distribution.
Friedman proposed his model for the situation where the
past bids of the competitors are known but no other information.
However, the model was titled, "Realistic Bidding Problems",
and it seems improbable that in a realistic bidding problem the
only information available is the past history of competitors' bids.
Indeed, this information tells which, and how many, contracts the
competitors have won. This, coupled with a slight knowledge of
their capacities, should indicate whether they are likely to bid
high or low. Even without specific knowledge of individual
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competitor's capacities; one usually possesses some concept
of the aggregate capacity of the field. Then, since there is a
basis for estimating the volume of work let to date, (from the
history of bids), an estimate can be made of the remaining
capacity. Reasoning along economic lines it can be assumed that
as the remaining capacity of competitors diminishes, there will
be an upward trend in prices. This trend will be damped in a
model that uses historical data as a basis for computing probabil-
ities. The exponential smoothing approach employed by Morin
and Clough (20) should reduce this damping effect. However, even
with this device the model has no way of reacting to changes in the
situation which are not reflected in past bids, but are known to
the decision maker. Therefore some of the available information
is suppressed by these models. 
The second assumption of constant cost estimation could
produce major errors in the bid determination. This could occur
in an obvious manner, like the hiring of a new estimator, or it
could occur in a less obvious way . Perhaps due to losing a
series of contracts the estimator might, consciously or sub-
consciously, be trying to reduce his cost estimates. It is easy
to envisage this sort of situation. In one set of data examined
during the research, on 9 out of 19 contracts, the cost estimate
was above the winning bid. This situation must obviously result
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in considerable psychological pressure on the estimators to
produce lower estimated costs. The estimating work load can
also affect the cost estimates. Presumably an overworked
estimating department is more likely to make errors. Again
these situations are known to the decision maker but are not
incorporated into the models.
The major criticism made of the Friedman, bid-cost
ratio approach is that it does not use all the available information.
The literature has provided no way of integrating these models
with managerial knowledge and expectation of the competitive
situation.
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3. 4 A SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY APPROACH
The principal criticism of the probability models is,
therefore, that they suppress some of the available data. This
is significant since the feasibility study, Section 2.4, indicated
that these suppressed data, the results of managerial judgement,
are relevant in the decision situation. Therefore a model was
developed that incorporates managerial judgement in a probabil-
istic bidding strategy model.
A precedent for this approach is the PERT method of
handling uncertain durations. In PERT the problem was to devise
a method of scheduling activities of an uncertain or variable
duration. The method adopted was to assume that the durations
followed a standard distribution, the beta, and use the best inform-
ation available, managerial estimate, to determine the distribution
parameters. In competitive bidding the problem is to determine
the uncertain behaviour of the competitors and a method analogous
to that of PERT is used.
The initial assumption is that the competitors' bids on a
specific contract are random samples from a distribution. This
. assumption is the same as that of the Friedman approach and the
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order statistic derivation, Section 3.2.2, of the probability of
winning applies. The,n it is assumed that there is one general 
distribution function that applies to all building construction 
contracts. The parameters of the distribution relate it to a
specific contract. That is, there exists a function f(z; e )
that is common to all contracts; the e being a set of parameters
that are unique to a specific contract. If this is the case, and
f(z; e ) can be determined in terms of the set e then the
problem of determing the probability function for a particular
contract is reduced to the problem of determing the set of para-
meters ( o ) that are particular to that contract.
The determination of the parameters is left to the decision
maker. His experience, knowledge of the market, intuition, etc.
are used to determine the values. In this manner the model
incorporates managerial judgement and becomes a subjective
probability approach.
3.4.1	 Experimental Determination of f(z; e) 
For computational reasons, it is simpler to determine
the cumulative distribution function F(z; ). The determination
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of F( - ) was carried out in the following manner:
1. A general shape was assumed for the function F.
2. The coefficients of the general shape were calculated by
multiple regression analysis and tested for significance by
means of a t test.
The data for the multiple regression analysis were historical
contract bids. These were provided by the Contracts Directorite
of the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works. A description of
the data is found in Appendix 5. If the original assumption, i. e.
that bids are random samples from a distribution, is valid, then
when the bids on a given contract are ranked in order of size,
from the smallest to the largest, an estimate of the cumulative
probability is the rank number divided by the total number of
bids plus 1. For example, if N is the total number of bids on
the contract, the cumulative probability of the first (lowest) is
1	 , of the second is  2  , and so on up to the highest
N + 1	 N + 1
which is	 N .	 Since the data contained no ties, the problem
N + 1
of resolving ties did not arise.
The multiple regression analysis was done using the ICL
Statistical package, XDS3. A Fortran IV program, STAT, was
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written to generate the input matrix from the data. STAT and
XDS3 were run on the City University ICL 1905 Computer.
Trial Number 1
The first assumption made was that the cumulative
probability function F had the shape of an S-curve. The
equation
b3F
2
	+ b 4ln(F) + b5 1n(1-F)x = b1 + b2F
(3.4.1-1)
is a general equation for an S-curve with 0 z F	 1 .*
Therefore the General Distribution Equation was assumed to be
x.	 bli + b2iF + b3 F2 + b4ln(F) + b5ln(1 - F)1
(3.4.1-2)
where the bli and b2i are the el and e2 of contract i
and the b3 ' b4 ' and b5 are common to all contracts.
The b4 and b5 coefficients control the curvature at the ends
of the S-curve and it is unreasonable to assume that they would be
constant for all contracts. Therefore the data was stratified and it
was assumed that b 3 , b4 , and b5 were constant for
* This equation was provided in a private communication from
Mr. A. H. Russell.
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contracts within the stratified range, (e. g. for £100,000 -4
x	 £200,000). The strata boundaries were arbitrarily
set at £100,000, £200,000, £300,000, .
The regression matrix for this trial, where m is the
total number of contracts, is
bll
x11	 1
b12
0
blm
0
b21
1
N1+1
x12	 1 0 0 2N +11
N1
X	 11N1
0 0 N +11
x21	 0 1 0 0
x22	 0 1 0 0
x2N	 02
1 0 0
x
ml	 00 1
xm2 0 0 1 0
xmNm0 0 1 0
1
N.1
Norm x.. -=11
(3.4.1-4)
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A regression analysis was performed on a sample of
19 contracts, ( 6 Z N Z 10) ; (£100, 000--. x Z £200, 000 ) ,
and the results can best be described as erratic. The b 5
term was not significantly non-zero when tested at a 5% level of
significance and only a few of the b2i terms were significant
at this level. This indicated that the shape of the distribution
was more like
x	 =	 bli + b3 F2 + b4ln(F)
	 (3.4.1-3)
and that the stratification of the data was not sufficient. Therefore
the trial was run using normalised bid values. They were
normalised by dividing them by the mean of the bids for that
contract. That is
When tested at the 5% level this analysis produced non-significant
results for bli' b21'. and b5 .	 This reduced the equation to
norm=x.	 Const. + b3F
2
	+ b 4ln(F)i
(3.4.1-5)
1xml 
A
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m
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m
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Trial Number 2
Using the normalised data, the next general shape tested
was
A.
x.
1
1	 b
o	b 3F
2
	+ b 6
F	 (3.4.1-6)
where A. = the arithmetic mean of the bids on contract i.1
Therefore the General Distribution Function was assumed to be
	
x.	 = A. (b
	 + b3F
2
	+ b 6 / F)	 (3.4.1-6)
	
1	 1 o
with A1. (the mean bid) being the parameter to be estimated and
b
o' b3' and b6 being common to all contracts. The regression
matrix for this trial is
b
o	b 3	 6
x11 21	 1 
Al	 Ni+	
N1 +1
1
2
	
NI	 N1+1
	(  N1 +1 )	 N1
x1N 1	 1
Al
-137-
The regression was performed on a sample of 57 contracts,
7	 N	 9. At the 5% level of significance all the variables
were included. The results are given in the table below.
TABLE OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS
COEFFICIENT VALUE STANDARD ERROR
b
o
0.9744490 0.00448
b3 0.1352319 0.00728
b6 -0.0055555 0.00076
These results appear reasonable and so the General Distribution
is taken to be
xi = Ai(0.974449 + 0.1352319 F(xi)2 - 0.0055555 / F(xi) )
(3.4.1-7)
where x.	 = the bid on contract i1
F(xi)	 the cumulative probability distribution
x.1 f(x)dx
-oo
A. = the arithmetic mean of the competitors' bids.
•
3. 4. 2	 Consistency of Distributions 
It was argued in Chapter 2 that an estimate was a random
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sample from a distribution and that this distribution could be
approximated by a uniform distribution. Then by assuming
that the lowest estimated cost won the auction, and that all
competitors had the same estimating accuracy range, the expected
value of the winning cost estimate was calculated.
The General Distribution derived from the regression
analysis is proposed as the distribution of bids on a contract.
Obviously, for this development to be consistent it must be related
to the earlier, uniform distribution. The following example is used
to indicate the relationship.
Let 4' be the multiplier that converts an estimate 	 to a
bid g:
II	 f(k)
Then f(g)
and F(g)
=
=
=
1
1
g	 1
4,fi
g.
d Y
4).k.J
100-R
4)(100-R)
k-4-100+R
g	 (100+R)
2
4,
4(100 - )
(	 g 100 A- 1)
4)11 R .411 2-
(3.4.2-1)
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Figure 3.1 shows '(g) plotted for an estimating accuracy of
+ 8% (R=16), and	 values of 1.05, 1.07, and 1.09. The
black dots on the figure are points of the General Distribution
equation for a mean bid of 107. The agreement between distrib-
utions is taken as an indication that the development is consistent
and in reasonable agreement with the data.
It is not proposed that all contracts have the same estimat-
ing accuracy, or that the contractor with the lowest mark-up wins,
or that the uniform distribution is the best one for estimating
accuracy. However, it is argued that the general cumulative
frequency distribution for bids and the use of the uniform distrib-
ution for cost estimates are consistent and provide adequate
description of behaviour of the real system. Hence they may be
employed in a prescriptive bidding model.
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3. 4. 3	 The General Distribution Model
It is proposed that the formula (3.4.1-7) be used as the
functional relationship between the bid value, x i, and the
probability of winning, Pi(xi). A managerial estimate is used
for the value of A. . It is an estimate of the arithmetic mean of1
the competitors' bids and as such is an estimate of the aggregate 
behaviour of the competitors. Formally, the relationships in the
model are
Objective = maximize	 maximum	 (Z(R, n)aii +
c:e5
a2ixi) + 1. ;
where
	 P.(x.)11
x.1
=	 (1 - F.1(xi) )n	(3. 4. 2-1)
= e(0. 974449 + 0.1352319Fi(xi) 2
- O. 0055555 /Fi(xi) )
ei	 managerial assessment of the arithmetic
mean of the competitors' bids on contract i.
By incorporating a managerial assessment of the
competitive situation into the parameter 0, this model avoids
the information suppression criticism of the previous models.
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Since the model implies no fixed relationship between the
estimated cost and the level of competitive activity, it is also
applicable to situations where the contracts are differentiable,
and the competitors unknown. This General Distribution Model
is tested in Chapter 5, Empirical Evaluation.
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3. 5 SUMMARY
This Chapter investigated the relationship between the
uncontrollable variable (the lowest competitor's bid) and the
managerial objectives. The objectives are expressed in
expected value terms and the uncontrollable variable is a subject
of statistical prediction.
Assuming that the competitors bids are random samples
from a distribution, a distribution of the lowest competing bid
is derived. From this the probability of winning can be
calculated. The Friedman based bid - cost ratio methods of
deriving the underlying distribution are the most popular.
However they are liable to criticism as they suppress some of
the available information. A method of incorporating the
additional information into the probabilistic concept was proposed
and the relationship empirically determined. The method is
analogous to the PERT method of handling uncertain durations.
The result is a model which bases probability determination upon
a managerial assessment of the competitive situation and a
general distribution of bids about the mean.
CHAPTER 4: OPTIMAL DECISION MODEL
4.1 INTRODUCTION
To this point this thesis has concentrated on analysing
certain aspects of the Management Problem. An objective
function has been proposed and a method of probabilistically
treating the predicted behaviour of the competition developed.
In this Chapter a mathematical model of the decision situation
is developed. Using this formulation it is theoretically possible
to calculate a mathematically optimum solution for the
Management Problem.
The model is developed by considering a series of cases,
proceeding from the simple, single contract unconstrained, case
to the complex, N contracts, constrained, sequential bidding
case. It is proposed that the complex case is a reasonable mapping
of the actual bidding situation.
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4.2 MODEL FORMULATION
4. 2. 1	 Decision Situation
The mathematical model is constructed from the single
contract decision process presented in Chapter 2. The two
parts of the decision, Selection and Adjudication, are combined
in this formulation to produce the decision situation illustrated
below.
4. 2. 2	 Independence Assumption 
In the model the contracts are assumed to be independent.
That is there is no inherent interaction between contracts and the
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right to bid on one is in no way dependent upon the results of
action with respect to another. Also the winning of one
contract does not provide a competitive advantage, or disadvant-
age, on another. Internal interactions, i. e. contracts competing
for the firms resources, are considered.
This is not an unrealistic assumption. Most of the
contract interaction is internal and this is considered. The
external interactions that are usually found in building construct-
ion are where a contract is one of a series of stage contracts, or
where a contract provides opportunities for future work, as in
the case of getting on the list of an architect. Both these inter-
actions imply possible future benefits and so can be accommodated
by including in the contracts value measure the discounted
expected value of the benefit.
The assumption would not be realistic for civil engineering
construction where there is specialised plant and wider geograph-
ical dispersion of a more limited number of suitably qualified
contractors. For a civil engineering contractor, one job in
Malaya obviously influences getting another there, and a piece
of specialised plant purchased for one contract can produce a
competitive advantage on another contract requiring that plant.
But building construction has little specialised plant and the
r-147-
companies tend to concentrate their activities in a small area.
4. 2. 3	 Notation
In the formulation, the following notation is used.
i	 = subscript referring to the individual contracts.
h	 = subscript referring to resource type.
j	 = subscript referring to time period.
x.	 = amount bid on contract i.1
X	 = vector of contract bids (x. x	 ..	 X.))1 ,	2' 	 x'	 '	 PI 
V.(x.) = value of contract i if it is won with a bid of x..11	 1
Pi(xi) = probability of winning contract i with a bid of xi.
1.	 = cost of prearing and submitting a bid for contract i.i
It is a negative constant.
= amount of resource h required by contract i in timeNil
period j.
Cih	 = amount of resource h available in time period j.
4. 2.4	 Expected Value 
For each contract i, there is a value attached to each of
=	 P.(x.) V.(x.) + 1.11	 11	 1 (4. 2. 4-1)
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the possible outcomes of the decision situation. These are
illustrated below.
V.(x.) + 1
1,_ ,. ',n)"- _-----
11
Le,
DECISION
	 n..,........p 0
The expected value of the decision, Bid xi , is
Pi(xi) (Vi(xi) + l i) + (1 - Pi(xi) ) li
i
The expected value of the decision, Do Not Bid, is
0
4. 2. 5	 Case 1 - Single Contract: No Constraints
For this case, xi = x1 = x; li
 = 1i = 1	 and so on.
Nco-r
0d ( P(x) V(x) +1 ) _dx (4.2.5-2)
(4.2.5-2)
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(V(x) + 1)
LDECISION
1	 r,cb
The decision tree above illustrates the situation. The expressions
in the brackets are the values resulting from the different outcomes.
The expected value of the decision, Bid x
= P(x) V(x) + 1
and the expected value of the decision, Do Not Bid
= 0
The objective is to determine the maximum expected value
decision. The objective function is expressed as
MAXIMIZE
	 ( P(x) V(x) + 1 , 	 0))	 (4.2.5-1)
x
0 . -P(x) 1
To determine the x which maximizes the first part of the
objective function, differentiate that part of the expression
w.r.t. x and set the first derivative equal to zero.
P(x)  d V(x) + V(x) ddPx(x) _ 0
dx
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If (P(x) V(x) + 1 ) is a concave function in the region of the
*
optimum, the x resulting from the solution of (4.2.5-2)
is the optimum bid value.
The decision function for Case 1 is therefore:
*	 *	 *
Bid x
	
if P(x)V(x) + 1
	 )0
*Do Not Bid if P(x*
 ) V(x ) + 1	 <0
(4. 2. 5-3)
*	 *In the rare event that P(x ) V(x ) + 1 = 0, either decision
is optimal.
4. 2. 6	 Case 2: N Contracts: Simultaneous Bidding:
No Constraints
The decision situation for this Case is the same as that
for Case 1 except that here the decision is made simultaneously
for all the members of a set of contracts. The expected value is
the sum of the expected values of the individual contracts. The
objective function for this Case is
N
MAXIMIZE	 [Pi(xi) Vi(xi) + l i ,	 0}.	 (4. 2. 6-1)
X	 	 ..1=
0	 Pi(xj)-1
and setting them equal to zero provides N equations.
1,1
P. (x.)V.(x.) + 1.) = P, (xi) ()Vi(xi) + Vi(x)) Pi(xi) = 0iiii	 1	 1
	1
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Taking partial derivatives of the first parts of the expression
	
a x.() x.
	 (7) x.1	 1	 1
(4. 2. 6-2)
for i = 1,2, ..., N
which are the same as equation (4.2. 5-2) of Case 1. This is
obvious as the function is separable. The decision function for
each contract in this Case is the same as (4.2. 5-3). Thus it
can be seen that, in the absence of any constraints, the optimum
decision for a given contract i is the same regardless of
whether or not it is one of a set of contracts. It is also apparent
that, for this Case, the optimum decision is not affected by
whether the contracts are bid sequentially, or simultaneously;
or by whether you know the results of the first c contracts before
you bid on the remaining N-c contracts.
Cases 1 and 2 are essentially the same as the "General
Model" developed by Friedman (11).
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4.2. 7 Case 3: Single Contract: Independent Constraints
An independent constraint is defined as one which is a
function of the contract i , but not of the amount bid, xi .
This is the normal type of resource constraint encountered
where the men, plant, and materials necessary to fulfill the
contract are a function of the contract but independent of the bid
price.
With the introduction of constraints, the fact that a
contract has a dimension in time must be considered. If the
time interval under consideration, i. e. the duration of the
contract, is divided into m discrete intervals of length t;
then the amount of resource h required in time period j can
be expressed as Rjh ' and the amount of resource h available
(capacity) in time period j is Cih.
The decision situation for this Case is the similar to
Case 1. The Objective Function for this Case is
MAXIMIZE [P(x) V(x) + 1 , 01
x
0-P(W1
(4. 2. 7-1)
Subject to	 R .
 Z Cjh
h=1, 2, ...,r
-153-
For the case of a single contract, probabilistic treatment of
a constraint is meaningless. It is a binary (yes-no) situation.
Either there are sufficient resources to fulfill the contract,
in which event the decision function of Case 1 applies; or
there are not sufficient resources and the decision is Do Not Bid.
Formally, the decision function for Case 3 is
*	 *
Bid x	 if P(x )V(x )+1	 0	 andR
	
Cjhjh
for j=1, 2, .. 
• f
h=1, 2, .. 
•
(4. 2. 7-2)
Do Not Bid	 if P(x* )V(x* )+1 < 0 or
	 Rjh
	 Cjh
for any j=1, 2, ... , m
or h=1, 2, ... , r
If P(x)V(x) + 1 = 0 and Rjh	 Cjh for all j and h,
either decision is optimal.
4.2. 8	 Case 4: N Contracts: Simultaneous Bidding:
Independent Constraints
This is the general Case and the other cases can be
considered to be this case modified by simplifying assumptions.
The case is similar to Case 2 and the objective function is the
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sum of the individual contract expected values. However, , the
function is no longer separable as the constraints create an
inter-relationship between the contracts.
Since this Case deals with a set of contracts, the
statistical concept of expected resource utilisation is employed.
The effect of using this concept is best demonstrated by example.
Consider the simple example where a company that possesses
one tower crane and cannot acquire another, has the opportunity to
bid on two contracts, A and B, each of which would require the
crane. Using the expected resource utilisation concept, as long as
the sum of the probabilities of winning the two contracts was less
than 1, the company would bid both contracts. That is, if
PA = probability of winning contract A
pB = probability of winning contract B
RA = resource requirement for contract A = 1. 0
RB = resource requirement for contract B = 1. 0
C	 = capacity = 1.0
as long as PA .RA + PB.RB	 C
PA .1	 + PB.1	
1
	 1.0
both contracts will be bid.
This does not prevent the contractor from achieving the
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embarrassing position of winning two contracts and having only
one crane; but it does provide a rationale which permits him
to bid both contracts.
For Case 4, the problem is formulated as
MAXIMIZE	 V.(x.)	 1.
X 1=1
subject to	
,Jh - C.	 (4. 2. 8-1)
active i's
for j = 1, 2, ... , m
h = 1, 2, ... , r
R..	 C.ijh -	 jh for all active i's
and for all j and h
where the active i's refer to all contracts included in the solution
sub-set. Solution procedures for this Case will be considered in
Section 4. 3.
4.2. 9
	 Case 5: N Contracts: Independent Constraints:
Sequential Bidding 
In this Case the bids for contracts are made sequentially
and the results of the previous auctions are assumed to be known
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before the next bid is placed. That is, the first contract is bid,
the results are made known; then the secOnd contract is bid;
and so on. The order in which the contracts are bid is considered
in this Case. To formulate the problem the contracts are
numbered in the reverse order to the way in which they are bid.
First contract N is bid, the results of the auction made known,
then contract N-1 is bid, and so on. The decision situation is
illustrated diagramatically below.
CONTRACT N	 CONTRACT N-1
	 CONTRACT N-2
P.(x.) R.1 1
	 1	 (4.2.9.1)-=Yr C
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The only decision that must be made is the first one, (Contract
N). For that decision there is a total of 3N possible outcomes.
Since this is a multi-stage decision problem, a dynamic
programming approach is used to formulate it. Consider the
situation where j = 1, h = 1; the development for j, h > 1 is
the same but more complicated. Then considering only those
contracts for which R 1. -4 C, C being the capacity.
Let yr be the expected remaining resources when there are
r-1 decisions left.
N
When only one decision remains, (I. e. the last contract),
the expected value of the decision is
r131 (x1) Vi(xi) +
	 1 1
 ,	 30	 (4. 2. 9-2)
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Let f
1 ( 3' 	 be the maximum expected value when one
decision remains.
r
Ii ( IL ) - MAXIMUM	 Z pioci vi(x is) + 11 , oI(4. 2. 9-3)
xl
subject to constraint 	 Pi(xl)R1
on the decision to bid.
The effect of the concept of expected resource requirement
is apparent here. It is possible for R. > Ifi	 2- 9 that is the resource
required by contract 1 to be more than the expected remaining
capacity, as long as the expected resource requirement, 21(x1)R1
is less.
The basis for this approach is that,whilst this is not the
way the decision would be made in practice when this decision
stage is reached, it permits allowance to be made for future
possibilities at the first stage of the decision process.
The two part nature of the objective function results in
different constraint conditions applying to the different alternatives.
In the situation where there is only one contract left, the constraint
PM R1 2Y
— U?.
if contract 2 is not bid and contract 1 is bid
Y3	 if contract 2 is bid and contract 1 is not bid
2
-159-
applies only if the decision to bid results in the maximum value
of f1 ( ?fa ) . The decision not to bid is not constrained since
it requires no resources. This point becomes clearer when the
situation of two decisions (contracts) remaining is examined.
,c2)	 4 V. ( X2)
17_ +
-C s (L)
Ca( Y3) = MAX [P,()(Vaci0 +.?„ %)) + (1-Ror.))(1.. k, OA -F,(g3)]
= MA) [ FZ0(,)VAK.) )2. + (	 (1-5)
(4. 2. 9-4)
subject to constraints
P1(x1)R1+P2 (x2)R2 z	 if contract 2 is bid and contract 1
is bid.
P.(x.) R.11subject to 2 n+1
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These constraints can be expressed as
-7 P.(x.) R.
	 1 11
 1
acts ve_
Ito.% 	 I
where the active i's include only those contracts which are bid.
For the general case, n decisions (contracts) left this becomes
fn I n+1) = MAX [Pnn nn	 n(x) V(x) + I + fn-1 (2(n) ) fn-1an+1
(4.2.9-5)
And for the first contract, ( N decisions remaining)
(4.2.9-6)
subject to	
	  1 1 1
 N+1
Ckaa sic
For the first contract the expected remaining resources
are the initial starting capacity.
+ 1 = C
J CP.(x.)R.1 1 1
,,,ctwe i.A
subject to
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Therefor e
fn(e) = MAXIMUM [PN(xN) VN(xN) 1+ -N + 1N-1 (C - PN(N)RN),
fN - 1(C)]
(4. 2. 9-7)
which is just another way of writing the equations for the N
contract, simultaneous bidding case, (eqn. 4. 2. 8-1). From this
it is concluded that when a contract is a member of a constrained
set, if the concept of expected resource utilisation is employed
it is necessary to determine the optimum decision for all contracts
in the set to obtain the optimum decision for a single contract in
the set. The difference between the simultaneous and the sequential
cases is that in the simultaneous case all bids are decided, whereas
in the sequential case only the decision for the first contract is made.
The results of the auction determine the capacity limitations for
calculating the optimum decision for the second contract, and so on.
R..	 C.ijh -	 jh for active i's
and for all j and h
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4.3 SOLUTION PROCEDURES
Cases 1, 2, and 3 require to determine the optimum
decision that the equation
Pi(xi) dVi(xi)	 + Vi(xi) dPi.(xi)	 = 0
dx.	 dx.
(4.3-1)
be solved for x. The solution procedures adopted for these
Cases depend upon the expressions used for P(x) and V(x).
In Chapter 5, solution algorithms using the Adjudication Value -
function from Section 2. 5.6 and several different probability
functions, are developed and tested.
To solve the problem for the general formulation, Cases
4 and 5, it is necessary to determine the vector of contract bids,
X, that
MAXIMIZES	 ( P.(x.) V.(x.) + 1. , 0)1 1	 1 1	 1X
0-P(x)4--1	 i=1
subject to	 	  Pi(xi) Riih 	 jhC 	for j = 1,2, ...,m
ta	 h=1,2,...,r
P. x. R..	 21 1 ijh - C.
(4. 3.1-1)
subject to
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Like the real problem it models, the mathematical problem has
two parts: first the selection of the optimum sub-set from the
given set of N contracts; and second the determination of the
optimum bid prices for the constracts in the sub-set. Section
4. 3.1 considers the problem of the sub-set N' , where all
contracts are bid; and Section 4.3.2 suggests an approach to
solution of the combined Selection and Adjudication Problem.
4. 3.1	 The Sub-set N'
The set of contracts, N, can be divided into two sub-sets.
Those which are bid,W, and those which are not. Ignoring, for
the moment, how the division is made; the problem of determining
the optimum bids for sub-set N' is examined. Since all the
contracts are to be estimated and bid, the cost of bidding does not
enter the decision. Therefore the problem is
N'
MAXIMIZE	 ----‘13.(x.)V. (x.)ill	 1
Rijh 4 Cjh
- --): 0	 Cjh -' ' 0	 for j = 1,2,..,mRijh h=1,2,...,r
IvN
••nn
For
	 u-ivi
	 0
E RV-
-6 L.. - Civa)
	
.0
-V.,	 Nis
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The following changes are made in the notation:
P. = P. (xi)1
V. = Vi(xi)1
Eliminate any contract that does not satisfy the absolute
capacity constraint: Ri 4 C. Then it is possible to formulate
the Kuhn-Tucker (17) conditions for optimality for the problem.
N'
if uik 0 then	 0
N'
> 0 tker-L	 F PLJh -
L.I
(4.3.1-2)
Ifujh = 0 for all j and h, then the solution is unconstrained
and the optimal x's are the solution to
VP.	 d	 V. dP.1	 1	 +	 1	 1	 0	 (4. 3. 1-3)
dx.	 dx.1	 1
i = 1, 2, .. ,N'
1=1
-165-
If ujh > 0, for all j and h necessary conditions for optimality
are the N' + (m - r) equations:
P. dV.1	 1
dx.1
V. dP.1	 1
dx.1
	
u. R.. dP.	 0jh	 ijh	 1
cbc.1
N'
	 for i = 1,2, ... , N'
- Cjh = 0ijh h = 1,	 , r
(4.3.1-4)
sfor the N' unknown x.' and the (m • r) unkown u's. These
are sufficient conditions of optimality if
P. V.1	 1
is a concave function and the
7 , 13i
 Rijh	 Cjh	 for all j and h
are convex functions satisfying the Kuhn-Tucker regularity
condition.
Theujh's that constrain the solution (i.e. those greater
than 0) are shadow prices for the resources. They are related to
the cost of not having the additional unit of resource h in time
period j.
Fi'64) d Qw.) + V ( 1c,)  Mx.) (IV(%)
I )P)	
2, al	 CA RN.)
otle,
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Example: Consider the case where N = 3, m = 1, r = 1.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions give the following equations.
F(x.) 		 CL 	 u„
d x,	 a x,
Roo d 	 4_ Vex.) Roe.) 
z.	 d
u_, 122. ot P,_	 0
11	 cix.„..
Pacgs) "(1(3) + V	 aReg-6) — (Au 2 311 1/ (16) =-
1)C.3	
3 3 ci 1(3.
a x5
(4.3.1-5)
2'„ + PB„ - C„ = 0
Solving the first three equations for un,
dV.ve.)
RoG) 	
	
ct 2.(qc.)	
\12. ( x21
c1V306))
( 5C,^ ) c •x3	Vse)(,‘)
las ti	 d R ('es)
clx3
-167-
If a feasible solution exists, it can be found by the following
gradient procedure.
1. Compute the unconstrained values of x, from eqn. (4.3.1-3)
This will provide starting values P 1 , P2, P3, and un = 0.
2. ( P1R111	 P2R211	 P3R311	 - C11 )
n+1	 n c
< 0 select a new value u11	 = u11 -	 5 unless
u 11 = 0 in which case the solution is optimal
= 0 this solution is optimal
n+1> 0 select a new value	 u11 = u11 + g
3. Compute P1' P2 and P3 for the new value of u11 and
return to step 2.
4. 3.2 The Two-Stage Problem 
When the Selection phase is introduced the problem becomes
more complex. If the number of contracts (N) is small the most
satisfactory method of solution may be to try all possible combin-
ations.
V.MAXIMIZE
X
0 (4. 3. 2-2)
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A mathematical method of solution is developed as follows:
The Problem: MAXIMIZE
X
10.P.4
(4. 3.2-1)
subject to Cih
j= 1,	 ,
h = 1,	 , r
R.. L C.ijh -	 jh
First eliminate all contracts which fail to satisfy the absolute
capacity constraint R ijh	 Cjh. Then it is necessary to devise
a formulation which confines the first constraint to the sub-set
of active contracts and requires P.1  + 1. 0. Since the
sl.' are independent of the x's; they do not affect the location of
the optimum X. Therefore the optimum for the original problem
is also the optimum for this equivalent problem.
subject to	 P R	 z C.Z1	 ijh -	 jh
and	 P. (P. V. +1 .)	 01	 11	 1
	(R	 -P...
'.Cjh)U.
	 ax.1
Pi
 Vi
3 x.
1
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since 0 ---13 ...1 ; the second constraint ensures that either1
	
P. V. 4- 1.	 0 or P. = 0. If P. = (), contract i does not11
	 1	 1	 1
affect the first constraint.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this formulation are:
for	 =0 and	 ---w.ujh
(-Pi(PiVi + ))
3 x.1
(4. 3. 2-3)
ifu = 0; then 2,P. R.	 - C	 0jh	 ijh	 jh
if ujh > 0; then 	
 1 
Rijh - Cjh = 0
if w. = 0; then	 - P.(P.V. + 1.) .Z 01	 111 	 1
if w. > 0; then	 - Pi(PiVi + 1i) = 0
The w.'s can be regarded as bid selectors. When w. = 0, the
contract i is included in the optimal sub-set; when wi > 0,
the contract is excluded. The w's also have "shadow cost
implications as they are related to the cost of having to bid when
it is not worth doing so.
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The model may be extended beyond this point by the
inclusion of the relationships derived in Chapters 2 and 3.
However, it was decided not to do this, for two reasons. First,
it appears that a point of diminishing returns has been achieved.
Although the extension of the formulation to include the relation-
ships would be an interesting mathematical exercise; the solution
procedures, if they exist, would probably be more complex than
the actual problem. As was discussed in Chapter 2, Building
Construction contracts are not very resource constrained. In fact,
they are even less constrained than an analysis of the resources
required for a contract might suggest. This is because of the
magnitude of the contracts with respect to the existing free
capacity of a firm. The Sample Comfa.nies are major companies
and yet in the time period covered by the data sets, few contracts
are won.
Company A	 12 months	 5 contracts won
Company B	 12 months	 5 contracts won
Company C	 9 months	 10 contracts won
Company D	 19 months	 6 contracts won
In addition, labour is more mobile between firms than in most
industries, and most kinds of building plant may be hired.
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The long durations of contracts also affect the problem
to the extent that in any one year period a company's bidding
activity is only concerned with allocating about 20% of the firms
resources. The remaining 80% being already committed from
the previous years. These small numbers suggest that a
probabilistic procedure is unnecessary since the entire problem
can be easily handled in a discrete manner. The current method
of integrating resources with bidding is to observe when current
p rojects are scheduled for completion, and intensify bidding
activity until contracts commencing at those times are acquired.
However, even this time element is not that crucial in most
cases because some overlapping of contracts is possible, and
alternate interim uses can be found for the site staff who are a
major resource.
The functioning of the selection decision in practice is
primarily explained by the absolute capacity constraint;
2R.	 - C. . Projects are turned away because of insufficientRijh	 i h
capacity. This constraint includes the capacity of the estimating
department to produce an estimate within the specified time. The
formulation indicates that given the absolute capacity, the
selection decision hinges on the relationship of the expected value
to the cost of estimating. Studies carried out by the Sample
Companies indicate that the cost of estimating is approximately
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0.1% of the pound volume estimated. This value being so low,
it appears unlikely that the formulation would eliminate many
contracts for this reason. This agrees with observed practice;
i. e. given absolute capacity, few contracts are turned away.
The second reason for not continuing the development of
the formulation was that, even assuming that a solution procedure
could be devised and that solutions exist, data with which to test
the formulation was not available from the Sample Companies
within the duration of the investigation.
Hence, for both reasons, it was decided to concentrate
further development and testing on the Adjudication Problem, i.e.
Cases 1, 2 and 3 of this Chapter. The Sample Companies data
sets, to which reference has already been made, permit
prescriptive models for this more limited, but significant, problem
to be tested.
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4. 4 SUMMARY
The Competitive Bidding Problem can be described by
a decision tree. Using this tree, and expected value concepts,
and assuming independent contracts and independent resources,
decision functions were developed for a series of competitive
bidding situations. It is apparent from the formulations of the
different Cases that there are only two basic situations. That is,
given sufficient absolute capacity to undertake the contract, the
Decision is either constrained by the expected resources utilisation
of other potential contracts or it is not. If the contract is not
constrained, then the Decision is independent of whether the
contract stands alone or is one of a set, and of whether it is bid
simultaneously with others or sequentially as one of a series.
The solution procedure for the constrained case involves
using mathematical programming and the Kuhn-Tucker optimality
conditions. The general structure of an appropriate model was
proposed, but it was not developed because, although it is felt to
be a reasonable mapping, in the real problem the constraints are
not markedlY inflexible or critical. Thus attention is concentrated
on the unconstrained case which is a close approximation to the
real situation and can be evaluated with the available data.
CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The preceding chapters have developed the approach
to the Competitive Bidding Problem, and a general probabilistic
model has been formulated.
The attention of this thesis now shifts to the research
question - Which of the alternative methods available should 
the decision maker use to make his decision? The alternative
methods amount to the use of the different probability functions.
In this Chapter the different models are empirically tested. All
the Friedman variants are included in the testing. This was done
because, despite the theoretical criticisms that can be directed
at them, there is the possibility that they could perform well, and
the success claimed by Park (24), and Morin and Clough (20)
cannot be ignored. Also included in the testing are the General
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Distribution Model, and a model which arises from trying to use
the OPTM procedures as an automatic feedback correction device.
A total of six models are tested. They are:
Model lA	 Single Contract, Unconstrained, Friedman
Average Competitor Hypothesis.
This is the basic Friedman model. All historical bid-cost ratios
are included in the distribution function with equal weight.
Model lE - Single Contract, Unconstrained, Friedman
Average Competition Hypothesis with
exponential smoothing.
This is the Friedman variant proposed by Morin and Clough.
Here an exponential weighted average of the bid-cost ratios is
used to determine the probability function.
Model 2	 Single Contract, Unconstrained, General •
Distribution Hypothesis.
This is the model developed by this thesis (equations 3.4. 2-1).
Since managerial estimates do not exist in the historical data,
the model was tested under conditions of perfect information.
Subsequently, sensitivity analysis is used to determine the
actual information requirement and permissible error ranges.
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Model 3 - Single Contract, Unconstrained, Normal
Distribution Probability Hypothesis.
This is the model proposed in Fundamentals of Operations
Research (1), which assumes that the distribution of the "lowest
competitor" is normal.
Model 4	 - Single Contract, Unconstrained, Lowest
Competitor Bid Hypothesis.
This is the Friedman variant proposed by Hannsmann and Rivett
(14), where only the lowest competitor is considered and the
number of competitors is not required.
Model 5	 - Single Contract, Unconstrained, Drift Model
This model is an outgrowth of the OPTM procedure. The results
of the last M contracts are used as a basis for altering the bid
on the next contract. .
The models are called single contract because they treat
each contract individually and ignore interactions between
contracts. They are called unconstrained because they ignore
any constraints that might exist.
The models are tested by computer simulation with the
Sample Companies' data sets. They are all tested with the same
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data and so it is possible to compare the models with each other,
with the sample companies, and with the results obtainable by
hindsight.
Another method used to evaluate the models was partial
implementation of selected models. Partial because there was
insufficient time available to adequately test the models - it was
felt that at least a year would be necessary to obtain any meaning-
ful results. Thus while no implementation results are available,
observations made during the installation of test procedures have
bearing on the usefulness of the models, and these are discussed.
5. 2 MODEL ALGORITHMS
Computer programs were written to test the six models
with the Study Companies data sets. The objective function used
was the adjudication objective of Chapter 2, Maximize V(x)
where	 V(x) =	 X -	 If x < y
0	 if x y
= Z(R, n). k
(5. 2-1)
The probablistic models, numbers 1 to 4, attempt to.
maximize the expected value of the objective. This requires
determing the bid x which satisfies the equation.
P(x) dV(x)	 + 1/(x)  dP(x)
dx	 dx	 (5. 2. -2)
Since the expected value function has the shape illustrated
below, the continuous formulation is easily adapted to an iterative
method of solution.
PCK)V(x)
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The.specific algorithms . u,s,ed_O_program the
models are presented in the following sub-sections.
5.2.1 Model IA and 1E: Friedman Average Competitor 
Hypothesis 
The Friedman "-average - bidder" probability
density is found by combining all previous ratios
•of an opposition bid to the company's cost estimate
into one distribution function, f(w).
 Then the
probability of a bid of x being lower than one average
bidder equals the complementary cumulative distribution
oo
G(x) f(w) dw
 -
(5.2.1-1)
and the probability of x being lower than n average
•bidders is
( G(x) )n
=  f (la )dw.) n
1( I oo
x
k' (5.2.1-2)
Two methods have been proposed for combining
the ratios: the average method, Model 1A, where all
previous ratios have equal weights, and the exponential
method, Model 1E, where exponential weights are used
for the previous ratios. The flow chart, Figure 5.1.
shows the computational procedure used for each
method.
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Both methods are special cases of weighted moving
average. However the exponential version is the more
general case and given a sufficiently large data base,
it can be anticipated that it will be the superior model.
First it permits greater 'weight to be attached to recent
observations, and hence allows more fully for recent
trends in the ratios of opposition bids to company cost
.estimates. Secondly, it possesses computational
advantages, the storage of data being greatly•reduced.
Thirdly, as the smoothing coefficient, a, approaches zero
the exponentially smoothed value approaches the arithmetic
mean, given a sufficiently large number of observations.
Hence, given an optimal choice of smoothing coefficient,
the exponential model should never be inferior to the
average model, but it could well be better. However,
since the data base is fairly small, and the simple
average version has received much attention (see
references 4, 7, 11, and 24) both versions were examined
and tested.
Average Method 
An array, HIST, was dimensioned in the computer.
This array was a discrete representation of the
complementary cumulative distribution G(x). It was
compiled as follows:
For each competitor's bid, the ratio
h = competitor bid/company's estimated cost
is computed. The value is incorporated in HIST by
a loop which
for m = 1, 2, 3, 

 50
if h
 0.950 + (m-l) *0.005 add 1 to HIST (m)
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q (0.9525) = HIST(1) / q
G (0.9575) = HLST(2) / qq
f(w)dw
0.9525
f(w)dw
0.9575
00
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The result is illustrated diagrammatically below.
0.950 0.955 0.960 0.965 0.970 0.975 0.980 0.96/5
The value of HLST ( . ) divided by the number of bids used in
compiling the histogram to date is the complementary cumulative
distribution of the midpoint of the interval.
00
where q is the total number of competitors bids in the histogram.
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• To find the maximum expected profit bid, the fact
that the objective function has a single optimum
is used. Successive expected profits are generated
as follows:
or 1, 2,   ,50
• .(P(x)V(x))m = G(0.9525

0.005(m-1)) n * k' * (0.9525 + 0.005'
.4	 (m-1)-1-.0)

•
until (P(x)V(x))j+1 is less than (P(x)V(x))j.  Then
CP(x)V(x)). is taken as the maximum expected profit and
the corresponding bid x = (0.9525 + 0.005 (j-1))* k' is
taken as the optimum bid.
In the average method, each probability value is
where
G
q
 (g) = (&q + &q-1 + ... +&1 ) r q
&. =1 if h. ."-	 g-0.0025
.1	 1
= 0 if h. < g-0.0025
-1
Exponential Method 
An exponential weighted moving average was
used in the second version of the model.
Here G (g) = a& + a(1 - a) & -1 + a(1-a)2 &q-2 +-q
+ a(1-a)q-1&,,
where 8-0.0025
0 0 if h. <
 g-0.0025
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The updating was done by the formula
G (g) = a &	 + (1-a) Gq-1 (g)
	 for all g
The maximum expected profit bid is computed in the same
manner as before. The order of the bids is important in this
formulation because different competitor bids for the same
contract will receive different weights. Although this should
not materially affect the results as the differences are very
small, to be consistent, the competitors' bids were incorporated
in the histogram in descending order.
5.2.2	 Model 2: General Distribution Model-
This is the model developed in Section 3.4.2, and uses
the probability function determined by regression analysis. The
computer is programmed to determine, for each contract, the
value of x which maximizes P(x) V(x)
where	 V(x) = x - k'
x= e (0.974449 + 0.1352319F(x) 2 - 0.0055555/ F(x) )
P(x) = (1 - F(x) )n
0	 F(x)	 1	 (5. 2. 2-1)
The equations are used to compute x, P(x), and V(x) for
successive values of F(x). The value of x which corresponds to
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the maximum value of P(x) V(x) is selected at the optimum bid.
This procedure is outlined in the flow chart, Figure 5.2.
5.2. 3	 Model 3: Normal Distribution Probability Hypothesis 
The assumption made by this model is that the ratio of
the lowest competitor's bid to the Company's cost estimate is a
sample from a normal distribution. The method then assumes
that you are only competing against one super competitor, the
lowest one. Whether this is valid is questionable; especially
most of the other determinations consider the number of
competitors a major parameter. The assumption does, however,
simplify the arithmetic, as the probability function no longer
contains the exponent n.
Case 1: Normal Distribution with Constantz& and g-- .
For this case a computer program is not necessary. The
assumption of a constant mean and standard deviation results in
a constant percentage mark-up figure to be applied to all contracts.
Thus, the best results possible for this case would be the maximum
results obtained by the OPT2 program.
FLOW CHART
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Case 2: Normal Distribution with varying ,,a and CF .
If it is assumed that the mean and standard deviation of
the ratio, lowest competitor bid to estimated cost, vary in
trends that can be discerned from past bids, it is possible to
construct a model. The model seeks to determine the optimum
bid by finding the bid x which maximizes
P (f,) V(x)
the complementary cumulative of the normal distribution.
A computer program was written to compute tie mean
and standard deviation of the ratios from the first m contracts.
These parameters were then used to calculate the optimum bid
for the m+1 contract. Then the mean and standard deviation of
the ratios for the m+1 contracts were computed. This was
a r
used for the m+2 contract and so on. Instead of integrating the
normal curve, a table of values of the Cumulative Normal
Distribution was included in the program. The program calculates
expected profits in the following manner.
Cr =
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for N = 0. 005, O. 001, 0.015, . . . , r
calculates s = 	 -14-)
cr
Use s and the table to determine P(N)
Then the expected profit is P(N) . N . k'
The program continues until
[P(N). N.	 < bN). N.
Since the expected profit curve possesses a single optimum,
LP(N). N. 101m-1	 is the maximum expected profit and
the optimum bid is x =	 . (1 + Nna_i )
The mean /Lt. and standard deviation (1- are calculated for all
previous contracts by the formula
y = lowest competitor on q th contract
corrected cost estimate of q th contract
_
9--
Figure 5.3 is a flow chart of the program.
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5.2.4 Model 4: Lowest Competitor Bid Hypothesis 
This model combines the Friedman historical distribution
concept of Model 1 with the Low Competitor concept of Model 3.
It assumes that there is a distribution of low or winning bids, and
this distribution can be found by combining all the previous ratios
of competitor's low bid to Company estimated cost.
The method of calculation is the same as that used in
Model 1A. The ratio
h. = Lowest Competitor bid on contract i 
- 1. 0 )1 (Company estimated _cost on contract i
is calculated.
1Frequency (g) =	 (& + &q	 q- + &I )
	
where &	 = 1 if h	 g - 0.0025
	
1	 1
= 0 if h. < g - O. 0025
For g = 0.005, 0.010, 0.015, ..., 0.20
Compute g . k' . Frequency (g) and select the maximum.
The optimum bid is then	 g Ma X + 1.0) . k = x
Figure 5.4 shows a flow chart of the program.
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5.2. 5	 Model 5: Drift Model
This model was inspired by the OPTM program. The
OPTM results indicated that dramatic improvements could
sometimes be obtained by incremental varying of the final tender
prices. For example, in data set A, an increase of all the
tender prices by 1% would have resulted in the winning of exactly
the same contracts and an increase in uncorrected profit of 16%.
However, this is hindsight. The question is - how can these
results be applied to current practice.
Model 5 is an attempt to use the OPTM-program as a track-
ing device. By using OPTM on the last M contracts bid, and
applying the resulting optimum correction to the next contract,
the model hopes to eliminate "drifts" away from peak performances.
The main problem in setting up the Model is the determin-
ation of M, the number of past contracts to examine. This number
should be small enough to be sensitive to trends and yet must be
large enough that a single large contract will not dominate the
results.
The Program operates as follows:
1i
I:.
LO0	 C ---..
PrOCit
-
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For a set of M contracts, compute the effect on profit of small
discrete variations in the tender price. The result will be as
illustrated below, where the bid is (c . tender price).
For the M+1 contract the bid submitted is (1.0 - ,N) times
original tender price. The first contract is then deleted from
the set and the M+1 th. contract added to the set. The process
is then repeated to determine the correction for the M+2 nd.
contract; and so on. This is a straight forward moving, average.
Figure 5.5 provides a flow diagram of the Drift Model.
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5. 3 SIMULATION TESTING
5. 3.1	 Testing Program
The five models, the OPTM and OPT2 programs, and a
program for graphing the model results on the line printer were
incorporated as subroutines in a master program called BIDS.
The structure of this program is illustrated diagrammatically
in Figure 5.6. The program was stored on The City University
ICL 1905 Computer Unit's EDITA tape, from which it can be
called by a single instruction.
The card deck for the program is illustrated in Figure 5.7.
It consists of:
- two cards to call the program from the EDITA tape
- a model selection card which specifies which models are to be
used on the data, which contract to start bidding at, and the
exponential smoothing coefficient to use in Model 1.
- the plotting symbols to be used by the graphing programs
- two cards listing the Z correction factors for the data set
- a title card for the data set
- the data set
11.,UT
Re:_'d Data
Calculate
Compaliy Results
yes	
yP R
yes
yes
DR ii?
MODia,
yes
yes
PLOT
OPTM
PLOT
OPTM
PLOT
OT'TM
PLOT
CPTM
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- an end card which signals the end of the data set and whether
another data set is present.
The INPUT section of the program:
- reads the model selection card
- reads the plotting symbols
- reads the Z factors
- reads the data title
- reads the data cards, applies the Z corrections to the estimated
costs, and outputs the corrected data to the line printer and to
magnetic tape.
- calculates the Company's performance (Contracts won,
Cumulative Profit, Cumulative Volume, Profit-Volume Ratio)
and outputs the results on the line printer.
- calls the OPTM and OPT2 programs.
Then it calls the models, specified on the model selection card,
to operate on the data.
Each model takes the data stored on the magnetic tape
and when it has compiled the specified number of contracts in
the cases of Models 1, 3, and 4, or after it has read its starting
set size in the case of Model 5, it begins to compute bids for the
contracts. The contract number, estimated cost, Model tender,
expected profit*, cumulative profit, cumulative expected profit*,
* Except for Model 5 where there is no expected profit
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cumulative volume and profit-volume ratio are calculated for
each contract a" nd output to the line printer. When the Model
has completed the data set it calls the PLOT program. This
program plots the Model's cumulative profit, the cumulative
expected profit, and the Company's cumulative profit over the
data set. When the PLOT program is finished, the Model calls
the OPTM program to operate on the Model's tenders.
By using the PLOT and OPTM programs on the results
of each model, a visual display of each model's effectiveness
is provided.
The PLOT graph reveals whether the actual results and
the expected results coincide, and whether the model has
performed more (or less) effectively than the Company. The
OPTM program provides an indication of whether the model is
operating in the neighbourhood of its peak.
5. 3. 2	 Program Data 
The different models require different information to
calculate the optimum bids for the contracts. This information'
can be divided into two classes -- that which is known and
available at the time of tendering; and that which must be estimated
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or predicted. Information known and available is the past bids
of competitors, past cost estimates, and the cost estimate of
the contract under consideration. Information that requires
determination at the time of tendering is the range of estimating
accuracy, the number of competitors, and the assessment of the
mean competitors bids.
The ranges calculated by method 2 of Appendix 3 are used
in the test. The determination of number of competitors is
discussed in Subsection 5.3.3. The problem of mean bid assess-
ment is handled by testing Model 2 under different conditions of
information. The initial test assumes perfect information - i. e.
the true mean is used as the assessed mean. Then in Section 5.4,
an investigation is made of the effect of constant errors, and
random errors in the assessment.
5.3.3	 The Number of Competitors
The formulation of the effect of estimating accuracy inter-
action (Chapter 2) indicates that the number of competitors is a
major parameter on the competitive bidding situation. The order
statistic derivation of probability of winning (Chapter 3) also
employs the number of competitors as a major determinant.
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Therefore any model which employs either, or both, of these
concepts must include some method of determining the number
of competitors.
Friedman (11) suggests two methods:
1. Linear regression of plot of the number of competitors
vs. cost.
2. Determination of the a priori probability distribution of
the number of competitors submitting bids for contracts
of a given cost range.
Theoretically pleasing as these methods may be, the plot of
number of competitors vs. cost for the four data sets combined,
Figure 5.8, suggests that these methods may not be appropriate
for the situation under consideration.
In the construction industry there exists an easier, less
sophisticated method of determing this parameter - it is inquiry.
The Client will usually, if requested, inform the company which
other companies have taken out plans, or expressed an intention
to bid. Therefore, by contacting these companies shortly before
the tender closing date, and asking them if they are bidding on
the contract the number can be determined. If direct inquiry does
not sound appealing, the nominated sub-contractors will usually
provide the necessary information. Admittedly, these methods
-202-
a
•
a
•
H
80
n
14
H
•
•
•
i
•
a
• E-1
in
PI
•
•
•
•
•
:.
i
II
i
•
•
•
:
•
•
•
•
8
1
0.11
:4
.	 :.
:
7.
:
1
:
.
.
..
•
•
iS
-203-
are not infallible. There will always be the last minute changes
of mind, and the unlikely (and difficult to repeat) case of lying.
However, this procedure should result in a figure more reliable
than can be obtained from any statistical technique. The trend
to Selective Tendering should be helpful in this regard. Since
the client is endeavouring to get a certain specific number of
bids, the possibility of last minute changes of heart, and strange
companies materialising are reduced.
The construction personnel interviewed in the course of
this research did not regard the determination of the number and
identity of their competitors prior to tender date a difficult task.
Therefore, in the testing of the models the number of competitors
bidding on a contract is taken as a known parameter.
• 5. 3.4	 Parameter Determination
There were several test parameters that had to be
determined before it was possible to run the simulation. Models
1, 3, and 4 require a certain number of contracts to establish
their probability density functions before they can start to compute
bids. Model 5 requires a set size to operate with. The
exponential smoothing version of Model 1 requires a smoothing
coefficient.
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To provide a basis for comparing the performance of
the different models, it is necessary for them all to start
bidding on the same contract. The number of contracts required
by Models 1, 3, and 4 to establish their probability functions is
not considered to be the governing parameter. This is so because
all previous contracts are included in the functions and regardless
of whether the model starts bidding at the fifth contract or the
fourteenth contract, the bid it will compute for the fifthteenth
contract will be the same. Therefore, the set size required by
Model 5 was the governing parameter. The earlier contract
bids computed by Models 1, 3 and 4 were examined to ensure
that they were not abnormal.
Model 5 Set Size
To determine the set size for Model 5, a Fortran program,
MARCH, was written. This program is a continued application
of Model 5 to the same data but using different set sizes. For
example, the program is given a data set and a starting number of
10. It calculates the results of Model 5, starting bidding at the
eleventh contract and using a set size of ten. It then bids the
same set, starting at the eleventh contract but using a set size
of 9, then 8, and so on down to a set size of two.
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In the experimental runs, a starting set size of ten was
used. This number was selected as the maximum since it
represented about three to four months of the Sample Companies'
operations, and it was felt that any longer time period would not
be sufficiently sensitive to market changes. Also, because of the
size of the data sets, any larger number would not leave many
contracts for the models to bid.
The results of the MARCH program on the four data sets
are summarised in Table 5.1. The figures in the table are the
total corrected profits made by the Model for the data set. The
maximum total corrected profit values occur at set sizes 2, 3, 4,
and 5 for Company A; set sizes 9 and 10 for Company B; set
sizes 3, 4, and 5, for Company C, and set size 3 for Company D.
As the companies are dealing in similar contracts, and are
subject to the same market forces, it was felt that one set size
should do for all four companies. To determine this compromise
set size a ranking procedure was used. The results of each
company were assigned a rank number from 1 to 9 in order of
decreasing magnitude of total profits. In cases of ties, the arith-
metic sum of the affected rank numbers was divided equally among
the tied values. Table 5.2 contains the ranking. The rank numbers
were summed for each set size and the minimum total, 111 for set
size 3, was used as the selection criteria.
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TABLE 5.1
DRIFT MODEL SET SIZE DETERMINATION
SET
SIZE
COMPANY A COMPANY B COMPANY C COMPANY D
Profit
£
Won Profit
£
Won Profit
£
Won Profit
£
Won
10 17, 409 2 27, 036 2 26, 922 6 12, 430 4
9 17, 409 2 27, 036 2 27, 777 6 12, 430 4
8 17,409 2 17,923 3 22,043 5 12,430 4
7 17, 409 2 15, 777 3 20, 628 5 11, 875 4
6 17, 409 2 16, 851 3 46, 280 6 11, 875 4
5 24,168 3 16,851 3 52,013 7 16,486 5
4 24,168 3 16,851 3 52,013 7 16,486 5
3 24,168 3 16, 851 3 52, 013 7 20, 053 5	 4
2 24,168 3 16,851 3 26,326 6 15,433 4
TABLE 5.2
RANKING OF SET SIZES
SET SIZE 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
COMPANY A 2; 21 21 2; 7 7 7 7 7
COMPANY B 6 6 6 6. 6 9 3 11 1;
COMPANY C 7 2. 2 2 4 9 8 5 6
COMPANY D 4 1 21 21 8; 81 6 6 6
TOTAL 19; 111 13 13 25; 33; 24 191 20
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' A. set Size of three waS—S&26-ate-d-and the
• Models all start bidding at the fourth contract
• in the data sets.
Exponential Smoothing Coefficient 
•
The exponential smoothing coefficient for
Model 1 was also determined by experiment.
For the four data sets, Model 1 was tested
using exponential coefficients which varied from
0.001 to 0.400. The resulting total profit values
are plotted on the graph on page: 206.-- - The values
have been converted to percentages by using the
maximum OPT2 value of the set as 100%.
. Since the maximum profit values for the four
sets did not occur at the same coefficient value, a
compromise value was selected.
If the data sets had been of sufficient length,
it would have been possible to use the procedure
followed by Morin and Clough (20). This is, splitting
the sets and using the first portion to determine the
coefficient and the second portion to test. In this
manner it would be possible to determine a separate
coefficient for each set.
However, there is insufficient data for this
procedure and since it is desirable to keep the sets
comparable, the coefficient value which yielded the
highest percentage sum, value 0.0028, was used in
testing all four sets.
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5. 3. 5	 Results and Discussion
The results are discussed under four separate headings.
First the performance of each model, as displayed by the OPTM
graphs, is discussed. Then the models are compared to each
other and to the Sample Companies' performance. The influence
of individual contracts on the results is examined and then the
theoretical performances, as exhibited by the PLOT graphs, of
the models are considered. Only summary results are presented
in this section. Figures 5.9 to 5.14 inclusive are the OPTM
graphs. Table 5.4 summarises the results of the Models. The
PLOT graphs are in Appendix 6.
Model Performance
Figures 5.9 to 5.14 inclusive are the OPTM graphs result-
ing from the program operating upon the tenders computed by the
Models. The operating position of the model is indicated on the
graphs with a
The Table below list the location of the peaks of the
graphs.
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LOCATION OF PEAKS-
MODEL
A
+3
+3
'0
0
-3
+1
+4
COMPANY.
D
+3i
+3i
0
0
+1
+1
+9
'
ROW
1(Average)
1(Exponent)
2
3
4
5
COLUMN
TOTAL:
B C
0 0
0 0
-1
+4 .
 -1.
+1 1
-7
+2 _i_
-2
+6 -2i
TOTAL
+64
+6i
+3
-1 i
This table provides the basis for two lines of
investigation. First, it may indicate any consistent
bias in a models performance; secondly, it may reveal
bias in the data introduced by the selection of the
estimating accuracy range.
The row totals, 6i for Model 1 and for Model 1
Exponential, suggest that these Models may be bidding
too low and a uniform percentage increase in all bids
may be advantageous.
The column totals, 6 for B, and 9 for D
indicate that the range correctionfor these two
Companies may be too large since a lower value of
R will shift the peaks to the left.
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However, these deviations could be a result of the
interaction of both of these possibilities.
The column totais for Companies A, B, C and D excluding
"odel 1 Average are +1, +6, -2i, and +53; excluding
Yodel 1 Exponential +1,
both of them -2,
+6,
+6,
-23,
-23,
and +541 and excluding
and +2.
4
The column total for Company B remains high suggesting
' that the selectad range of 12.9% is too high. The
shepe of the Company B graphs, with a large plateau
on the positive side supports this notion. Therefore
it is concluded that the 12.9% range correction
selected for Company B could be too high. A similar
conclusion cannot be drawn from the results for
Company D. The high column total is primarily due
to Model 1 results and this is caused by a low bid
on a single contract.
The figures in the Company . 0 column, although
not numerically large, are consistent -four being less
than zero and two equal to zero. This suggests that
the estimating accuracy range of 9.35% selected for
Company C may be a bit low.
The general conclusion drawn from these results 
is that the ranges of estimating accuracy for all four 
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companies are in the region 9.35% . R 12.9%, and
the ranges selected are approximately correct with
Company B, R 12.9%, possibly a bit high and
Company C, R 9.35%, possibly a . bit low.
Considering the OPTM graphs of each Model 
Model - Average Version
For companies B and C this Model is operating
at the peak. The plots for Companies A and D show
that in each case the Models poor performance was
dre to . a low bid on a single contract. In the
Company A contract, the Model left 3% on the table,
and 30 on the table in the Company D contract.
Model 1 - Exponential Version
With the exception of Company C, these graphs
are almost identical to those of Model 1A. The
Company C graphs are also very similar but this
version of the Model is able to achieve a higher
total profit value.
• Model 2
The graph for Company A, Model 2 is the
closest of all the graphs plotted to being ideal,
and even then it has one contract for which it
left 20 on the table. An ideal graph would
have no local peaks, and the model would be
operating at the peak. The Model 2 graph demonstrate°
the effectiveness of this system.
 It
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is operating at the peaks of Company A and D, and has attained
a high profit location in the regions of the other two peaks,
bidding 1% off for Company B and 1% off for Company C.
Model 3
This Model can best be described as inconsistent. It has
two very good results, Companies A and D, and two very bad,
Companies B and C. It is possible that the bad performances are
a result of the wrong range corrections as was discussed earlier.
It is also possible that the conclusions arrived at concerning the
range corrections are a result of this Model.
Model 4
The performance of this Model is bad. It shifts from the
low end of the graph of Company D to the high end for Company A.
When it does operate near a peak, Company C, the peak it produces
is less than one half the size of that achieved by the other models.
Only in one case, Company B, is the Models performance
satisfactory.
Model 5
The general impression gained from the Model 5 graphs
is that the system is bidding too low. A percent increase in
all bids would have increased the profit picture in three of the
Companies and resulted in negligible change for the fourth. The
Model is operating in the region of the peaks and so its performance
is judged to be generally satisfactory.
Comparison of Models 
One of the purposes of the simulation was
to compare the performances of the Models and to
determine whether any one is superior to any other,
or to the actual performance of the Companies. The
results of the simulation are summarised in Table
5.4. To enable comparisons to be made, a ranking
procedure is used with total cumulative profits,
taken as the performance criteria. The profits
achieved by each Model were ranked, the highest
profit figure receiving a rank number of.1 1 the
lowest 7. The ranks are shown in Table 5.5 with
the sum of the rank numbers for each Model given in
the bottom row.
The profit rank sums suggest the following
. trial ordering of the Models and Companies.

• Model 2
Model I Exponential
Model I Average

Model 3	 Actual Performance
Model 5
Model 4
To investigate this ordering, two tests
were performed.
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TABLE 5.4
SUMMARY OF MODEL RESULTS
MODEL
COMPANY Actual
IA lE 1	 2 3 4 5 Perform
-ance
- CUMULATIVE PROFIT %
A 53.5 53.5 107.1 94.6 8.5 79.2 76.5
B 99.0 99.0 79.5 42.7 91.5 . 57.2 96.5
C • 98.5 105.7 ' 95.0 41.2 36.9 56.0 81.8
D 76.8 76.8 128.5 109.5 47.8 76.0 72.6
CUMULATIVE EXPECTED PROFIT %
A 67.4 65.6 64.4 102.2 126.0 - -
B 78.4 77.2 104.2 81.5 122.0 - -
C 78.5 76.6 56.8 127.0 144.5 _ _
D 146.0 142.0 108.0 145.0 145.5
•	 NUMBER OF CONTRACTS WON
A 4 4 4 5 2 5 4
B 6 • 6 3 6 5 4 5
• C 13 13 10 6 6 8 10
D 7 7 6 6 4 6 5
PROFIT VOLUME RATIO
A .0174 .0174 .0348 .0284 .0271 .0224 .0249
B .0281 .0281 .0464 .0186 .0458 .0291 .0281
C .0208 .0208 .0276 .0330 .0284 .0182 .0235
D .0196 .0196 .0384 .0275 .0210 .0189 .0220
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TABLE 5.5
PROFIT RANKING OF. tODELS
COMPANY
MODEL ACTUAL
PERFORM
-ANCEIA lE 2 34 5
A 5i 5- 1 2 7 3 4
B 1- 1i 5 7 4 6 3 :
c- 2 1 3 6: -- -- 7 -- . 5 4
D 3- 3i 1 2 7 5 6
. .
TOTAL 14 , 11-1 10 17 25 19 17
PROlaT VOLUME RATIO RANKING OF MODELS
COMPANY
MODEL ACTUAL
PERFORM
-ANCEIA lE 2 3 4 5
A 6i 6- 1 2 3 5 4
B I-14 4-10 1 7 2 3 6
C 6 5 3 1 2 7 4
D 5i 51 1 2 4 7 3
TOTAL 22i 21- 12 11 22 17
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The first was the calculation of the Coefficient
of Concordance (Reference 22). This coefficient
is designed to measure the degree of agreement
between the rarildngs of the companies. It varies
from a value of zero, signifying complete randomness
in the allocation of rankings, to a value of one,
signifying complete agreement. For the rankings of
the four companies the Coefficient of Concordance
is 0.374.
This Coefficient can be tested for significance
with a F test. The F value for the coefficient is
1.76. For the corresponding degrees of freedom the
5% level of F = 2.82
1% level of F = 4.38
Therefore the hypothesis that the rankings are random
cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
Second the trial ordering based on the rank
sums was compared with the ordering for each company.
The following rank correlation coefficients were
obtained.
Trial Order and Company A
Trial Order and Company B
Trial Order and Company C
Trial Order and Company D
Rank Correlation Coefficients
0.574
0.358
0.832
0.784
More contracts determine the total results for Companies
C mid D (see Table 5.4 and subsection, Influence of Individual
Contracts). Therefore, the results of C and D should carry more
weight than those of A and B. The high correlation coefficients
of C and D are an indication that the trial order may be correct.
The rank correlation coefficients of all couples of companies
were computed.
•• Compani..s	 Rank Correlation	 Coefficient
	
A & B	 —0.644
	A & C 	 —0.027
• A & D
	 0.714
B & C,	 0.705
B & D	 —0.214
	
C & D	 0.473
No conclusion is drawn from this comparison.
•
The hypothesis that the ranking of the seven methods is
random cannot be rejected. However, although an overall
ranking for the six models and the companies cannot be made, it
is still possible to make paired comparisons. Therefore the
next comparison was between the Actual Companies and each
Model. For this a 1, 2 ranking was used.
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Nod..
_ lA
co. mod.
lE
• mod.
2
Co. Mod.
3
Co. Mod.
4
Co. Mod.
5
Data
Set.
A 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2
1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2
The chart illustrates that:
Model 2
Model
Model IA
Model 3
Model 5
-Model 4
outperformed the Companies 3 out of 4 times
II	 II	 II	 3	 II	 II	 4	 II
II	 II	 II	 3 II	
"	 4 II
II	 /I	 II	 2	 "	 "	 4	 II
II	 It	 II	 2	 "	 "	 4	 II
It	 II	 It	 0 " " 4 II
The sample, four companies, is too small to allow
any statistically significant conclusions since the
hypothesis that all models are equal to the Company
cannot be rejected. Even results such as the Model 4
comparison can be expected one sixteenth of the
times. However the results suggest that:
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• _
1. Models 2 and 1 could improve upon the
actual company performance.
• 2. Models 3 and 5 could equal the actual
company performance.
3. Model 4 produOes'reslat's worse than those
of the actual. company.
. 1 7 2 ranking comparison of the performance of
Models 2 and lE indicate that there is little to
choose . between them.
Model 2 „Model lE •
A

2
2
2
2
Influence of Individual Contracts 
Figure 5.15 is designed to illustrate the
effect of individual contracts on the Models'
performance. In the first column is listed the
reference number of every contract won, either by
one of the models or by the Companies. The six
models and the company are listed across the top
of the chart. The shaded areas indicate which of
the systems (models or Company) won the contract.
A total of 35 contracts were won in the
four data sets.
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_
. Ref. MODEL COMPANY
Number	 1A	 1E	 2	 3	 4	 5
Company A
Company C
Company D
6
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Of these:
10 were won by all 7 sysiems
8 were won by
•4 were won by
2 were won by
5 were won by
• 4 were won by
.2
 were won by
6 of the systems
5 of the systems
4 of the systems
3 of the systems
2 of the systems
1 of the systems
The point of Figure 5.15, and the above enumeration is to
demonstrate that there are certain contracts that are going to .
be won, regardless of which system is used. This is not
surprising since all the systems operate from the estimated cost
figure. Obviously some contracts possess an estimated cost
that will result in a winning bid almost irrespective of the system
used. Assuming of course that the systems are reasonable and
are not making 15% to 20% mark-ups.
The second point to be observed from the chart is the
' small number of contracts that actually produce the total profit
figure.
. The second point leads one to question the simple total
profits criterion that is being used to judge the models. A model
will be judged to be performing well if it is bidding low and
manages to win more contracts than the other models, or it
is judged to be performing well if it is bidding high and winning
the same contracts as the other models but at a higher profit.
This difference is illustrated by the results of models
2 and . I . Model 2 wins most of the contracts that the companies
win but with higher bids - thus with a higher total Profit. Model
1 bids lower than the companies and wins 30 contracts to the
companies 25; the result is, again, higher total profits. If the
companies resources are fully committed by their current bidding
behaviour, Model 2 is obviously superior. If, however, the
resources are available, and if, as claimed in some quarters,
the actual money on which the Company depends for survival is
largely made on the site through negotiation and extras, then
Model 1 is the superior system.
The fact that the Models and the companies all tend to win
the same contracts suggest an answer to the question, what bias
was introduced into the data sets by excluding nonstandard and
incomplete contracts? Since the excluded contracts were almost
all contracts on which the sample Companies we unsuccessful,
there is reason to assume that the Models would also be unsuccess-
ful on these contracts. However, the inclusion of these contracts
in the data sets would have resulted in higher figures for the
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cumulative expected profit. Therefore, the plot of expected
profit should fall below that of the actual profit is the Model is
predicting correctly.
Predictive Performance
The probabilistic Models attempt to maximize expected
profits, and an expected profit is calculated for each contract.
If the theoretical basis of a model is correct, then there should be
some correspondence between the cumulative expected profit and
the actual profit obtained. The investigation of this correspondence
is complicated by the small number of contracts won, and by the
previously mentioned bias in the data which should result in under-
prediction. Since the winning of a single contract exerts such a
marked effect upon the actual total profit, the comparison of actual
profit and expected profit at any one point is not meaningful.
Therefore the method of comparison selected was that of visual
examination of the cumulative profit graphs. If the plot of
cumulative expected profit appears to correspond with the actual
profit plot - i. e. 'has approximately the same slope and does not
diverge radically - then it is concluded that the theoretical basis
of the model may be valid. The comparison is made more
difficult by the different shapes of the plots. The cumulative
actual profit being a definite step function whereas the cumulative
expected profit is approximately a curve. The cumulative profit
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graphs are in Appendix 6, PLOT Graphs. They are classified •
visually into the following classes.
0 - there is no obvious correspondence between the cumulative
• profit arid the cumulative expected profit
? - no classification apparent
there appears to be some agreement between the cumulative
' profit and the cumulative expected profit. -k
The results are summarised in the table below.
•
MODEL
A
COMPANY
B	 C D
•	 lA ? + + 0
lE ? + + 0
.2 + + .+ +
3 + ? 0 0
4 0 + 0 0
The results are inconclusive. However, they do suggest that
expected profits yielded by Model 2 are associated with actual
profits.
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5.4 ANALYSIS OF GENERAL DISTRIBUTION MODEL
The experimental testing of the six models indicates that
Model 2, the General Distribution Hypothesis, can usually perform
as well as, if not better than, the sample companies. In the
testing the Model had an advantage over the sample companies
because it was operating in conditions of perfect information. That
is, it did not rely on a managerial assessment of the mean
competitors' bid, it calculated what the mean was. This suggests
that it is desirable to investigate the results of Model 2 in greater
depth.
5.4.1 Evaluation of Model 2 Performance
Since the Model does not require information from earlier
contracts, it is possible for it to bid every contract in the data set.
Therefore the Model was tested bidding every contract. Figures
5.16 to 5.19 are the resulting PLOT graphs. Figure 5.20 shows
the OPTM graphs, the dashed line is the position of the Sample
Company's performance.
To illustrate the performance of the Model, vis-a-vis the
sample companies, Table 5.6 was prepared. This table lists all
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TABLE 5.6
2
CONTACT CONTRACT
ITIMB3R	 VAMIE
CO1	 di Y A
2	 530,000
8.	 20,000
16	 217,000
30	 368,000
31	 393,000
B
9	 86,00019
	
421,000
28	 99,000
36	 50,000
37	 494,000
COMPANY C
6	 139,000
7	 154,000
8	 76,000
20	 66,000
24	 342,000
26	 403,000
27	 1,440,000
31	 417,000
39	 232,000
40	 73,000
41	 126,000
42	 292,000
COMPLNY D
6	 144,000
10	 248,000
19	 329,000
28	 234.000
34	 392,000
41	 10,000
46	 113,000
50	 113,000
MODEL 2 CONTRACT RESULTS
RESULT	 CO1 TR;.CT l'ROF IT
2
C11131.1:ATIVI3
COI iivuzy
WON
WON
WON
AN
WON
WON
WON
VON
WON
WON
WON
LOST
WON
WON
LOUT
WON
WON
WOh
WON
WON
WON
WON
WON
WON
vioi
LOIR
WON
WON
LOUT
WON
i01)ia,	 2
WON
WON
WON
WON
WW1
LOST
WOK
WON
WON
LOST
WON
WON
WON
WOE
WON
LOST
WON
WON
WON
WON
LOST
WON
WON
WON
LO;JT
WON .
WON
WON
. WON
WON
CO: il'.:114YI
35,098
	
41,880
1,525	 2,028
17,330	 17,522
20,362	 24,106
.26,780	 31,677
4,850	 0
29,483	 38,602
6,107	 7,132
3,744	 4,189
29,894	 0
10,880	 14,017
0	 8,281
4,530	 5,750
4,494	 6,127
0	 19,365
19,286	 0
82,227	 79,730
23,402	 25,041
13,620	 18,2C1
4,970	 7,503
7,410	 0
19,065
	 19,589
10,834
	
9,440
15,987	 16,408
14,819	 0
0	 13,912
23,509	 3,878
2,216	 2,411
0	 6,959
8,944	 10,590
CO,..1.Ci:Y1
	
)..OD.0
35,098	 41,180
36,623
	
43,208
53,953	 60,730
74,315	 84,836
101,095 116,513
4,850	 0
34,288	 38,602
40,395	 45,734
44,139
	
49,923
74,033	 49,923
10,880	 14,017
10,800	 22,298
15,410	 38,048
19,904	 44,178
1,904
	 63,543
39,190	 63,543
121,417 143.273
144,019 16C,314
158,439 184,595
163,409 192,098
170,019 192,098
189,384 211,607
10,034
	 9,440
' 26,821	 25,848
41,640	 25,04&
41, 640
	39,670
65,149
	
7C,638
67,365	 79,049
67,365	 86,008
76,309	 96,606
* Profit figure° not corrected for interaction bias
ie. PROFIT = BID - EST1LATED COOT
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the contracts that were won either by the Model or the Companies
or both. To make the comparison comprehensible to the
Companies' managJment the results are expressed in uncorrected
profit. To render the contracts unidentifiable, the contract value
(estimated cost) was rounded off to the nearest £1,000. ; and the
actual bid prices are not shown. The profits obtained on each
contract give the difference, in pounds, between the company's
bid and the Model's bid.
The results of all four companies show a total of 30
contracts won by either the companies or the Model or both. The
companies won 26 contracts, the Model won 25. On these 30
contracts the Model bid a higher value than the companies on 24
of them, winning 19. The Model bid lower than the companies on
6 contracts; winning four that the companies lost. The majority,
21 of the 30 contracts, were won by both the Model and the
companies with the Model submitting a higher bid in 19 of the 21
•cases.
The OPTM graphs, Figure 5.20, indicate that for
Companies A and D, the Model is bidding at the optimal position.
For Company C it is bidding 1% too high; and for Company B
it is 1% too low.
The results were also examined on an individual company
-240-
basis
For Company A, the Model and the Company won exactly the
same five contracts; the Model submitting a higher bid in
every case.
For Company B, the Company won five contracts, the Model
won three of these and lost the other two. One of the contracts
which the Company won and the Model lost represented over
one third of the total profit obtained on the set. This is the
Company that outperformed the Model and the results illustrate
the effect that one contract can have when total profit is used as
an evaluation criteria. The Model made a higher bid on all
five contracts and if only the first four are considered, the Model
received a higher profit on the three it won, than the Company
did on its four.
Companies C and D with their higher volumes, more contracts
won, provide more representative results.
For Company C the Model won two contracts that the Company
lost, and vice versa, plus there are eight contracts shared.
Here again, a single contract slightly distorts the results. Of the
eight contracts won by both, the Model bid higher than the Company
on seven of them and lower on one. The seven had an average
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value of £185, 000. The one on which the Model was lower than
the Company had a value of 21, 440, 000.
For Company D the Model won 2 contracts that the Company
lost; the Company won one that the Model lost, and there were
five contracts which they both won. On the five shared contracts,
the Model submitted a higher bid on four of them.
The Table below summarises the results in terms of contracts
won
NUMBER OF CONTRACTS WON
DATA SET	 A BCD
Model 5 3 10 7
Company 5 5 10 6
The following observations are made on the performance
of the Model vis-a-vis the companies.
1. The Company and the Model will generally win approximately
the same number of contracts. Thus any resource criterion
dependent upon the number of projects, for example stationary
plant like tower cranes, or hatching plants, or site personnel;
if it is currently being met by the Company's performance, will
also be met by the Models. The fact that the Company and the
Model tended to win the same contracts makes this point even more
valid.
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2. There is a general tendency for the Model to win the
contracts at a higher bid that the Company. This would mean
higher unit prices in the bill of quantities and higher profit
margins on the Provisional Sums. Therefore, regardless of
whether the actual profit accruing to the Company is the sum
represented by the difference between the estimated cost and the
tender sum, or whether it is the result of negotiation based upon
submitted unit prices, the final result should be an increase in
total profitability if the Model's bids are used.
5.4.2	 Sensitivity Analysis of Model 2 
The results produced by Model 2 are for a perfect
information situation. Since the testing was based upon historical
data it was impossible to obtain a managerial assessment of the
mean of the competitors' bids, and so the true mean was used.
To investigate the effect of this perfect information case, a
sensitivity analysis was performed. The operation of the Model
is independent of other contracts. Therefore it is possible to
group the data sets of the four companies. This Provides the
advantages of working with a set of 153 contracts, and of damping
the effect of any individual contract on the measurement criterion
of total profits.
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Constant Errors in Assessment
The first item to be investigated was the effect of
constant errors. The Model was run with the grouped data set
using values for the mean competitors' bid that deviated from
the true values by a fixed percentage increment. This was done
for increments of - 4. 5%, -4. 0%, -3. 5%, . . . . +3. 5%, +4. 0%,
+4. 5%. The results of these are plotted in Figure 5.21.
The zero error value is taken as 100% and the other results
expressed in percentage terms. The dashed line at 81% indicates
the Companies actual performance position.
The horizontal character on the left hand portion of the
graph indicates that the Model's performance is relatively stable
over a large range. Comparison with the actual companies'
performance suggests that as long as the managerial assessments
are within -3. 5% to + 1. 0%, the Model can outperform the
companies.
Random Errors in Assessment
A more realistic investigation of the effect of errors is
accomplished by using random errors in the assessment of the
mean. A program was written to use the City University Computer
Unit's random number generator, RAND, to introduce random
errors into the mean bid value. An error range was specified,
5.4
a)
5-n
0
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(true mean + e%), the computer would generate a random number
between 0.000 and 1.000 and the number would determine where
in the range the assessed value would lie. Then this assessed
value would be used by the Model to compute a bid.
In addition to computing the bids resulting from the random
number stream, the program was also designed to produce the
results using the antithetical number stream. That is, if on the
first run the mean assessment for contract y is (1. 0 + 0.026)
times the true value, in the antithetical run contract y's mean
assessment would be (1.0 - 0.026) times the true value. The
final result is two total set values for each specified error range.
These two values represent the opposite extremes and as such,
define the limits within which the actual values could be expected.
Three different random number streams were used. Before
the program was run the streams were tested with a Chi-square
test to see if they were from a uniform distribution. The Chi-
square values are:
Random number stream 1
	 3. 8
Random number stream 2
	 4.2
Random number stream 3 • 11.0
The five percent significance level for this case is 16.9. Therefore
it was accepted that the numbers are random.
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The results of the random error runs for the different
error ranges are graphed in Figure 5.22. The zero error
profit figure is taken as 100%. These graphs bear out the
results of the constant error analysis. That is, the Model is
reasonably stable and will usually outperform the actual compan-
ies if the mean can be assessed within + 2% of its true value.
The model will produce results similar to that of the companies
as long as the mean can be estimated with + 3.5%.
Error in Number of Competitors 
The number of competitors is the other major parameter
in the Model. Therefore, despite the fact that the managements
of the sample companies were confident that this number could be
predicted with a high degree of accuracy, it is instructive to
evaluate the effect of errors in this parameter.
The Model was run with errors of -2, -1, and +1 in the
number of competitors and the results are summarised in the
table below, the Model Profit for zero error taken as 100%. In
cases where the error would reduce the contract to zero
competitors, the full error was not applied and the contract was
treated as having one competitor.
ENVELOPE OF
i
MODEL PROFIT
Random Number Stream].
• COMPANY
PERFORMANCE
0	 OS	 •0	 45 .2 .0 .2,3"-
 3.0 as- 4.0
0	 OS 1.0 AS .2.0 .2.5" 50 1/43.5" 14.0
Random Number Stream 2
Random Number Stream 3
41111n111
4	 4	 4,
el	 .24) 1.5" J 0 J 5- MO *VS"
ERROR RANGE (0.0+ %)
• Figure 5.22
EFFECT OF RANDOM ERRORS
IN THE
PERCENT OF
	 ASSESSMENT OF THE MEAN
ZERO ERROR .
PROFIT
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Error in	 Cumulative	 Cumulative
Number of	 Model	 Expected
Competitors	 Profit	 Profit
fl y = n - 2	 43. 5%	 180%
n' = n - 1	 78.6%
	
113%
fl y = n 100.0% 73%
fl y = n +	 1 97.0% 51.5%
This comparison suggests that it is more desirable to over-
estimate the number of competitors. This has an advantage
from an application point of view since it would be more
reasonable to expect last minute "drop outs", than last minute
entries.
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5. 5 PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION
The simulation test results are on too small a sample
to be conclusive but they do indicate that some of the techniques
might provide benefits to an operating company. Two of the
sample companies were sufficiently interested to wish to pursue
the research further and test some of the models in parallel with
their normal tendering activity. Therefore work was initiated
to implement some of the techniques of the thesis and test some
of the others.
Insufficient time has elapsed for these tests to produce
any results that may be analysed. Firm conclusions are not
expected until the summer of 1971. However, several observations
made during the installation of the tests have a bearing on the
development of this thesis. Therefore, the work is outlined here
and the preliminary observations discussed.
5. 5.1 OPTM - A Feedback Device
The OPTM procedure provides a simple, concise method
of summarising historical tender information. Although the
Model 5 tests indicated it might be of limited benefit as a
prescriptive system, the Feasibility Study, Section 2.4,
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demonstrated that it has value as a reporting system. The
information is summarised in such a way that trends and drifts
in tendering activity can be readily detected. It is as a report-
ing system that it was installed.
A standard procedure was developed, together with
the necessary forms, computer programs, and instruction
manuals, that will produce OPTM reports on a monthly basis
covering tendering activity over a specified past time interval.
The procedure produces minimum disruption to normal tendering
activity, requiring only one form summarising the tender and
competitors' bids be completed for each tender submitted. The
past tender files are kept up-to-date by the Computer Unit and
the program is run once a month. The output is sent directly to
the senior decision maker. The output is a single sheet contain-
ing three graphs which plot the result of incremental changes in
bids in terms of total gross profit, annual gross profit, and
number of contracts won.
A secondary benefit of this procedure is that it provides,
on cards ready for processing, the tender information required
for the other tests.
5.5.2
	 Parallel Testing 
The Friedman Average Model and the General Distribution
-251-
Model were selected for further testing. Programs were
developed and installed that compute optimum bids from these
models. The intention is that these programs should run in
parallel with the company's normal estimating and tendering
activity so that the decision maker can compare his performance
with that of the models. Also, if desired, the models' bids
can be made available to the decision maker before he submits
his own.
It can be argued that this parallel testing of the Friedman
Model is superfluous since the model can be adequately tested
with historic data. This may be so but the test is also intended
to be a demonstration and the managements are more likely to
be impressed with a demonstration based upon current data than
one based upon historical data.
The effectiveness of the General Distribution Model, since
it relies upon a managerial assessment, can only be properly
analysed with a parallel test. The analysis, Section 5.4.2,
suggested that the Model would be effective if the decision maker
could assess his competition within the prescribed limits. Now
it is necessary to test whether the decision maker can. The
General Distribution Model is a simple system to install and use.
The Model reduces to a Table of Optimum Mark-ups and the
determination of the optimum bid requires only two simple
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calculations. The reduction was accomplished as follows.
The Model's optimum bid is a result of four values:
the estimated cost, the estimating accuracy range, the number
of competitors, and the assessment of the mean of the competitors'
bids. A non-dimensional ratio is obtained by dividing the assessed
mean by the estimated cost. Then for a specified estimate accuracy
range, the optimum mark-up is a function of this ratio and the
number of competitors. Thus it is possible to express the
optimum bid as an estimated cost multiplier and incorporate
these multipliers for a given estimate range into a single table.
A Fortran program was written to solve the Model for a number
of mean-estimated cost ratios and an example Table is shown in
Figure 5.23.
Using the table, the optimum bid is determined in the
following manner.
1. Select the table with the appropriate range R.
2. Use the mean-cost ratio and the number of competitors
to determine the optimum multiplier from the table.
3. Optimum Bid = estimated cost • optimum multiplier.
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5.5.3	 Observations 
It has been asserted by many of those interviewed during
the research that psychological factors have a strong influence
on estimating. Although an estimator will tacitly concede that in
practice he wins only one job in five, or one in ten; the project
he is estimating right now he is estimating to win. Several cases
were cited of estimators deliberately juggling their costs because
they felt that the mark-ups decided upon by management were too
high. Senior estimators know that one of their problems is the
young estimator who has not won a contract for a long period.
Psychological considerations are not dealt with in this
thesis as the author is not qualified to explain or assess them.
However, the personalisation of contracts, and the emotional
environment of estimating cannot be ignored. Therefore, the
following comment is made.
In order for a system to function it must be accepted by
the estimators. If it is not, the attempted introduction will
encounter resistance and the installation may be sabotaged. One
manager who, as a result of analysing past bids, decided to
increase his mark-up wondered how long it would be before his
estimators realised his action and started to decrease their
cost estimates.
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The emotional factors indicate that parallel testing
is an essential step in implementation. Only by demonstrating
on a continuous basis that the Models can equal or outperform
the current methods will acceptance be gained.
One parallel test of the General Distribution Model is,
after a month of operation, starting to produce interesting
results. This Model was originally developed from the assumption
that the decision maker was attuned to his market. This assump-
tion was reinforced by interviews with construction personnel and
quotations such as,
"A further disadvantage of competitive tendering from the builders
point of view is that cost have little bearing on the quotation which
is based upon what he thinks the market will bear. It has been
suggested that some companies are "frightened" to quote in any
other way." (38)
which appear in the literature.
The experimental tests of the Model indicated that bene-
ficial results could be obtained if the decision maker could assess
the mean bid of his competitors to within + 2%. The requirement
is that the mean be assessed independently of the estimated cost.
Independently, because the concept of the Model is to use two
figures to arrive at an optimum bid: a market estimate and a cost
estimate. If the market estimate is based upon the cost estimate
then, as the optimum table • shows, the result would just be
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that of using a constant set of multipliers that vary with the number
of competitors, and the market exploitation power of the Model
would be lost.
At the time of development is was thought that it would not
be too onerous a task for someone who "knows his market" to
estimate his market to within + 2%. However, the Sample
Companies that were to participate in the test thought it was. The
reason is doubtlessly that construction management is cost, not
market oriented. This is not suprising since construction is
basically a production industry and the path to management is via
the production hierarchy. Thus the main emphasis is on costs
and cost control and little attention is paid to marketing.
In view of these doubts, it is interesting that on the one
test started, the senior estimator concerned has found, much to
his own suprise, that he can estimate his market. The test so far
only includes five tenders and on four of these the assessment has
fallen within the prescribed + 2% limits. The estimator concerned
feels that, as his learning process continues, he will consistently
refine his market assessment ability. He also feels that he will
achieve considerable benefit from being forced to look beyond his
. own company for market indications.
Another firm, not one of the original four, has become
interested in the research and has started experimenting with
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regression analysis to see if the mean can be predicted from
contract elements. This work has just started and no results
are yet available.
y
The final observation concerns the use of informative and
decision rule models. The OPTM procedure is an informative
model. It can indicate, for instance, that an increase of 1% would
result in the same acceptances and higher profit. However, the
decision makers find it very difficult to apply this result because
the tender in front of them is "different". A decision rule model,
like the General Distribution Model, which takes an estimate and
produces a positive statement, e. g. the optimum multiplier for
a specific contract, may be emotionally more acceptable to the
decision makers. For him to use its results effectively, however,
it is necessary that he should both understand its general structure
(and method of operation) and have confidence in its results.
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5.6 SUMMARY
•
Empirical testing and partial implementation
were used to evaluate the adjudication decision models.
Six models were tested using the data from the four
sample companies. The tests were conducted by
simulating on a complitei. ," alIb'aing the models to bid
against the companies' competitors. The six models
tested were:
Model 1A. - Friedman Average Competitor Hypothesis
Model lE - Friedman Average Competitor Hypothesis
with exponential smoothing
„ ----- -
Model 2 - General Distribution Hypothesis
Model 3 - Normal Distribution Hypothesis
Model 4 - Lowest Competitor Hypothesis
. Model 5 - Drift Model.
The results suggested that when total profits
is the criterion, both versions of the Friedman Model,
and the General Distribution Model will equal or
improve upon the current company performance. Generally,
when compared with the company; the Friedman Model wins
more contracts but at lower bid prices, the General
Distribution Model wins the same contracts but at
higher prices. The results also indicate the effect
of the estimated cost on winning, some contracts
having such low estimated.costs that all the models
won them.
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The General Distribution Model was initially tested under
conditions of perfect information. Then a sensitivity analysis
was conducted to evaluate the effect of errors in information.
The result was that the model would equal or outperform the
current company performance if the mean of the competitors'
bids could be assessed to within + 2%.
_
• A partial implementation produced some subjective
observations on the usefulness of the models. It is apparent
that to be useful the models must be acceptable not just to the
management, but also to the estimators. Also there are strong
indications that, as the decision maker becomes more adept at
estimating his competition, the General Distribution Model will
become even more practicable and beneficial.
CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 SUMMARY
The Management Problem presented in Chapter I was:
"Within the prescribed boundaries what are the
optimal decisions relative to the management objectives".
This thesis is a study of the Problem as it is manifest in the
building construction industry competitive bidding process. This
section summarises the central development of the study.
The work progressed generally along the conventional
operational research lines of
i. Define problem
ii. Formulate problem in quantitative terms
iii. Develop decision models
iv. Test decision models
V. Implement solutions.
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The first concern was to make the Management Problem
specific. This was done by delineating the boundaries, describing
the decisions, and investigating the objectives. The boundaries
of the study are the markets of the four Sample Companies. This
is part of the building construction market in the south of England,
and is characterised by the following features:
i) There are a large number of potential competitors
for each project.
ii) There is little product differentiation.
iii) There is little differentiation between companies.
iv) The resource constraints are minimal.
v) The contractural risk is low.
Black box models were used to isolate the management
decisions. The Competitive Bidding Decision was found to consist
of two stages: the decision to tender (selection), and the tender
price decision (adjudication).
The search for a quantitative objective function was based
upon the assumptions that an economic measure existed and that
the companies practiced maximizing behaviour. An investigation
of the variables in the situation led to consideration of the
uncertainty in the process and the explanation of the effect of the
estimating uncertainty interacting with the bidding process. A
value function was proposed that attempts to integrate the rationale
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of discounted cash flow procedures with the subjective judgement
of management. The Adjudication objective was tested with a
simplified version of the function and the results indicated that
the measure was suitable.
The problem was modelled in quantitative terms by
considering a series of cases from the simple, Single Contract,
Unconstrained, situation to the complex, N Contract, Independent
Constraints, Sequential Bidding, situation. The complex, N
Contract, case, while mathematically intriguing,was felt to be
unnecessary for the actual decision situation and so the simple,
single contract, case was used.
The development of a decision model began by considering
some existing models. These were found to be based upon an
assumption of constant competitive behaviour which did not seem
appropriate for the situation under consideration. Therefore a
model was developed from basic probability concepts that employed
a managerial estimate of the present instead of a study of
competitors' histories.
The data provided by-the four Sample Companies was used
to test six different decision models. Although the sample was
too small for statistically significant conclusions to be derived,
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the tests indicated that the Friedman Model and the General
Distribution Model could equal, and usually exceed, the current
company results. A sensitivity analysis was performed on the
General Distribution Model to investigate the effect that errors
in the assessment of the mean bid would have on the results.
Implementation revealed two features which affect the
potential usefulness of the Models. One is the need for acceptance
by the persons (estimators) affected. The other is the indication
that the decision maker may be able to assess his competition
within the prescribed limits.
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6.2 CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions of this thesis are:
(1) The decision process in the building construction competitive
bidding situation is composed of two related management decisions -
the selection decision and the adjudication decision. Although it is
possible to mathematically model the situation in such a way that
the decisions are handled simultaneously, the actual nature of the
problem allows the decisions to be handled independently. The
independent treatment of the adjudication decision is compatible
with the approaches of previous researchers, and with the approach
employed by the companies studied.
(2) In the market studied, which is a segment of the building
construction market, two important characteristics are apparent.
(a) Different firms attempt to place the same value
(estimated cost) on a specified contract. The differences that
occur between estimated costs are primarily attributable to
uncertainty and not to any competitive advantage possessed by one
firm.
(b) The market is comprised of a large number of firms,
although in any specified competition only a few of them participate.
-265-
The result of these two characteristics is to suggest that -
statistical techniques which average the behaviour of competitors
and aggregate the result of past competitions are the appropriate
methods with which to study the situation_
(3)	 From a study of the decision process, and an analysis
of current company performance, it was concluded that a pre-
scriptive decision model, in addition to accommodating the above
mentioned characteristics, should provide some method of
incorporating managerial judgement of the competitive situation
into the decision. The published models examined were unable
to include this factor (Friedman), or were inappropriate for the
situation (Edelman). Therefore the General Distribution Model
which integrates managerial judgement into a probablistic model
was developed.
(4)	 A key factor in the determination of an appropriate object-
ive function was the influence of the uncertainty present in the
estimating process. It was concluded that this uncertainty inter- •
acts with the competitive bidding mechanism and introduces a
bias into the estimates of winning bids. A mathematical model of
this interaction was developed and a correction method proposed.
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(5) Six prescriptive models were tested and the results were
compared between the models, and with the actual performance of
the sample companies. The seven methods . (six models plus
company) were ranked on the basis of total profits achieved,
but a rank test indicated that the hypothesis, the ranking is
random, could not be rejected. This was felt to be partially due
to the large number of methods compared and the small number
(four) of tests run.
(6) Comparison of each model's results with those achieved
by the companies suggested that the Friedman Model and the
General Distribution Model could usually equal or exceed the
results achieved by the companies. The sample was too small to
permit any statistically significant conclusions, but an examination
of the results on an individual contract basis indicates that, depend-
ing on the chosen criteria, either model could be superior to
current company methods. The Friedman Model tended to win
more contracts than the companies and achieved a lower profit
volume ratio, higher total profits and a higher volume than the
companies. Therefore, if volume is the criterion, the Friedman
Model would appear to be suitable. The General Distribution
Model tended to win the same number of contracts as the companies,
but at higher bid prices and thus achieved a higher profit volume
ratio, higher total profits and approximately the same volume.
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Therefore, if total profits, or profit volume ratio, is the
criterion, the General Distribution Model appears to be the
superior method.
(7) The General Distribution Model requires a managerial
assessment of the mean of the bids that the competitors will
submit. A sensitivity analysis was performed on the model and
the results indicate that this assessment need only be within a
range of the true value. Specifically, it was concluded from the
test results that if the manager can assess the mean within +. 2%
of the true value, the model will equal or exceed current
performance. Preliminary trials have indicated that assessment
within these limits is possible.
(8) The initial indications are that the General Distribution
Model can be used as a prescriptive model by an operating company.
This is because, in addition to the test performances mentioned
above, the model is emotionally acceptable to the decision maker.
Since the model uses managerial judgement as a major input, it
is regarded by the decision maker as an aid and not as a potential
replacement.
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6.3 FURTHER RESEARCH
This thesis is not an isolated work but is part of the
continuing study of competitive bidding problems initiated by
Friedma.n in 1956. It is hoped that this study will stimulate
still more exploration of the process of competitive bidding.
Three obvious extensions of this work are:
(1) The continued implementation and testing of the models
of this thesis, and the utilisation of other techniques to complement
the models. For example the use of a regression technique such
as that of Mercer and Russell (19) for predicting the mean of the
competitor 's bids.
(2) Empirical research into the relationship between the
a ctual gross profit received and that predicted by the bid minus
estimated cost figure. This research could be directed at
investigation of the elements of contract uncertainty: client,
percentage of sub-contractor's work, etc., it could be an attempt
to utilise the proposed general objective function. The latter
course, with its rationale for quantifying managerial intuition
and preference, could provide the averaging, variance reduction
effect sought by Bowmans Theory (3).
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( 3)	 The application of the concept of the General Distribution
Model to other competitive situations. The idea of an underlying
distribution with assessed parameters has worked with PERT,
and appears to work here. Possibly it will work in other
situations where uncertainty exists and managerial judgement
is the best method of assessing it.
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APPENDIX 1 - SAMPLE COMPANIES' DATA
The investigation was provided with historical data by a
number of operating construction companies. These companies
are referred to as the Sample Companies. A historical data set
consists of a series of contracts which the sample company has
bid over a period of time. Each set has a brief description of
the type of work, and the time period covered. For each contract
in the set the data consists of:
a sequence number
the sample company's estimated cost
the sample company's submitted bid
the number of competitors
the competitors' bids
and in some cases, the names of the competitors. An example
data sheet is shown on the following page. For reasons of
company security, the data sets cannot be included in the thesis.
Several factors complicated the obtaining of this data.
1. Some of the sample companies do not formally record this
data. Therefore, although it exists, it often consists of scribbled
notes scattered through their files.
2. The British practice is to not always make available the
competitors' prices. This produces gaps in the data.
EXAMPLE DATA SHEET
Page 1 of 6
COMPANY NAME: XYZ Company
TYPE OF WORK: 	 Building Construction
TIME .PERIOD:	 Jan. 1969 to Sept. 1969 inc.
Date (1) Estimated
Cost
Tender Competitors'
Bids
Competitors'
Names (2)
1/10/69 £100,000
•
£106,000 £104,000
109,000
99,750
114,000
W
X
Y
Z
(1) Or chronological sequence number
(2) The Competitors names and bids do not have to match up
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At the start of the research, the policy of eliminating all contracts
which had incomplete data was followed. It was rapidly discovered
that this policy was not reasonable. For example, in Company D
this policy reduced the data set from 51 contracts to 30 contracts.
Therefore some selectivity was used. For instance, if five of the
seven submitted bids on a contract were available, the contract
was included; if only the low bid was available, the contract was
.
eliminated. As a result, some of the data contain unknown errors.
3. Very little information is kept by the sample companies on
cover bids submitted. However, since these are effectively non-
bids, these gaps should not be significant.
4. In cases where the tender documents called for alternates,
it is not always recorded which alternate was accepted. However,
from the cases where data was available it appears that the
rankings of firms are usually the same for the alternatives.
The result of these factors is that the data does not describe the
complete bidding histories of the Sample Companies over the
periods. Whether these gaps and unknown errors significantly
affect the conclusions is unknown. One result of the gaps could
be that the computed expected value for the set may be expected to
be less than the actual value. The reason for this is discussed in
Chapter 5.
A-4
Inquiries did not seem to indicate that any information was
deliberately withheld, or that the gaps were found to be concent-
rated on any specific type of contract. The only common factor
that they appeared to have was that most of them were contracts
on which the company's tender had been unsuccessful. Thus it
was felt that there was no deliberate attempt to bias the data.
Certain contracts were eliminated from the data sets by
the author. These were contracts that the data indicated were
misfits or abnormal contracts. The bases for elimination are
outlined below:-
(i) Figure A. 5 was compiled from the original data sets.
It shows the frequency of the normalised range of the bids sub-
mitted on the contracts.
Highest bid - Lowest bid 
Range	 Mean bid
Contracts with a bidding range greater than 24% were eliminated.
(ii) Any contracts in which the estimated cost exceeded the
average estimated cost of the contracts in the data set by an
excessive amount (factors of 6 to 14) were eliminated. This was
done for two reasons:
1. The contract would probably be singled out for special
attention by management.
2. The presence of these contracts in the data sets distort
r  I
r
I
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the results.
Three contracts were eliminated for this reason. One each
from Companies A, C, and D.
(iii) Obviously abnormal contracts were eliminated. For
example, in one of Company C's contracts, the estimated cost
was 21% higher than thy highest competitive bid submitted.
This suggests some major estimating error, like the transposing
of figures.
The following bid data sets were used in the research.
Company A
Type of Projects. 	  Building Contracts in England
Time Period 	  Jan. 1968 - Dec. 1968 inclusive
Number of Contracts 
	
 34 ((37))*
Total Number of Different
Competitors 	  65
Company B
Type of Projects
	
 Building Contracts in England
Time Period 	  Jan. 1968 - Dec. 1968 inclusive
Number of Contracts 	  41 ((43))
Total Number of Different
Competitors 	  81
*The number in the double brackets is the original number of
contracts supplied, before elimination.
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Company C
Type of Projects 
	
 Building Contracts in England
Time Period 	
 Jan. 1969 - Sept. 1969 inclusive
Number of Contracts 	
 37 ((41))
Company D
Type of Projects 	
 Building Contracts in England
Time Period 	
 May 1968 - Dec. 1969 inclusive
Number of Contracts 	
 41 ((51))
Total Number of Different
Competitors 	
 100
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APPENDIX 2 - UNBALANCED BIDDING
A device sometimes employed on unit price (Bill of
Quantities type) contracts is that of the unbalanced bid. There
are two major motives for employing this device:
1. To exploit a mistake on the part of the client organisation.
2. To accelerate the cash flow on a contract.
Unbalancing is best explained by example.
To Exploit a Mistake -
On a unit price contract the following estimated quantities
are provided in the contract documents*:
5000	 cu. yds solid rock
10000 cu. yds loose rock
40000 cu. yds earth
The estimating department decides that for that site, and equipment,
reasonable unit prices are:
£1.25	 for solid rock
£0.80 for loose rock
£0.40 for earth
Therefore, the tender would appear as:
5,000 Cu. yds solid rock @1.25 = £6,250
10,000 cu.	 yds loose rock @ £0. 80 = 8,000
40,000 cu. yds earth
	 @ £0.40 = 16, 000
£30,250.
The numbers in this example are taken from reference 26 with
£ signs used instead of dollar signs.
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Now for some reason, (site investigation, previous knowledge),
it is assumed that the engineer has made an error in the estimated
quantities and that the site actually contains a far higher percentage
of rock than is stated. Therefore the bid is unbalanced by increas-
ing the rock prices and decreasing the earth price. The submitted
tender appears as:
5, 000 cu. yds solid rock @ £2. 0 = £10, 000
10, 000 cu. yds loose rock @ £1.0 = £10, 000
40,000 cu. yds earth
	 @ £0.2 = £ 8,000
£28,000
Now, after the contract has been completed, the surveyor has
recorded the following actual quantities.
15, 000 cu. yds solid rock @ £2.0 = £30, 000
20, 000 cu. yds loose rock @ £1.0 = £20, 000
20, 000 cu. yds earth
	 @ £0.2 = 4, 000
£54, 000
The advantage is obvious; the company receives £54, 000
instead of £32, 750 it would have received if the bid had not
been unbalanced.
To Accelerate the Cash Flow -
A paving contract specifies payments at the completion
of the following stages.
REPAYMENT
EXPENDITURE10 —
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Stage
Estimated Time
Months
Estimated Cost
Curb and gutter 2 2,000
Subgrade excavation 4 4,000
Stabilised base course 2 2,000
Asphalt paving 2 2,000
1-2 £10, 000
The Company applies a 10% mark-up and so the submitted prices
are:
Curb and gutter	 £2,200
Subgrade excavation 	 4,400
Stabilised base	 2,200
Asphalt paving	 2,200 
£11,000
Assuming a delay of one-half a month between the submission of
the certificate and the receipt of payment; the first graph shows
the job expenditure and stage repayment plotted against time.
12 "-
8 —
(£, 000)
6 _
4
2 —
4	 6	 8	 10	 12	 14
Months
6-.
(£, 000)
4 —
2
12 —
REPAYMENT
0 6
Months
10	 12
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The shaded area is the "job borrowing", i.e. the time the
job owes the company money.
Now unbalance the bid to:
Curb and gutter £3,000
Subgrade excavation £6, 000
Stabilised base £1, 000
Asphalt paving El, 000
£11, 000
The second graph shows the unbalanced situation
10 _ EXPENDITURE
By unbalancing the bidding the borrowing time is reduced and the
job rapidly becomes self financing. The only limit on unbalancing
appears to be credibility. Unbalancing is frowned upon and so a
contractor can only unbalance a bid as far as he thinks he can get
away with it.
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APPENDIX 3 - ESTIMATE RANGE DETERMINATION
The formulation of the uncertainty interaction correction,
•
Section 2. 5.3, requires, to be applicable, the range of estimating
accuracy. Now one possible method of determining the range
could be from the accounting systems of the companies. If
separate job costing is kept by a company, then from the account-
ing profits received on the projects, the number of competitors,
and original bidding information it would be possible to use the
formulas of Section 2. 5.3 to determine R. This accounting inform-
ation was not available to this Research. It is often not available
to the contractor since bulk buying and general stores complicate
the task of determining a cost for a particular project. Variations
and extras during the course of a contract further confuse this
determination. Therefore three methods were devised for
estimating the range from the available data.
Method 1 
The first method assumes that on all estimates prepared,
a condition of cancelling errors exists. Therefore the average
of the ratios of the winning bid to the Company's cost estimate
for all the contracts in the set is a measure of the profit
potential of the set.
Assume that the Company's average mark-up is the average
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mark-up of the winning bidders. Therefore
n = the average number of competitors
Z = (Average Company Mark-up - Average winning bid 
company cost estimate)
= 100 xR xn
n(200-R) x 400
Solve the formula for R.
Method 2 
Method 2 is identical to method 1 except that it assumes
that the profit-volume ratio achieved by the Company is the
average mark-up of the winning bidders. Thus
Z = (Company's Profit-Volume Ratio - Average winning bid 	 ) 
company cost estimate)
= 100 xR x n 
n(200-R) x 400
Solve the formula for R.
Method 3
Let	 y1 be the lowest of the n estimated costs
yn
 be the highest of n estimated costs
• Assuming that the y's are random samples from a
distribution, f(y), their joint distribution is
n-2
13 (y1 , yn)dyidyn
 = n(n-1) (F(y)- F(yi) )
	
f(y1) f(yn)dyi dyn
where
F(yi)	 (y) dy
where 100-2-	 y 100 + —R2
elsewhere
f (y) =
034, 34, 
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Assume:
1. That all bidders use the same cost multiplier sb to determine
their bids.
2. That all estimated costs are random samples from
Make the transformation Si =
SA. '	 95
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Now S2 is the bid range. Given that the assumptions
hold, then an estimate of the estimating accuracy can be
calculated from the mean value of the bid range.
Example - Average bid range
Average number of competitors
Average mark-up multiplier 42.
RE(S2) =
5b
1. 0-8-	 f /-1
10	 . R
R	 =
	 14.8%
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The three different methods for computing the accuracy
range for the data sets provide the following results.
Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
Company A 12. 85% 11. 9 % 15. 35%
Company B 13.45% 12. 9 % 15. 5 %
Company C 11.0 % 9. 35% 16. 65%
Company D 13.1
	 % 10. 7 % 16.45%
These ranges are all within the anticipated region and at this
{ n -1--1	 11
= 10%
= 6
= 1.06
stage no one method is demonstratably more suitable than any other.
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Using these ranges, three sets of Z correction multipliers were
calculated for each company. These multipliers are designed
to correct the estimated costs by an amount equal to the expected
error. The multipliers calculated for Company C, 11.0% Range
are presented below as an example.
Z MULTIPLIERS FOR COMPANY C
Range = 11.0%
Number of Competitors	 Z
1 1.019
2 1.028
3 1.034
4 1.038
5 1. 041
6 1.043
7 1.045
8 1.046
9 1.047
10 1.048
An assumption implicit in the three methods is that all the
companies competing in a data set are doing so on approximately
the same terms and in a similar manner.
That they are doing so in a similar manner was illustrated by
the fact that the sample companies followed almost identical
procedures.
A-18
To investigate whether any one company possessed a
competitive advantage, a dominance matrix was constructed
for Company D. This was possible because Company D's records
had the names of the competitors as well as their submitted bids
for most of the contracts in the set.
The dominance matrix is constructed by listing all the companies
down the left hand side of the matrix. The same companies are
listed across the top. The order from top to bottom and from left
to right being the same. Then the submitted bids are examined and
every time a company listed on the left hand side bids below one
listed along the top, one is added to the value of the intersecting cell.
Company D
Z
Y
X
W
V
U
T
D Z YXW V UTSR QP
6
4
2
4
2
1
422
4 3
2
3
1
5
2
1
2
1
3
222
3
2
11
1
2
3
1
1
1
2
3
2
33
5
1
1
2
S	 41
R 2
Q 2	 1
P 01
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The data is sparse but it is sufficient to illustrate the concept.
From the top row it can be seen that Company D bid below
Company X three times. From the first column it can be seen
that Company X was below Company D four times. If any one
Company has an advantage over any other, it will make that
portion of the matrix unsymmetrical. For this matrix, there is
only sufficient data to look at Company D and a comparison of the
first row with the first column indicates that Company D is no
better and no worse than these elven competitors. It could be
argued that Company D dominates Company P, but this conclusion
would be based upon only five common bidding situations.
The symmetrical appearance of the matrix suggests that no
company has any decided advantage over any other, and the assump-
tion of similar behaviour seems reasonable.
Method 3 assumes more than similar behaviour; it assumes
identical behaviour. That is, the assumption of all companies
using exactly the same mark-up. The assumption was made to
try and transform the estimating distribution into the bid distribut-
ion and, as the subsequent tests with the derived ranges revealed
(Chapter 2), it was inadequate.. This point is further discussed
in Section 3.4.
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APPENDIX 4 - REVIEW OF BIDDING THEORY
The term, Bidding Theory, does not relate to a single
unified theory, but is a generic title used to encompass the
various management science (operational research) quantitative
approaches to the problems of competitive bidding.
The original stimulus was the publication, in 1944, of von
Neumann and Morgenstern's book, -
 "Theory of Games and Economic
Behaviour" (23). This book introduced an analytic framework for
dealing with competitive situations. Following von Neumann and
Morgenstern, a number of books and papers concerned with the
analytic treatment of competitive situations appeared. However, it
was ndt until 1957 that the problem of competitive bidding was
specifically dealt with by Lawrence Friedman in his doctoral
dissertation, "Competitive Bidding Strategies" (11).
Friedman approached the problem in two ways. One approach
was via the game theoretic, minimax, method of von Neumann and
Morgenstern. The other method was based upon probabilistic
concepts and used an a priori distribution to arrive at a strategy
which maximized the expected value of the objective function. The
former method was used primarily for a conceptual understanding
of the problem because the games theory framework could not
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accommodate the complexities of the real situation. The latter
method was proposed as a solution to a "realistic bidding problem".
Ii
Following Friedman, research on competitive bidding has
proceeded, fairly independently, along the two main approaches
he -started. Since they developed independently, they will be out-
lined separately. Two new approaches, simulation and operational
gamming, have also been used to study competitive bidding. These
are discussed under the heading, Other Approaches. Recently the
two principal approaches have started to merge. Rothkopf (25)
treats the problem as a game with partial information and invest-
igates the question of equilibrium when all bidders maximize.
Games Theory:- 
The Theory of Games provides an analytic basis for treatment
of competitive problems. However, attempts to apply it often
encounter serious conceptual and computational difficulties. This
has been the case with competitive bidding.
The original theory developed the two-person, strictly
competitive (zero sum), game and introduced the minimax method
of solution. A coalition concept was used for considering N-person
games. Even in the simpler formulations, the competitive bidding
problem becomes an N-person, non zero sum game, with
coalitions prohibited and the minimax solution appearing to be too
pessimistic.
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Several researchers have tried to extend the theory to
handle the bidding problem. Friedman, in his thesis, introduced
the concept of competitive co-efficients as a suggested method of
handling the N-person game. However this does not appear to
have been adopted by any subsequent researcher.
The major work done on competitive bidding using a games
theory approach was "Towards a Study at Bidding Processes113)
by Griesmer and Shubic, published in 1963. In their series of
three papers they advanced the study of competitive bidding from
a "simultaneous move, single shot, two-person" game to one
where they could treat "sequential bidding with capacity limitations
and varying degrees of information", for the two-person, non-zero
sum case. This development is an excellent basis for understanding
the interactions of some of the variables of the competitive bidding
process but still is not sufficiently developed to provide any obvious
operational applications.
Recent work by Rothkopf (25) has extended the theory to
consider the uncertainty of the bidder about the value of the subject
of the auction to himself; and what happens when each bidder
optimizes. The equilibrium strategies devised are based upon
assumptions of rational behaviour and, as the author suggests,
"It is easy enough to envisage situations that violate them". However,
the game theoretic treatment appears to be advancing at such a rate
that it may soon pass, or encompass the decision theory competitive
bidding models.
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Probabilistic Treatment of Competitive Bidding 
The 1956 paper, "A Competitive Bidding Strategy" (11) by
L. Friedman was the first published probabilistic approach to
competitive bidding. In this paper, Friedman hypothesized the
existence of an objective function and a probability of winning
function - both functions of the bid price. He then determined
the bid price which maximised the expected value of the objective
function and proposed that this was the optimum bid price.
To determine the probability of winning Friedman utilised
the past bidding activity of the company. For all the company's
past contracts which Competitor A had bid on, the ratio of
Competitor A's bid to the Company's cost estimate was determined.
These ratios were combined in a histogram and the resulting curve,
fA(w), was used as a description of Competitor A's bidding
behaviour. The probability that a bid-estimated cost ratio of
x/k would be below Competitor A's ratio was taken as
oo
< A)	 =	 f (w) dw
x
'
/k
Similar curves were compiled for all the other competitors
and the probability of winning a contract was taken as the product
of the probability of beating the competitors that were participating.
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For the cases where there was not sufficient data to
determine each competitor's curve, or where the competitors
are unknown, Friedman offered the concept of an "average
competitor". The curve for the average competitor was developed
by combining all past ratios of competitors bids to company cost
estimate into a single histogram. The probability of winning a
contract against n competitors was the probability of beating the
average competition taken to the n th power.
By studying the cost data of contracts won by the company,
Friedman was able to collect ratios of true cost to estimated cost.
These he combined into a density function which he used to correct
his estimated cost for bias.
Two variants of the basic Friedman model have appeared.
Hanssmann and Rivett, 1959, (14) proposed using only the ratio
of the lowest competitive bid and Ackoff and Sasieni, 196 .8, (1),
suggested that this ratio followed a normal distribution. Both of
these methods eliminate the number of competitors, n, from the
probability determination. This simplifies the computation of
optimum bid but introduces a possible error since the findings
of other investigators (Park (24), Morin and Clough (20),
Friedman (11), and this thesis) suggest that this is a significant
parameter.
Several attempts have been made to apply the Friedman
concepts to construction industry competitive bidding. Two of
these, Casey and Shaffer (4), and Shortell (28), were unable to
obtain cost data and so produced no results. The work of Park
is interesting. He noted that the average competition distribution
is relatively stable and the main variation in the optimum bid was
introduced by the number of competitors. Thus he was able to
develop a series of optimum percentage mark-ups for his study
companies, the mark-up varying inversely with the number of •
competitors. He claims considerable success and supports this
claim with case histories.
Morin and Clough (20) also reported successful results,
claiming a 27% profit increase. They used a Friedman Average
Competition model but employed exponential smoothing instead of
the normal averaging technique.
The basic Friedman concepts have stood, relatively
unchallenged, until publications by Simmonds, 1968, (29) and
Mercer and Russell, 1969, (19). Simmonds noted that the cost
bias could not be determined from analysis of contracts won
because these contracts constituted a biased set. This point is
further developed in this thesis under the heading "Management
Objectives". Mercer and Russell observed that the methods of
deriving the probability function imply that a contract has the same
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value to all companies competing. As this is not compatible
with 'rational' economic behaviour, this observation casts doubts
on the family of Friedman based techniques.
The first major departure from the Friedman method was
that of Marvin Gates, 1960, and 1967 (14. Gates uses the expected
value concept but derives his probability from a regression analysis
of past bids. He concentrates on changes in probability of winning
for changes in bid price rather than starting with cost as in the
Friedman model. It is suggested that similar results can be
obtained from a less involved technique - specifically the OPTM
program employed in this thesis.
The next major departure was proposed by Edelman (8) in
1965. Retaining the concept of the maximum expected value bid,
he removed the probability function from dependence upon historic
data and based it upon subjective management estimates of the
competition and the client. His results demonstrated the useful-
ness of his technique. However, his market was not the construct-
ion industry and there are sufficient differences to make his
methods not directly applicable.
Up to 1965, researchers were concerned primarily with the
static case of a single, unconstrained, contract. In that year
Simmonds (29) produced the first major treatment of the effect
of a company's internal capacity upon its bidding strategy. He
proposed penalty functions for having more, or less, work than
the company's capacity and introduced these functions into the
bid determination.
The work of Mercer and Russell, 1969 (19) also considers
the dynamic nature of the market. They develop a quantitative
framework which enables them to interpret individual competitive
behaviour over a series of contracts.
The work of this thesis is intended to complement that of
Simmonds, and Mercer and Russell. An analytic treatment of
the dynamic case is developed and a device for handling the
aggregate behaviour of unidentifiable competitors is proposed.
Other Approaches
Two other approaches have also been used to study the
problems of competitive bidding. These are Operational Gaming
and Simulation.
Although the method of gaining has demonstrated its value
as a teaching tool, as a vehicle for research it has three major
drawbacks.
1. Assuming that the purpose of the research is to devise a
bidding strategy or model, it is necessary for the game to be as
realistic as possible. Any assumptions or distribution utilised
in constructing the game would also be implicitly contained in the
model. The model would be solving the devised problem, i.e.
the game, which is not necessarily the real problem.
2. If the purpose of the game is to study bidding behaviour,
then it is desirable to have as players actual decision makers from
industry. These gentlemen usually have many demands on their
time and the problem of getting them is a major one.
3. If the second drawback is overcome, there is still the
problem of playing the game long enough to get meaningful results.
This, plus the fact that the players do not always take the game
seriously compounds the difficulties.
It is not suggested that these problems are insurmountable,
or that gaming is not a valid method of research. It is suggested
that research effort can presently be more fruitfully employed by
more direct studies of the real bidding situation. After more
work has been done in analysing the situation, then the data will
be available to construct realistic games.
The first drawback of gaming also applies to the method of
simulation. The results obtained from a simulation will only
be as valid as the degree in which the model maps reality.
Simulation studies, for example Hackemer and Fine's (10),
highlight some interesting interactions in the process, but it
is felt that more basic research on the process is required
before this method can be fully exploited.
APPENDIX 5 - M. P. B . W. DATA
The data used to determine the General Distribution was
taken from the "Flimsy Summaries" of the Contracts Directorate,
Ministry of Public Buildings and Works. The period covered was
from January 1, 1967 to February 29, 1968 inclusive.
102 contracts were taken from the year 1967.
20 contracts were taken from the year 1968.
The summaries contain a one line description of the location of
the contract, a one line description of the work, the date, and a
list of the companies tendering and their tender prices. Also
listed were those companies invited to tender but were, "unable
to tender", and who, "did not tender".
The summaries contain all contracts handled by the Govern-
ment ranging from the sale of deer hides and horns to communi-
cation towers; therefore selectivity was required in extracting
contracts for analysis. Since this thesis is primarily concerned
with the building construction industry, only those works which,
from the one line description, obviously fell into the domain of
the general building contractor were taken. All contracts for
mechanical or electrical works, structural steel, prefabricated
units, roads and paving, as well as the many supply, renovation,
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alteration, decorating, cleaning, repair and maintenance,
catering, etc.. contracts were excluded.
Only contracts with a value over £50, 000 were considered.
The contracts usually had one of the following phrases in its
one line description:
"Erection and completion, including external services for 	 if
or
"Construction of 	  TT
Contracts with alternates and contracts in foreign countries
were excluded.
The types of work included in the data are:
telephone exchanges (new and additions)
quarters for armed services
post offices
buildings on military camps, including schools
gymnasiums, etc.
office buildings
hospitals
prisons and related buildings
airport buildings
mint
The contract values were rounded off to the nearest pound.
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